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I 
See, I now return answer to the 
demand; What did God do before he 
made heaven and earth? But I will 
not answer so as one was said to 
have done merrily, to break the 
violence of the question: God was 
preparing hell, saith he, for those 
that should pry into such profound 
mysteries. 
Augustine, Confessiones, Book XI, 
chap. XII. 
Introduction. 
The subject of this dissertation is 'physical time'. The ex-
pression 'physical time* refers to 'time' as used by physicists 
in their theories, i.e., to time insofar as it occurs in the 
description of physical reality. This study ignores all other 
aspects of time; it will not treat topics such as the development 
of the awareness of time in children, the phenomenon known as 
'biological clocks', the metaphysical status of time etc. . This 
self-imposed 'narrow-mindedness' may be regrettable for several 
reasons. Most importantly, it leads to a fragmentation in the 
study of time along the boundaries of established disciplines, 
while an overall framework for integrating the piecemeal results 
remains lacking. But it has the obvious advantage of reducing the 
complexity of the problem since it allows me to put aside many 
questions as not being relevant within the chosen perspective. 
In the case of a notion as complex as time, such decision is 
almost unavoidable. 
In physics, time is ordinarily introduced by way of a variable 
t ranging over a certain domain U, the elements of which repre-
sent the moments of time, and to which a particular structure is 
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ascribed: the structure of physical time. In most cases, U is 
taken to be isomorphic to the Euclidean line E; this means that 
the moments of time have the same order, as well as the same 
topological and metrical properties as the points on a straight 
line. This particular choice for the structure of physical time 
is almost without exception justified by an appeal to an intuitive 
conception of time: time is 'continuous' because a time-interval 
is infinitely divisible, it has neither beginning nor end, and 
its moments are linearly ordered. The standard idea of physical 
time, as isomorphic to a one-dimensional totally ordered conti-
nuum, fullfils and combines all these properties of the intui-
tive picture of time. 
This standard modern picture of physical time, enthroned in 
Newton's Principia (1686) as 'absolute time', retained a dogma-
tic character for about two centuries. Its dogmatic status was 
enhanced by Kant's analysis of space and time in his Kritik der 
Reinen Vernunft (178I) where he argued that space and time are 
a priori forms of intuition. Admittedly, the ontological status 
of physical time was and stayed a topic of controversy which 
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started with the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke , 
the spokesman of Newton. On the whole, however, the conception 
of time modeled after a straight line, was not put into question. 
During the 19 century and the beginning of the 20 , seve-
ral developments took place which strongly stimulated interest 
in and ultimately revolutionised the physicist's conception of 
time. In the first place, the discovery of non-euclidean geome-
tries destroyed the monpoly of Euclidean geometry and led to the 
problem of the structure of physical space. It resulted by the 
end of the century in Poincaré's conventionalism according to 
which the structure of physical space is not completely determi-
ned by empirical data alone, but also depends upon certain con-
ventions (e.g., the definition of the physical counterpart of 
a straight line). Thus, physical space would be Euclidean with-
in one set of conventions, and non-euclidean for another set. 
But similar arguments can be and in fact were extended by Poin-
caré to the structure of physical time. Prom the conventionalis-
tic point of view, the claim that physical time has the structu-
re of a straight line, cannot be justified only on the basis of 
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empirical data; here too, certain conventions are involved. By 
choosing a different set of conventions, physical time might 
very well have a different structure. 
Secondly, the interest in the study of physical time was 
aroused by the study of irreversible processes in thermodynamics. 
Contrary to the laws of classical mechanics, the second law of 
phenomenological thermodynamics is not time reversal invariant, 
i.e., is valid only relatively to the future orientation of time 
and not relatively to the past orientation. It therefore offered 
the opportunity to provide a physical foundation to the so-called 
'arrow of time' which refers to the 'irreversible process par 
excellence': the irreversible flow of time from the past toward 
the future. Henceforth, the problem of the arrow of time has 
become one of the central problems in the study of physical 
time. 
Last but not least, relativity displayed hitherto unknown 
and unsuspected properties of physical time. Einstein showed that 
our intuitive picture of time, sanctioned in the notion of abso-
lute time, had to be corrected. Moreover, the introduction in 
physics of the notion of spacetime in which space and time merge 
into a single four-dimensional manifold, opened up a completely 
new perspective to the problem of physical time. 
As a result of these developments, physical space and time 
became the object of intense study in our century, both by phy-
cisists and philosophers. Gradually the 'philosophy of space 
and time' established itself as a new branch of^study within 
the philosophy of science, more particularly within the philoso-
phy of physics. It deals, among others, with topics like the 
ontology of space and time, the epistemology of geometry and of 
time measurements, the global structure of space and time within 
cosmologica! models and its implications, the causal theories 
of time (i.e., the reduction of temporal to causal relationships), 
the physical foundation of the manifold-structure of spacetime, 
irreversibility and the arrow of time. 
Three outstanding contributors to this field ought to be men-
tioned here, not only as a hommage to them, but also because they 
greatly influenced the content of this thesis: 
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-Weyl's Space, time and matter and Philosophy of mathematics and 
natural science have been a constant source of inspiration. From 
these books I learned especially that physics and philosophy 
are not disconnected, but that there is a no man's land in be-
tween in which Weyl was a great pioneer. 
-Reichenbach's Philosophy of space and time and The direction of 
time have become classics and the publication of the first book 
undoubtedly marked the beginning of the philosophy of space and 
time as a separate field of research. 
-Griinbaum's momentous Philosophical problems of space and time 
contains a wealth of information which only someone deeply invol-
ved in this subject matter can appreciate. 
Although it was my original intention to write about both 
space and time, I soon saw the necessity of restricting myself 
to the problem of physical time. The philosophical, and especial-
ly the epistemologica! problems pertaining to the structure of 
physical space in many ways resemble those pertaining to the 
structure of physical time; this is not really surprising in 
view of the synthesis of both into the notion of spacetime. But 
there is also a number of problems specific to the notion of 
physical time, which demand a separate treatment. The problems 
of the distinction between parameter and coordinate time, of 
time asymmetry and of the flow of time, which will be discussed 
in chapters II to IV,are characteristic for physical time alone. 
But in spite of this restriction, this thesis does not claim 
to cover the entire subject; it does not contain an exhaustive 
treatment of all the aspects of physical time. The ease with 
which physicists introduce and make use of the notion of physi-
cal time in their theories, belies the number and complexity 
of the problems to which it gives rise. Indeed, I cannot but 
agree with Prigogine that "the concept of time is much more com-
plex than we thought'.1 That complexity in turn forced me to a 
further restriction in the range of problems to be treated. 
Partly for reasons that will soon be apparent, and partly be-
cause of personal preference, I have concentrated mainly on a 
systematic exposition of the structure of physical time and the 
epistemologica! problems connected with it (ch. I), on a- study 
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of the geometrical role which time plays in physical theories 
(ch. II), and on the problem of time asymmetry (ch. Ill and IV). 
The last topic is more generally known as the problem of the ar­
row of time, but for reasons to be stated later I prefer to use 
the expression 'time asymmetry'. This choice implies leaving 
out many other interesting aspects, particularly the problem of 
the ontological status of physical time and the problem of the 
flow of time. To the last one I shall briefly return at the end 
of this introduction. 
In chapter I, I shall try to present a systematic account of 
the problem of the structure of physical time. The use of the 
notion of a differentiable manifold and of the classification 
of the relations between the elements of such manifold into 
different structural levels, viz., those of the order, the topo­
logical and metrical level, has greatly helped me in sorting 
out the various approaches to this problem. The dissection of 
the total structure of time into several substructures clearly 
shows that different kinds of epistemologica! problems are in­
volved in the determination of the actual structure of physical 
time; moreover, it enables a better understanding of how these 
are related to each other. Only this mathematical 'thread of 
Ariadne' allows us to find our way through the labyrinth of 
literature on this topic. 
On the whole, I have taken, or better, I was forced to take 
a conventionalistic attitude with respect to the structure of 
physical time. Few people nowadays would still maintain that 
the structure of physical time is completely determined by empi­
rical data or that it can be determined on a priori grounds. 
The empirical data themselves do not provide a direct access 
to the structure of physical time. According to Poincaré's con-
ventionalism, this gap cannot be bridged by collecting ever more 
data, but only by introducing certain 'free' conventions. A 
complete determination of the structure of physical time is pos-
sible only on the basis of the combination of these conventions 
with the empirical data. Therefore, any discussion of· the 'real' 
structure of physical time remains illusory. 
This conventionalism has been accused of (complete) relati-
vism, since it implies the possibility of ascribing any arbitrary 
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structure to physical time provided we accept the corresponding 
appropriate sets of conventions. In reply to this charge, I 
would like to point out the following. 
-The threat of relativism is purely theoretical. Physicists do 
not in practice grant each other the liberty to 'choose' whatever 
structure for physical time. There is general agreement about 
the basic conventions involved (e.g., the continuity of physical 
time); anyone wanting to deviate from these standard conventions 
would have to produce strong arguments. Physicists are committed 
to the standard conception of physical time mainly because it 
has proven to be extremely successful in the past. This strong 
commitment, however, should not be misunderstood to imply that 
this standard picture represents the real structure of physical 
time. Indeed, careful study shows irrefutably that conventions 
play a substantive role. Paradoxically, the 'freedom' of conven-
tionalism does not exclude the pragmatic necessity of a commit-
ment to a particular set of conventions. 
-It was certainly not Poincaré's intention to clear the path for 
relativism; on the contrary, he was very much opposed to and he 
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explicitly rejected that point of view. For instance, his claim 
that we are free to make a choice between Euclidean and non-
Euclidean geometry, has often been misconstrued as the claim 
that the choice is arbitrary. According to Poincaré, this choice 
is free relatively to the empirical data, i.e., they do not pre-
scribe which choice to make. But this specific freedom of choice 
does not imply arbitrariness, for indifference with respect to 
the empirical data is perfectly compatible with having good rea-
sons for making a particular choice. For instance, Poincaré 
proposed the criteria of simplicity and/or beauty. 
-Instead of looking at conventionalism as leading to relativism, 
one can also view it more positively as being a kind of antidote 
against dogmatism in science. I disagree with Lakatos that 
a 'conservative'conventionalist creates his own prison from which 
5 . . . 
he cannot escape. But no such prison exists. A conventionalist 
who has made a decision or established a convention does not 
have to stick to it permanently, but can always reevaluate his 
choice in the light of new evidence and come back on his previous 
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decision. A hard boiled empiricist, on the other hand, who asu-
mes that the structure of physical time is completely determined 
by empirical data, is more liable to a dogmatic attitude: once 
the real structure of physical time has been uncovered, it beco-
mes part of the immutable stock of knowledge which can no longer 
be questioned. The conventionalist, however, is or ought always 
to be aware of the constitutive character of our knowledge of 
the physical world. Conventionalism, conceived in this way, is 
also more in line with the idea that a scientist creates a phy-
sical universe: he does not construct the building of the phy-
sical universe with the bricks of empirical data and the cement 
of logic alone. Conventionalism can free the scientific imagina-
tion from the bounds of immutable axioms. Precisely the recogni-
tion of the arbitrary character of one of those seemingly absolu-
te axioms contained for Einstein the clue to relativity theory. 
Of course, these remarks do not settle the dispute around 
conventionalism and relativism; they do not show that the charge 
of relativism can be refuted. For instance, the criteria of 
simplicity and beauty invoked by Poincaré, contain their own 
share of arbitrariness. But these questions are here of secon-
dary importance; my intention is not to give a critical analysis 
of conventionalism in general, but to show how in the specific 
case of physical time, the conventionalistic point of view forces 
itself upon us and manifests itself. 
In the second chapter, I shall discuss the role time plays 
in physical theories. My interest in this problem was aroused 
by (1) the simple statement, found in any modern textbook on 
relativity theory, that since Einstein time has become a coordi-
nate because it transforms under the Lorentz-transformations in 
the same way as the space coordinates, whereas for Newton it 
functioned essentially as a parameter in the description of the 
motion of a point-particle, and (2) Scheurer's proposal of a 
theory from which both classical and relativistic physics can 
be derived, depending upon the geometrical role of time. If time 
is considered as parameter, this theory leads to classica] me-
chanics; if time is considered as a coordinate, it results in 
relativistic mechanics. 
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What is the meaning of this transition from time as a para-
meter to time as a coordinate? Does it in any way affect the 
physicist's conception of time, or is it only some kind of mathe-
matical trick? 
In order to deal with this problem, I have made a detailed 
analysis of and comparison between the 'space and time approach' 
and the 'spacetime approach' to physics. In the former, time 
functions as a parameter for the description of motion in space; 
in the latter, it functions both as a coordinate insofar as it 
is part of the manifold in which motion is described and as a 
parameter for parametrising the trajectories in spacetime (in 
which case it is often called 'proper time'). Historically, the, 
space and time approach is connected with classical Newtonian 
physics and the spacetime approach with relativistic Einsteinian 
physics. 
The space and time and the spacetime approach can be concei-
ved of as two different languages for doinê physics. Of special 
interest is the question whether or not we can find a translation 
from one language to the other. A translation from the space and 
time to the spacetime approach can always be given, but the re-
verse is more complicated. The investigation of the general con-
ditions under which a transition from the spacetime to the space 
and time approach is possible, is done by means of the concept 
of a foliation, usually referred to by physicists as 'stratifi-
cation' . 
Without any doubt, the introduction of the notion of spacetime 
was fruitful not only for physics itself, but also for the study 
of time; this is why my analysis of the structure of physical 
time in ch. I is based upon the spacetime point of view. Strange-
ly enough, the distinction between parameter time and coordinate 
time has remained almost completely unnoticed within the spacetime 
approach. Nevertheless, I am convinced and I shall endeauvour to 
show in this chapter that this distinction between parameter and 
coordinate time can throw a new light upon some philosophical 
problems of physical time. Contrary to Reichenbach for whom the 
treatment of time as a coordinate was nothing but a convenient 
mathematical trick relevant to mathematical physics but of no 
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interest for the study of time, I am of the considerate opinion 
that this distinction can contribute to a better understanding 
of physical time. 
The second half of ny thesis deals with time asymnetry, of-
ten referred to, especially by physicists, as the arrow of time. 
Any study on physical time would be grossly incomplete if it 
did not include a discussion of this topic. Here we touch upon 
one of the most intriguing but also one of the most obscure as-
pects of physical time. The complexity of this problem is com-
pounded by the chaotic terminology. Various expressions can be 
found, such as the arrow of time, time asymmetry, anisotropy of 
time, direction of time and time orientation, but there is no 
general agreement about their precise meaning. A closer examina-
tion shows that the expression 'arrow of time' covers a whole 
cluster of problems, such as: Why does time flow in just one 
way, from the past toward the future? What is the difference 
between the past, the present and the future? Is the flow of 
time an objective phenomenon in the sense that it is part of 
physical reality, or is it 'mind-dependent'? How can the occur-
rence of irreversible processes be reconciled with the time 
reversal invariant laws of classical mechanics? How can we ex-
plain the increase of order in our universe? Why can we have 
traces of the past but not of the future?, etc. All these ques-
tions are, one way or another, assumed to be related to the 
problem of the arrow of time. 
At the beginning of ch. Ill, I shall argue that the unraveling 
of this cluster requires the preliminary distinction between 
time asymmetry and the flow of time. Their different nature 
which has been pointed out some time ago by Grünbaum and which 
can be expressed easily in terms of the distinction between 
parameter time and coordinate time, has generally not been re-
cognised; in my opinion, the failure to appreciate the impor-
tance of this distinction between time asymmetry and flow of 
time has caused much confusion. In a nutshell, time asymmetry 
refers to the fact that the world viewed in the past orienta-
tion of time is different from the world viewed in the future 
orientation, or, in order to avoid any reference to the notions 
of past and future, the world looks different relatively to the 
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opposite orientations of time. Consider the standard example of 
the mixing of coffee and cream: the mixing occurs exclusively 
relatively to the future orientation of time. The flow of time 
refers to another feature of time. Indeed, within the perspec­
tive of time asymmetry all moments of time are on a par: no mo­
ment is singled out as 'the present', and consequently the no­
tions of the past and the future are meaningless. The notion 
of the flow of time precisely refers to the fact that the future 
becomes the past, and therefore requires the introduction of 
the notion of the present. In Newton's picture of time as a 
straight line, this flow of time is represented by the motion 
of a point (the now or the present) along this line in the direc­
tion of the future. 
Chapters III and IV exclusively deal with time asymmetry. In 
view of the foregoing, my first task was to strive for a clear 
and precise definition of time asymmetry. History shows that the 
problem of time asymmetry arose in the wake of the 19 century 
studies of irreversible processes; ever since, time asymmetry 
and irreversibility have been linked closely together. I shall 
propose, however, a more general definition according to which 
time asymmetry can also occur with respect to reversible proces­
ses. Reversibility is compatible with the existence of time asym­
metry since reversibility itself, i.e. the symmetry of the laws 
with respect to time reversal, does not imply that actually the 
reversal of processes does take place. Indeed, specific boundary 
conditions prevailing in our universe, as described e.g. by 
Reichenbach in his 'branch systems hypothesis', could be the cause 
that de facto the reversal of certain processes does not take 
place. Time asymmetry, thus defined, becomes a probabilistic con­
cept; this raises some problems which I shall discuss in due course. 
This analysis of the concept of time asymmetry has incited 
me to a close examination of the relation between a process and 
its reversal. Given a process A, the definition of the reversal 
of A (A ) is not trivial from a physical point of view. Here, 
the time reversal operator Τ plays a crucial role. It will be 
shown that the action of Τ on physical quantities can be defi­
ned coherently in different ways. This again has important conse-
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quences for the definition of the reversal of a process and for 
the time reversal invariance,respectively non-invariance, of phy-
sical laws; depending upon the chosen definition of T, a law 
may be time reversal invariant or not. 
The analysis of the notion of time asymmetry and of irrever-
sibility in ch. Ill, sets the stage for the final chapter. There, 
I consider one particular kind of time asymmetry, viz., the time 
asymmetric behaviour of thermodynamic systems: a closed system 
not in thermodynamical equilibrium, i.e. in a relatively low 
state of entropy, will evolve toward equilibrium, i.e. to the 
state of maximum entropy, but the evolution in the opposite way, 
from equilibrium to non-equilibrium, never takes place spontane-
ously. This time asymmetric behaviour is captured in the second 
law of phenomenological thermodynamics, which states that the 
entropy of a closed system increase or stays equal, but never 
decreases. 
In chapter IV, I shall examine the status of this second law 
of phenomenological thermodynamics, especially with respect to 
mechanics. The problem is roughly the following: is it, or is it 
not one of the fundamental laws of physics? Because this second 
law is time reversal non-invariant, the answer to this question 
has far-reaching consequences for the physicist's conception of 
thermodynamical time asymmetry and thus, this question deserves 
our close attention. If, on the one hand, it is indeed considered 
to be of the same fundamental nature as the laws of mechanics, 
then the origin of thermodynamic time asymmetry can easily be 
traced back to this second law, but the problem arises how in that 
case this time reversal non-invariant law can be reconciled with 
the time reversal invariant laws of mechanics. If, on the other 
hand, the second law is regarded as 'only' a macroscopic law which 
somehow can be shown to result from reversible processes at the 
microscopic level, e.g., collisions between molecules, then the 
origin of thermodynamic time asymmetry is not to be found in 
the fundamental laws of physics, but must be looked for elsewhere, 
e.g., in the boundary conditions prevailing in our universe. 
Important contributions to an analysis of the problem of ther-
modynamic time asymmetry from this second point of view which 
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will be referred to here as the 'mechanical program', were made 
among others by Boltzmann, Reichenbach and Grünbaum. This mecha-
nical conception of thermodynamical time asymmetry has become 
dominant among physicists. The first point of view which lies 
at the basis of the so-called 'thermodynamical program', has 
been defended only occasionally, for instance by Planck and 
Stueckelberg. Recently, Prigogine has joined this camp and has 
strongly attacked the mechanical interpretation of thermodynamic 
time asymmetry. His arguments against the mechanical program 
will be examined in detail. 
Not only the physicists, but also the philosophers of science 
usually neglect the thermodynamical program in their discussions 
of the problem of thermodynamic time asymmetry. There is, however, 
no a priori reason to reject it. That is why I have undertaken 
an examination and comparison of both programs in ch. IV, where 
the most significant differences between them will be pointed 
out. In my opinion, there are no compelling reasons for abando-
ning the mechanical program; I will show in particular that Pri-
gogine' s criticism against the mechanical program is not justi-
fied. Yet, I do not claim to evaluate both programs because an 
evaluation will be shown to be premature. Since ultimately the 
physicists themselves must pronounce the verdict, we must await 
a discussion of the problem within physics. This chapter is in-
tended as a first impulse to such discussion by exploring the 
conceptual gap between the two programs. 
The problem whether or not irreversibility should be 'built' 
into the fundamental laws of physics not only presents itself 
with respect to thermodynamic time asymmetry, but also arises 
for other types of time asymmetry such as the expansion of the 
cosmos (the 'cosmologica! arrow of time') or the asymmetry be-
tween emission and absorption of radiation (asymmetry between 
retarded and advanced radiation): are these time asymmetries due 
to (accidental) boundary conditions in our universe or do they 
find their origin in the laws of physics? At this moment, there 
is at least one kind of time asymmetry which is supposed to be 
due to time reversal non-invariant laws, viz., the decay of a 
neutral K-meson into two pions. The existence of different kinds 
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of time asymmetry poses yet another problem, namely, whether or 
not they are related to each other. Is there, in other words, 
one fundamental kind of time asymmetry (e.g., the expansion of 
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the universe, as was proposed by Gold ) from which the others 
can be derived? I refrained from dealing with these problems not 
only for reasons of space but also because an adequate treatment 
of these problems requires a thorough knowledge of several spe­
cialised domains of physics. Especially cosmology plays an impor­
tant role in these issues; the various cosmologica! models used 
by physicists do not yet allow for definite answers to these 
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questions. 
At the end of this introduction, I must clarify why the topic of 
the flow of time is conspicuously absent from this thesis, even 
though I had originally intended to discuss it. 
Whereas time asymmetry is generally regarded to be a 'legiti­
mate' physical concept, the status of the notion of a flow of 
time is more controversial: does it, or does it not 'belong' to 
physical reality? In other words, is the phenomenon known as 
flow of time part of the structure of physical time? Very often, 
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these questions are answered in the negative, the impression 
of a flow of time, it is said, is nothing but an illusion which 
is not relevant for the description of physical reality and, 
therefore, the flow of time is not part, of the structure of phy­
sical time. This view holds that concepts such as 'the past', 
'the present', 'the future' and 'the flow of time' ('temporal 
becoming') are not genuine physical concepts since they only 
acquire some meaning relatively to a conscious observer or a 
'mind'. They are empty concepts as far as they pretend to say 
something about physical reality itself. If this were true, any 
discussion of the flow of time would fall outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
Yet, it is paradoxical that such a fundamental aspect of our 
awareness of time should not be incorporated into the structure 
of physical time. A closer look, however, shows why this is the 
case. The expression 'flow of time' is itself nothing but a 
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(kinematical) metaphor based on our intuitive picture of time 
as a straight line. In this picture, the flow of time is repre-
sented by the motion of a particular point ('the present') along 
this line in the direction of the future. However, the motion of 
this present cannot be analysed or understood relatively to time 
itself, but requires something like a second time in order to 
account for the motion of this present. Thus, if we take this 
metaphor too literally, we immediately get into trouble. 
Likewise, it can be shown that phrases such as "the present 
advances into the direction of the future" or "time flows into 
the direction of the future" are nothing but mere tautologies 
(similar to statements such as "all bachelors are males") if the 
meaning of 'advancing' or 'flowing' in a temporal direction is 
construed in analogy to the meaning of the same terms in the 
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case of a spatial direction. Such expressions therefore do 
not convey any information about the meaning of the notion of 
flow of time. 
All in all, it proves extremely difficult to pin down the 
meaning of the concepts of the past, the present, the future 
and of the flow of time. This being the case and realising that 
physics does get along very well without introducing such con-
cepts -which is rather remarkable- it is no great wonder that 
physicists are inclined to degrade this flow of time into an 
11 illusion, or to consider this flow of time mind-dependent. 
Moreover, the rare attempts at constructing an Objective 
12 theory of time flow' , i.e., theories in which the flow of time 
becomes an integral part of physical reality, have not been very 
successful. The problen is to state within a purely physical 
language an intrinsic difference between events belonging to 
the future, the present and to the past. None of the differences 
commonly attributed to the future and the past, such as 
-past events are fixed once and for all and are unalterable, where-
as future events are not determined and can be influenced, 
-some of the past events can be remembered, but none of the futu-
re; more generally, we can have traces of the past but not of the 
future, 
-past events have been, whereas future events still have to come, 
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can be reformulated into a physical discourse so as to allow a 
physically significant distinction between past and future events. 
The most famous attempt, and at the same time the most famous 
failure, to construct an objective theory of time flow, stems 
from Reichenbach J\ he thought that the mdeterminism of quantum 
mechanics would allow the introduction of the concept of becoming 
within physics without having to introduce a conscious observer. 
Accordingly, he proposed to define the present as "the moment 
when that which was undetermined becomes determined." But 
Grünbaum has shown that this characterisation of the present is 
not adequate because any moment of time constitutes a present 
IS in Reichenbach1s sense. ^  
It is doubtful whether the attempts to construct an objective 
theory of time flow have any chance of success. In studying phy-
sical reality, physicists concentrate upon reproducible phenome-
na, and they eliminate all that makes a phenomenon unique. In 
particular, they abstract from the fact that an event takes place 
'here and now'. But whereas physics generally seeks to eliminate 
that which is unique in the phenomena, the goal of an objective 
theory of time flow is precisely to get hold on the unique: such 
theory must single out a unique moment of time as the present 
which separates the past from the future. Therefore, it is in 
principle questionable whether an objective theory of time flow 
is feasable. 
The difficulties in analysing the meaning of the notion of 
the flow of time, taken together with the problems connected with 
constructing an objective theory of time flow, are at first glance 
reason enough to advocate the mind-dependent theory of time flow. 
However, this conception of the flow of time, which eliminates 
temporal becoming from physical reality, is itself problematic, 
for it immediately provokes the following question: what is, 
from a physical point of view, the difference between space and 
time? Consider the Newtonian picture of time; if the flow of 
time is not part of the structure of physical time, then what is 
left of Newton's conception of time is just a straight line since 
the motion of the present along this line has disappeared. In 
that case, space and time would differ structurally only with 
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respect to their number of dimensions, space being three-dimensi­
onal and time one-dimensional. But clearly, this is not the most 
significant difference between space and time. What really dis­
tinguishes the two are the notions of the past, the present, the 
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future and the flow of time, which have no counterpart in space. 
But precisely these would be physically irrelevant according to 
the mind-dependent theory of time flow. 
This problem becomes even more acute within the spacetime 
description of physical reality. Through the unification of spa­
ce and time into a four-dimensional spacetime manifold by means 
of the universal constant of homogenisation с (= the velocity of 
light in vacuo), the specific character of time is completely 
lost. Structurally, the time-coordinate is indistinguishable 
from a space-coordinate (see also p. 95-6)· Admittedly, the inde­
finite metric of the spacetime manifold assings a special role 
to one of the four coordinates, but this, by itself, does not 
suffice to qualify that one as the time coordinate. Only the 
definition of the notions of the past, the present, the future 
and the flow of time would really allow such qualification; but 
again, according to the mind-dependent theory of time flow, the­
se notions are physically irrelevant. 
In my opinion, the reason why this special coordinate can 
appropriately be called time-coordinate lies in the fact that it 
can be identified with parameter time, which is not possible for 
the other three coordinates. The complete structure of parameter 
time is, however, richer than that of coordinate time since para­
meter time is intimately connected with temporal becoming. But 
to the question whether or not this flow of parameter time is 
objective or mind-dependent, I have no answer. 
I had originally planned to treat this problem in a separate 
chapter, but a closer analysis of the objective and mind-dependent 
theories of time flow led me nowhere; both theories are so beset 
by conceptual problems that both become equally unattractive. 
That is why I decided not to enter this labyrinth hiding the 
profound mysteries of time; I feared that once entered, there 
would be no way out of it and I wanted at all cost to escape 
from the eternal punishment which Augustine alludes to. 
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I. PHYSICAL TIME AND THE PROBLEM OF ITS STRUCTURE. 
Summary. 
I will argue that in general it is possible to talk meaning-
fully about the structure of physical time, even if it is assu-
med that spacetime is the fundamental spatio-temporal entity, 
from which spatial and temporal properties must be derived. 
The notion 'time1, as soon as it is used in a global sense, be-
comes problematic for those spacetimes that cannot be written 
as the direct product of a three- and one-dimensional manifold, 
representing resp. space and time. In view of the fact that the 
global properties of time can vary from one observer to the 
other, it does not always make sense to speak about the struc-
ture of physical time. 
The properties of time will be analysed in terms of its 
ordering, topological and metrical structure. At each structu-
ral level, Newton's absolute time will be compared with time 
as used in Einstein's theory of relativity; the significant 
differences between both time concepts will be pointed out in 
detail. Besides Newton's conception of time as a straight line, 
at least a variety of other possibilities must be taken into 
account in the determination of the actual structure of physi-
time. This creates various epistemologica! problems, some of 
which will be explored in detail. 
1.1 Introduction. 
This chapter deals with the structure of physical time. 
Within classical Newtonian physics, with its strict separation 
between space and time, the meaning of this expression 'the 
structure of physical time' is rather unproblematic: time, as 
conceived by Newton, is an entity existing by itself, per se, 
and this entity has certain properties. The whole set of these 
properties ascribed to time, will be referred to as 'the struc-
ture of (physical) time'. Of special interest is the fact that 
this structure belongs to time itself, irrespective of the re-
lation time bears to space or any other physical quantity, or 
the way time is being used in physical theories; as is well 
known, time, within a relativistic context, looses much of its 
independence, especially with regard to space. 
Within a classical context, therefore, the question 'What 
is the structure of time?' is meaningful, and the answer runs 
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as follows: time has the structure of an Euclidean line along 
which the 'now', the 'present', is moving constantly toward the 
future. Apart from this motion of the new, the structure of 
time is isomorphic with the structure of a straight line. For 
Newton it was not possible to think of time in another way than 
as a straight line. Therefore time had neither a beginning nor 
an end, and it was infinite toward the past and the future. 
Moreover, the moments of time were ordered like the points of 
a line, thereby eliminating the possibility of cyclic time. 
This image of tine, as a straight line, determined all its 
physically relevant properties. 
Within relativistic Einsteinian physics, however, the notion 
of time itself, and a fortiori of the structure of time, be-
comes problematic. Time and space can no longer be completely 
separated, as is most clearly demonstrated in the, by now stan-
dard spacetime approach to relativistic physics. Within the 
latter, spacetime is taken to be the fundamental spatio-temporal 
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entity. Time as such no longer exists, nor does space. The 
spatial relationships between events depend upon the temporal 
ones and vice versa. In the course of this chapter the precise 
nature of this relationship between space and time will be 
elucidated.For the moment, the issue whether we can in a sen-
sible way speak of the structure of time in a relativistic 
context is more important. 
Suppose we had at our disposal a unique way of splitting up 
an entire spacetime manifold into two components, space and 
time; i.e., given a spacetime manifold M we apply a certain 
procedure S which yields M as the direct product of a three-
dimensional and one-dimensional manifold, representing resp. 
space and time. Now, if for each and every observer the result 
of applying S to M is the same, in other words, if for each 
observer the procedure S yields the same separation of space-
time into space and time, the use of the notion 'time' and 
'structure of time' is justified. Although time is thus con-
structed from spacetime, it nevertheless makes sense to speak 
of time and moreover, that time possesses a unique structure, 
the structure of time. Like for Newton, time has in that case 
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a universal character,i.e., the properties of time are the 
same for all observers, independently of their place and state 
of motion. 
Unfortunately however, there exists no such procedure S 
which produces an universal separation of a relativistic space-
time M into space and time, because temporal relationships 
between events are observer-dependent. For instance, it is 
impossible to split up an arbitrary spacetime M into space and 
time so that it incorporates the simultaneity of events accor-
ding to two observers in relative motion. The same applies to 
the measurement of time-intervals by observers in relative 
motion. Moreover, within a given spacetime manifold, the global 
properties of time, e.g. whether it is closed or open, may vary 
from one observer to the other. 
For these reasons, 'time and space talk' within a relativis-
tic context is highly problematic. The notions 'time' and 
'the structure of time' have at first sight lost much of their 
significance. However, this should not be exaggerated; it does 
not mean that these notions cannot be used anymore in a sensi-
ble way within a relativistic context. 
Indeed the use of the notions 'time' and 'space' in a global 
sense requires great caution. But, on the other hand, locally 
any spacetime manifold looks the same for any observer, inde-
pendently of his state of mot:on,viz., like Minkowskian space-
time. Therefore the temporal aspects of this Minkowskian 
spacetime are of a general nature; they are valid for all ob-
servers. In this sense,time has locally the same structure 
for all observers, in spite of the fact that the temporal re-
lations between events are observer-dependent. Thus locally 
the notion 'time' remains meaningful. The problems occur when 
we go from local time to global time. Indeed, the notion 
'global time' itself is highly problematic, especially in those 
cases where a global separation of a spacetime into space and 
time is not possible. Nevertheless, I will use the term 
'global time', but with the understanding that, whenever 
necessary, it refers to the global temporal aspects of a 
spacetime manifold. 
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So far, we have seen only one side of the 'problem of the 
structure of physical time', viz., the ona concerning the use of 
the notion of time within a spacetime description of physical 
reality. I shall now turn to the other side which concerns the 
epistemologica! status of the structure of physical time. 
The birth of non-euclidean geometries not only led to the 
insight that several alternative geometries had to be taken into 
consideration in the determination of the structure of physical 
space, it also led to the recognition that the same applies to 
the determination of the structure of physical time. But only 
in the theory of relativity (the special (STR) and the general 
(GTR) theory) real alternatives for the standard conception of 
physical time were introduced within physics. 
Before the advent of relativity theory (RT) the epistemolo-
gica! problems concerning the structure of physical time were, 
roughly, all pervaded by the idea that there was only one pos-
sible candidate for the actual structure of time: time as a 
straight line. All other possibilities belonged to the domain 
of pure speculation. This led to the idea of the a priori na-
ture of the structure of time. 
But RT drastically changed the situation. In the transition 
from classical to relativistic physics, the number of possible 
candidates for the structure of physical time increased from 
a single one to a whole spectrum of physically relevant alter-
natives. For instance, the concept of closed time was no longer 
purely speculative, but had become a physically significant 
concept, for GTR allowed for spacetimes with closed worldlines; 
for an observer on such a worldline, time will indeed be closed 
(circular). 
As a result the following epistemologica! problem presents 
itself. Given the fact that various possibilities have to be 
taken into account for the structure of physical time, and 
that none of these can be singled out a priori as the actual 
structure of physical time, is it possible to turn to experi-
mental data for a solution of the problem of the structure of 
physical time? At first an affirmative answer looks plausible. 
However, the analogous case of the problem of the structure of 
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physical space shows the question to be more complicated. Gauss 
thought that a simple measurement would be able to settle the 
issue whether space was euclidian or not; in other words,he was 
convinced of the existence of crucial experiments in that matter. 
But the situation turned out to be much more complicated. The 
ensuing discussions concerning the epistemologica! status of 
the structure of space are to well-known to be repeated here. 
The fact that even today this issue is still a matter of dis-
pute shows clearly how complicated this problem is. The case 
of physical time is not simpler than that of physical space. 
The same set of problems are encountered and no straightfor-
ward answers are to be expected. 
In view of these considerations I intend to expose in this 
chapter in the first place in what way RT has changed the phy-
sicist's conception of time, and, in the second place, how 
this change affected the epistemologica! status of the struc-
ture of physical time. In approaching these problems I take 
as my point of departure the fact that it is possible to dis-
tinguish between the following kinds of properties of time: 
a) ordering properties: 'before', 'after', 
b) topological properties: continuity of time, boundaries of 
time, number of dimensions of time, etc., 
c) metrical properties: length of time-intervals. 
In other words, the total structure of time can be conceived 
to consist of a number of sub-structures, viz., the ordering, 
the topological and the metrical structure. However, if space-
time is the fundamental spatio-temporal entity, then the orde-
ring, topological and metrical properties of time have to be 
derived from resp. the ordering, topological and metrical 
structure of the spacetime manifold. These three sub-structures 
are not the only ones that can be distinguished in a spacetime 
manifold. The full-blown structure of a spacetime manifold 
can, roughly, be decomposed into its sub-structures in the 
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following manner. 
drop distance drop angles 
metric manifold > conformai manifold »affine manifold 
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drop parallellism drop coordinates 
affine manifold •differentiatie manifold > 
and differentiability 
drop neighborhood drop order 
topological space » (ordered) set * set. 
Of course, this schema can be read in reversed order; a metric 
spacetime M can be construed from a set by defining on this 
' set successively a toplogy, coordinate systems and differen-
tiability conditions, parallel-displacement, the notion 
'angle', and finally the notion of distance between two points. 
Going from the metric manifold to the underlying set (as 
in the above schema) the structures are increasingly general 
in nature. This can be seen as follows. All the different types 
of manifolds (spaces) mentioned above can be characterised by 
a corresponding group of transformations (in the way indicated 
by F. Klein in his 'Erlanger programm'). But going from the 
metric manifold to the topological space, these corresponding 
groups grow larger: the group leaving invariant metric rela-
tions is a subgroup of the group leaving invariant angles, etc. 
But the larger the group of transformations, the more general 
the kind of properties it leaves invariant. 
Not all sub-structures necessary for construing the total 
structure of a spacetime manifold are of equal importance for 
the study of the structure of time. The most important and 
interesting ones are the ordering, topological and metrical 
structures. I will confine myself mainly to these, but occa-
sionally it will also be necessary to consider the conformai 
structure. Within the context of this discussion, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the possibility of a division of the 
total structure of a spacetime manifold does not imply that 
all its structural levels are independent of each other (e.g., 
a given affine manifold cannot be endowed with any arbitrary 
metric). 
The above classification of the properties of time proves 
to be very fruitful. First of all, it makes possible a syste-
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matic presentation of the changes in the physicist's conception 
of time due to RT. We will see that, whereas STR modified 
Newton's time concept only insofar the order and metrical 
properties are concerned, GTR also puts into question the 
topological properties of time. But, secondly, it proves to be 
an excellent guide in finding our way through the numerous 
epistemologica! problems, discussed in the literature about 
the structure of time. Each structural level brings forth its 
own specific kind of epistemologica! problems. 
This discussion will start with the ordering structure of 
time (sect. 1.2) and then proceeds to the topological (sect. 
1.3) and metrical ( sect. 1.4) structures. But before beginning 
the analysis of the temporal order relations, the following 
general observations must be made. 
-The reader is reminded that the following presupposition 
obtains throughout this chapter: spacetime is taken to be the 
basic spatio-temporal entity; in other words, to speak of space 
and time is to speak of the spatial and temporal aspects of 
a spacetime manifold. The paradigmatic instance of a spacetime 
is a relativistic spacetime which is a four-dimensional dif-
ferentiable manifold M equipped with a Lorentzian metric (see 
appendix). The advantage of this point of view is obvious; 
the interrelationship between space and time is most easily 
seen within the spacetime picture. Moreover, certain aspects 
and problems about space and time can be discussed properly 
only when space and time are not considered by themselves, but 
as resp. a three- and one-dimensional submanifold of a four-
7 dimensional spacetime. This is especially the case for the 
global aspects of time. 
-In the next chapter I will introduce a distinction between 
parameter time and coordinate time. This distinction concerns 
the role time plays in physical theories; time can be used in 
two different ways, as a parameter and as a coordinate. This 
double nature of time with regard to its role in physical 
theories has, generally speaking, no relevance for the thema 
of this chapter,viz., the structure of time and its epistemo-
logica! status. An exception has to be made for the problem 
of the number of dimensions of time; in that case it is useful 
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to take this distinction between parameter time and coordinate 
time into account (see sect. 1.3). 
1.2 The ordering structure of time. 
Of crucial importance for an understanding of the difference 
in temporal ordering relations between classical-Newtonian 
time and relativistic-Einsteinian time is the distinction be-
tween a partial and total order. In a total order, all the 
elements of a set are ordered into a unique chain (fig. la), 
whereas in a partial order they are ordered in the form of a 
lattice, with branching points (fig. lb). But this distinction 
fig. la 
'total order' 
fig. lb 
'partial order' 
can be expressed more clearly with the help of the formal 
definition of an order relation. Given a set S, a binary rela-
tion R on S is called an order relation if, for all x,y and z, 
x,y,z€S, the following relations hold: 
1) reflexivity 
2) anti-symmetry 
3) transitivity 
xRx 
xRy and yRx implies x=y 
xRy and yRz implies xRz. 
A familiar example of an order relation is the '4 '-relation 
('smaller then or equal to') defined on the reals. 
A total order relation on the set S is characterised by the 
fact that for all pairs x,ye S (x^y) it is true that ór xRy, 
ór yRx ('ór' in the exclusive sense). On the other hand, in a 
partially ordered set, there are pairs of elements x,y for 
which neither xRy nor yRx is true; for example, elements a and 
b in fig. lb. 
When applying these definitions to temporal order, we have 
to start from the set S of all events and from the relation 
'earlier than or simultaneous with' (or, inversely, 'later than 
or simultaneous with'). This relation, however, is not always 
a genuine order relation; whether it is an order relation 
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depends upon how physically temporal order is defined. In the 
case of Newtonian physics, it is not yet an order relation, but 
it can be turned into one, more specifically, into a total 
order relation. But in the case of Einstein:an physics it is 
already an order relation, however only a partial one. Both 
cases will now be considered in detail. 
-Newtonian case: total order. 
According to Newton, any arbitrary pair of events a and b 
has an intrinsic temporal order: either a is earlier than b, 
or the reverse is true, and if neither is the case, then both 
events are simultaneous. This temporal order is absolute, i.e., 
it is fixed once and for all, and it is the same for all ob­
servers. In principle, knowledge or discovery of these intrin­
sic temporal relationships between the events is possible by 
virtue of causal relationships. If event a is a possible cause 
of event b, then a is earlier than b, and vice versa if b is 
a possible cause of a,then b is earlier then a. If neither one 
is the possible cause of the other, then a is simultaneous 
with b. (In principle, simultaneity of events is determined 
by the gravitational force: action at a distance means that 
cause and effect are simultaneous.) 
Strictly speaking, the Newtonian temporal order relation, 
RN, with the above properties is not an order relation at all 
when it is applied to the set S of all events, since the anti­
symmetry condition is not met: хК гУ and yR^x does not imply 
that χ and y are the same event, but only that χ and y are 
simultaneous. To be a formal order relation, RM has to be 
applied not to the set of all events itself, but to the set 
consisting of the equivalence classes generated by the equiva­
lence relation 'simultaneous with'. An equivalence relation is 
reflexive and transitive, but, unlike an order relation, 
symmetric,i.e., xRy implies yRx. Whereas an order relation 
puts the elements of a set into a (branched) chain, an equiva­
lence relation partitions a set into disjoint subsets, the 
so-called equivalence classes. In the case of time, the equi­
valence relation 'simultaneous with' partitions the set of all 
events into subsets consisting of all simultaneous events. For 
the sake of convenience, these equivalence classes are called 
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'moments of time'. If RM is applied to the set of all moments 
of time, then R., is an order relation, more particularly a 
total order relation since for any two moments of time a and 
b (a^b) ór aRj-b, ór bR a. 
It should be noted that because of the absolute character 
of Newtonian time, the equivalence relation 'simultaneous with', 
and the equivalence classes generated by it, have an absolute 
status; they represent an objective property of physical reali-
ty in the sense that the partition of the set of events into 
equivalence classes is the same for all observers. This is no 
longer the case within relativistic physics. 
-Einsteinian case: partial order. 
In RT the situation with regard to the temporal ordering 
of events is different. 
1. Special theory of relativity (STR). In the Minkowskian 
spacetime of STR, we can distinguish, due to the indefinite 
Lorentzian metric, at each point 0 between the following clas-
ses of events: 
a) events with a timelike distance to 0, 
b) events with zero distance to 0, and 
c) events with a spacelike distance (see fig. 2a). 
The events with a timelike distance relative to 0 fall apart 
into two disconnected parts, the future and the past, while 
the events with zero distance relative to 0 constitute the 
lightcone. 
fig. 2a fig. 2b 
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Only the events within the lightcone of 0,i.e., with a time­
like distance to 0, have an invariant temporal order relative 
to 0: those in the future lobe of the lightcone are later than 
0, while those in the past lobe are earlier than 0. This is the 
same for each and every observer, independently of his state 
of (inertial) motion at 0. But no such invariant temporal order 
relative to 0 exists for those events with a spacelike distance 
to 0. Depending upon the state of motion of the observer, these 
events are later than, simultaneous with or earlier than 0. 
For example, in fig. 2b, event с is later than 0 in reference 
frame x,t of observer A, but earlier than 0 in reference frame 
о 
x',t' of observer B. Even for one observer the temporal order 
of two events with a spacelike distance is not necessarily 
invariant, because this temporal order may change if the state 
of motion of the observer changes. For instance, if observer A 
of fig. 2b were to change his state of motion at 0 to the 
state of motion of observer B, then for observer A the tempo­
ral order of the events 0 and с would be reversed. 
Thus, the temporal ordering of events in STR is only a parti­
al ordering. Let us take a look at this partial ordering from 
the point of view of the simultaneity relation. We saw that 
for Newton the relation 'simultaneous with' was an equivalence 
relation and, moreover, that this relation had an objective 
status. But in STR simultaneity looses its objective status. 
It is no longer an intrinsic property of the events. Simulta­
neity of events is no longer something to be discovered, but 
to be defined in terms of a specific procedure. However, the 
standard procedure, as given by Einstein, makes simultaneity 
observer dependent: two observers in relative motion will 
regard different sets of events as simultaneous. Therefore, 
the simultaneity relation is no longer an equivalence relation, 
as it was for Newton, because it is not transitive: altough 
events a and 0 are simultaneous for observer A (reference 
frame x,t, fig. 2b) and 0 and b are simultaneous for observer 
В (reference frame x',t', fig. 2b), a is not simultaneous with 
b, neither for observer A nor for observer B. The simultaneity 
relation is transitive only for one and the same observer and 
13 
is therefore only in that case an equivalence relation. 
Since simultaneity has become observer dependent, the set of 
all events can no longer be partitioned in an objective, obser-
ver independent way into mutually disjoint simultaneity classes. 
This absence of an observer independent partition of the Min-
kowskian spacetime into 'simultaneity planes' accounts for the 
lack of a total temporal order in STR. 
Now it is easy to understand why in the case of STR the rela-
tion 'earlier than or simultaneous with' is indeed an ordering 
relation. This relation satifies, contrary to the Newtonian 
temporal ordering relation, the anti-symmetry condition: if 
two events a and b are simultaneous for all observers, then 
this implies that a and b must be the same event. And so the 
anti-symmetry condition obtains. 
It is well-known that the origin for this lack of a total 
temporal order within STR is to be found in the causal struc-
ture of the world. The upper limit to the velocity with which 
causal influences can propagate, viz., the velocity of light, 
is responsible for this state of affairs. Because of this limit, 
only the events within the lightcone of 0 can stand in a causal 
relationship with 0 (for the events in the future lobe, 0 is a 
possible cause, while events in the past cone are possible 
causes of 0). These events must have an observer independent 
temporal order relative to 0, otherwhise the cause-effect rela-
tions between those events would not be preserved. 
But for the events outside the lightcone of 0, a causal 
connection with 0 is in principle impossible, because of the 
upper limit in the velocity of propagation of causal influences. 
For those events it is imposssible to determine an intrinsic 
or objective temporal order relative to 0. For this reason 
there is only a partial temporal ordering of events in STR. 
The foregoing should not be misunderstood. By selecting 
a special reference frame, it is possible to construct within 
STR a total temporal ordering of events,i.e., to construct a 
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kind of absolute time. But, contrary to the total temporal 
order within Newtonian physics, such a total temporal order 
within STR has no objective significance; this point will be 
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discussed in more detail later on within the context of the 
notion of cosmic time function. 
2. General theory of relativity (GTR). GTR changes the foregoing 
picture considerably, since not all the spacetimes satisfying 
the field equations of GTR are such that a reasonable definition 
of temporal order is possible. Consider, for instance, a space-
time which possesses closed worldlines. The temporal ordering 
of the events on such worldlines cannot be represented in an 
adequate way with the help of a binary ordering relation R. 
Take an arbitrary pair of events a and b on such a worldline 
(see fig. 3a); if a is earlier than b, then it is also true 
that b is earlier than a. Thus for all a and b, aRb implies that 
bRa, which again implies, if R is an ordering relation, that 
a=b, which is clearly absurd. Therefore a binary ordering rela­
tion R is unable to represent the cyclic order of events on 
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a closed worldline. But also a ternary relation (for instance 
'x lies between y and z') is not powerful enough to adequately 
represent the cyclic order, since it cannot distinguish between 
the ordering of the events a,b,c and d as given in fig. 3a and 
3bj only with the help of a four-place relation, called 'pair-
separation') is it possible to distinguish between both orde-
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rings of a,b,c and d. 
fig. 3a fig. 3b 
It follows that within a spacetime with closed worldlines, 
the use of the relations 'earlier than' and 'lies in between' 
is, at least globally, no longer meaningful. Only expressions 
like 'events a and b are pair separated from events с and d' 
contain, then, any information about the ordering of events. 
15 
If a spacetime M does not admit a temporal ordering relation 
then a pre-ordering relation can very often be meaningfully 
defined; a pre-ordering relation is reflexive and transitive, 
but not anti-symmetric. Kronheimer has shown that for a large 
class of spacetimes the following pre-ordering relation, cal-
led 'temporal precedence', obtains: a is temporally precedent 
to b, whenever there exists a future-directed timelike path 
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from a to b. The reason for selecting timelike paths is ob-
vious; temporal order is intimately related to causality, and 
points of M which can be connected by timelike paths are points 
for which a causal relation actually exists or is possible. 
Temporal precedence, however, is not yet an ordering relation, 
since it is not anti-symmetric. But for spacetimes satisfying 
the chronology condition which states that the spacetime under 
consideration does not posses closed timelike worldlines, the 
relation of temporal precedence is also anti-symmetric, and 
therefore it is in those cases an ordering relation as well. 
Although for spacetimes satisfying the chronology condition, 
a reasonable definition of temporal order is possible, this 
condition is not sufficient to guarantee the existence of 
cosmic time functions. These are defined in the following way: 
a spacetime M admits a cosmic time function, if there exists a 
function f from M to R (the reals), such that f increases 
14 
along every future directed timelike curve or null curve. 
Thus, f defines a kind of global time function: it assigns to 
each event its 'cosmic' time. Hawking has shown that stable 
causality is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of cosmic time functions. Roughly speaking, a space-
time M is said to be stably causal if there are no closed 
timelike or null curves in any Lorentzian metric which is 
15 sufficiently 'near' to the original metric of the manifold M. 
Spacetimes that allow for the definition of a cosmic time 
function are of special interest, for it looks as if a total 
temporal ordering of the events can be reintroduced in our 
relativistic models of the universe by using those cosmic 
time functions, particularly by interpreting those functions 
in terms of the evolution of the universe. Apparently, each 
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event can be dated in an objective way in terms of the state 
of the universe, at the time of its occurrence. This creates 
the impression that an objective total temporal order can be 
obtained for all events, even for those with a spacelike dis­
tance to each other. But how can this be reconsiled with the 
fact that these models of the universe are based upon RT, 
according to which no objective total temporal ordering of the 
events is possible? 
In the following pages I will concentrate upon this problem. 
As will be seen, this seemingly objective total temporal order, 
based upon the 'intrinsic cosmic date' of each event, is not 
observer independent and therefore not objective. No clash 
with the basic principles of RT occurs because there is no 
intrinsic cosmic date at all, this in spite of Whitrow's claim 
to the contrary. To show this, I shall first analyse more 
carefully the meaning of the notion 'cosmic time function'. 
This will lead to a clearer understanding of the relation 
between cosmic time functions and the notion 'evolution of the 
universe'. The conclusion will be that the idea of an objecti­
ve total temporal ordering of the events is due to a misunder­
standing of the notion 'evolution of the universe'. This notion 
is very misleading because its meaning is not observer inde­
pendent . 
If cosmic time functions are considered in abstracto,i.е., 
without relating them to the evolution of the universe, it 
is immedeatly clear that the existence of these functions does 
not contradict the basic principles of RT. If a spacetime M 
admits the definition of one cosmic time function f, then 
infinitely many other cosmic time functions can be defined; 
f is by no means unique. But this infinity of other cosmic 
time functions contains members which generate different total 
temporal orderings of the events. RT,however, does not pres­
cribe a choice; it does not specify which is the 'real' cosmic 
time function, with its corresponding 'real' total temporal 
order. If this were the case, a contradiction with the prin­
ciples of RT would occur. 
The foregoing can be stated in a different way. The choice 
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of a particular cosmic time function f introduces a family of 
simultaneity planes in the spacetime manifold (called 'time 
slices', see appendix p.57); each simultaneity plane contains 
all the events m for which f(m) has the same value. But, the 
simultaneity of events defined by f in the neighborhood of a 
point of such a simultaneity plane will coincide only for a 
special observer, in the appropriate state of motion, with 
the simultaneity of events defined by the Einstein convention 
for synchronising clocks. Thus to each cosmic time function f, 
there corresponds a special group of observers for whom the 
standard definition of simultaneity gives locally the same 
result as simultaneity defined by the cosmic time function f. 
Therefore, if it were possible to single out on the basis of 
objective physical facts, a unique cosmic time function as the 
'real' one, then it would also be possible to single out a 
preferred group of observers. In that case, however, there 
would clearly be a clash with the equivalence principle of RT 
which states that all observers (all reference frames), in 
whatever state of motion, are equivalent from a physical point 
of view. 
Since it is impossible to single out, on physical grounds, 
a class of preferred observers, for whom the definition of 
simultaneity has objective physical significance, it is also 
impossible to determine which cosmic time function is the 
'real' one. Our choice of f is free. But the freedom of our 
choise does not imply its arbitrariness; not every choice 
is convenient or fruitful. It will appear that in the descrip-
tion of the evolution of the universe certain 'natural' cosmic 
time functions force themselves upon us. 
Indeed, the use of cosmic time functions is of special 
interest in the context of the description of the evolution 
of the universe: at each moment of cosmic time, the universe 
is said to be in a particular state of its evolution. Is an 
objective total temporal ordering of the events possible in 
this way? At first sight it looks indeed as if each event 
possesses an intrinsic cosmxc date. Supposing that the uni-
verse is not static, but evolves in time, and that it does not 
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go through the same sequence of states twice, then each event 
can be dated by labelling it in terms of the state of the uni-
verse at that moment. Thus, it seems possible to objectively 
establish whether two events are simultaneous or not; the only 
thing we would have to do is to see whether the labels attached 
to both events refer to the same state of the universe in its 
evolution. 
The situation, however, is not as simple as that. First of 
all, there would be the need to define the state of motion of 
the observer who performs the labelling in order to obtain 
an univocal dating of the events relatively to the evolution 
of the universe; observers in different states of motion will 
observe the universe in different ways. Secondly, suppose the 
universe to be non-homogeneous and/or non-isotropic, then 
observers at different places will see the universe evolving 
through different sequences of states. But it is impossible 
to determine objectively which states are simultaneous. This 
shows clearly that in general it is very misleading to speak 
of the evolution of the universe; this notion lacks a definite 
meaning. 
Nevertheless, there is a particular class of universes 
for which a reasonable definition of Ihe evolution of the 
universe can be given, albeit in a very special sense. This 
is the case whenever the cosmologica! principle is valid. 
This principle states that it is always and everywhere possible 
to find a special observer, usually called the 'fundamental 
observer' for whom the universe at large will look homogeneous 
17 and isotropic. 'The reference frames corresponding to these 
fundamental observers are called the 'comoving frames'. For 
such universes, a special coordinate system can be introduced, 
namely the 'comoving synchronous coordinate system' which 
distinguishes itself from all others by the fact that the hyper-
planes of constant t coincide with the hyperplanes of homo-
geneity. In this special situation, a particular cosmic 
time function ( or a set of cosmic time functions, but all 
leading to the same simultaneity hyperplanes) can be singled 
out from all the others by means of a symmetry condition: the 
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simultaneity planes of cosmic time must coincide with the hyper-
planes of homogeneity of the universe. Now,all these fundamen-
tal observers have one very nice property in common: because 
the universe at large looks the same for all of them, they will 
also see the universe develop in the same way. Relatively to 
this group of observers, therefore, we can speak of the evolu-
tion of the universe. 
In spite of this, it is not possible to construct an obser-
ver independent total temporal ordering of the events. Labelling 
all events relative to the evolution of the universe seems at 
first sight to be such an observer independent procedure for 
constructing a total temporal order, but it is not since it is 
also based upon a preferred group of observers, viz., the 
group of fundamental observers. Although the above symmetry 
condition may be a very good reason for selecting this group 
of observers, the total temporal order constructed on basis 
of this group of observers has by itself, i.e., without refe-
rence to this special group of observers, no physical meaning 
whatsoever. So we reach the conclusion that the cosmologica! 
principle may suggest a very elegant way of defining a cosmic 
time function and its corresponding total temporal ordering, 
but it cannot be the basis for the construction of a kind of 
absolute Newtonian time in relativistic models of the universe. 
In summary, the special and the general theory of relativity 
have forced the physicist to reconsider thouroughly the proper-
ties of temporal order. But RT has not only led to a careful 
study of the structure of temporal order, but also of the 
nature thereof. Indeed, RT disclosed a close relationship 
between temporal and causal order: only those events which can 
be connected by a causal chain can be ordered temporally in 
an invariant way. Events for which no causal connection is 
possible, have no temporal order. Therefore, the temporal 
order relation 'before' has the same extension as the relation 
'is the possible cause of'. But if these two binary relations 
do have the same extension, why make any difference between 
them; should we not apply Occam's rasor? Would a reduction of 
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temporal order to causal order (or vice versa) not be prefe-
rable? 
-Causal order and temporal order. In recent years, this problem 
of reducing temporal order to causal order has received consi-
derable attention; it is usually referred to as the problem 
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of 'the causal theory of time*. All causal theories of time 
are reduction theories: in some way or another they try to re-
duce temporal relations to causal relations. In the past, diffe-
rent versions were proposed. In the first place, these differ 
with respect to the choice of the type of causal relations to 
wnich temporal relations are to be reduced. For instance, 
Reichenbach tried to reduce the temporal ordering relation 
'before' to the asymmetric causal relation 'is the cause of' 
('asymmetric' here means that if a is the cause of b, then b 
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cannot be the cause of a). This required a distinction be-
tween cause and effect without a recourse to temporal relations. 
Reichenbach thought this to be possible, for "causality esta-
blishes not a symmetrical but an asymmetrical relation between 
21 
events." More in particular, he proposed the following 
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'a-temporal' characterisation of cause and effect: 
"If E is the cause of E ?, then a small variation (a mark) 
in E. is associated with a small variation in Ep, whereas 
small variations in E0 are not associated with variations 
in El." ¿ 
However, Grünbaum has shown that Reichenbach was wrong and 
instead proposed to define temporal betweenness in terms of 
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the symmetric causal relation 'is causally connectible with'. 
But even with regard to this weaker version he had to admit 
that sofar every attempt to explictely define this primitive 
symmetrical causal relation without using any temporal concepts 
24 had failed. 
In the second place, these causal theories of time differ 
with respect to the extent of the reduction. In weak versions, 
the reduction is said to pertain to temporal ordering rela-
tions only, whereas in strong versions, all temporal relations 
(order, topological and metrical) are claimed to be reducible 
to causal relations. 
Instead of presenting a detailed discussion and evaluation 
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of these different causal theories of time, it is more useful, 
within the present scope, to situate this problem of the causal 
theories of time in a broader perspective which is more in line 
with the basic assumption of this chapter that spacetime is 
the more fundamental spatio-temporal entity. The counterpart 
of a causal theory of time in the spacetime approach is a 
causal theory of the structure of spacetime in which the spa-
tial as well as the temporal relations between events are 
reduced to the causal structure of the world. In a recent 
article, entitled "The causal theory of Space-time", Winnie 
25 has treated this problem. He claims to have shown that "the 
causal structure of Minkowski space-time contains within it-
self the entire geometry (topological and metrical structure) 
of Minkowski space-time." This amounts to an extremely 
strong version of the causal theory of spacetime. Winnie 
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remarks that: 
"..while special relativity has been cited by defenders of 
a causal theory of time as providing fresh support for the 
causal theory of temporal order, these same causal theorists 
have not seen that the causal resources of this theory are 
so powerful as to yield in addition a purely causal account 
of temporal metric, spatial geometry, and the topology and 
metric geometry of Minkowski space-time." 
At first sight this is a rather astonishing conclusion, especi-
ally with regard to the metric of Minkowski spacetime, since 
the conformai structure of a spacetime contains the complete 
causal structure. Therefore the determination of the Minkows-
ki spacetime metric on the sole basis of this conformai 
(causal) structure seems to be impossible in view of the fact 
that in general different metrics are compatible with one and 
the same conformai structure. Winnie is aware of this objection, 
but for very special reasons he does not regard it as a blow 
against the causal theory of Minkowski spacetime of the spe-
cial theory of relativity. But he remarks that in the case 
of the spacetimes of the general theory of relativity this 
argument prohibits the construction of the metric of those 
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spacetimes from the causal structure. 
In spite of the sometimes remarkable succes of these reduc-
tion theories, the question remains whether it is at all neces-
22 
sary to reduce spatial and temporal relations to causal ones? 
Sklar has raised serious doubts about the need for such theories, 
and argues that causal theories of (space-)time are rather 
implausible. Instead, he is more in favour of the reverse, 
viz., a 'spatiotemporal theory of causation'. One of the reasons 
he adduces for the "superiority of a spatiotemporal theory of 
causation to a causal theory of time" is that. In the latter, 
"actual temporal relations are associated with only the 
31 possibility of the appropriate causal relations." 
Another argument that speaks against the causal theories 
of time, stems from a consideration of the general nature of 
reduction theories. These have at least two characteristics. 
In the first place, a reduction theory aims at translating all 
terms and concepts from a less fundamental level into those 
of a more fundamental one; it always involves a hierarchy of 
levels. Secondly, such theories translate vague and not well 
understood concepts into more clearly defined and better under-
stood concepts. A reduction always involves an increase of 
understanding and clarity of the basic concepts. But neither 
condition is satisfied by the causal theories of time. It is 
not self-evident at all that causal relations are more funda-
mental than spatial and temporal ones. Furthermore, it is 
highly dubious that the nature of causal relations is better 
understood than that of temporal and spatial relations. 
Therefore, there would be no need for constructing causal 
theories of (space-)time. 
Besides necessitating a critique of longstanding ideas about 
temporal ordering of events, RT has also caused a change in 
the physicist's conception of the topological structure of time, 
primarily by revealing the complex nature of the global struc-
ture of time, but also by enabling the physicist to restate 
old ideas about time, such as the idea of cyclic time, but 
now within the context of a physical discourse, instead of that 
of philosophical speculation. 
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1.3 The topological structure of time. 
Various apparently unrelated problems concerning the concept 
of time, are, nevertheless, mathematically of the same kind: 
they all concern the topological structure of time. Questions 
as diverse as "How many dimensions does time have?", "Is time 
continuous or discrete?", "Does time have the structure of an 
Euclidian line (fig. 4a), of a closed line segment (fig. 4b, 
time with a beginning and an end), of a semi-line (fig. 4c)?", 
"Is time many-fingered (fig. 4d), or cyclic (fig. 4e)?", "Is 
time orientable?", all pertain to the problem of the topolo­
gical structure of time. 
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Whereas STR changed the physicist's ideas about temporal 
order and, as will appear shortly, also about the measurement 
of time-intervals (the metric of time), it did not modify the 
ideas about the topological structure of time. Time, within 
STR, has the same topological properties as absolute Newtonian 
time, viz., those of the Euclidian line (fig. 4a). Only within 
GTR was the 'field of possibilities' for the topological struc­
ture of time enlarged. 
Since it is not possible to treat here in extenso all the 
topological properties of time, I shall limit myself to two 
central topics: first, the problem of the continuity versus 
discreteness of time, and the related issue of the number of 
dimensions of time, and secondly, the notion of temporal orien-
tability. The first topic concerns the local structure of time 
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while the second deals with a global aspect of tine. The impor­
tance of the first problem lies in the fact that the notion 
'discrete time' is sometimes proposed as a possible solution to 
fundamental problems encountered especially in microscopic 
physics; but in most cases the notion 'discrete time' itself 
stays rather obscure. The second topic is important because 
temporal orientability is related to the issue of time asym­
metry which will be discussed in chapters III and IV. 
But a discussion of these topological properties of time 
requires first some general observations about a) the topolo­
gical structure of spacetimes, and b) the topological structure 
of time within a spacetime approach. 
a) Topology of spacetimes. Topology treats of the 'neighbor­
hood '-relations between the elements of a space. Loosely, it 
can be described as 'rubber-sheet geometry', because topology 
studies only those properties of geometrical figures, that stay 
the same no matter how the rubber-sheet on which these figures 
are drawn, is being stretched (without tearing or gluing). 
Formally, topology deals with those properties that are left 
invariant under homeomorphisms: one-to-one bicontinuous map-
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pings. These homeomorphisms do not change the neighborhood-
relations between the elements of a space. A set S is turned 
into a topological space by specifying a family of open subsets 
Τ of S which is closed under union and finite intersection. 
In the case of metric spaces, the family of open sets, defi­
ning the topology, is usually given with the help of the 
metric. This metric of the space M induces in a natural way 
a topology on M, of which the open sets correspond to the 
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ε -balls around the points of M. 
For spacetime manifolds, however, the relation between the 
spacetime metric and the spacetime topology is more complica­
ted. The topological structure of a spacetime manifold cannot 
be given with the help of the metric, since the spacetime 
metric is not positive definite. The open sets induced by the 
spacetime metric do not specify a topology. Indeed, all the 
points of a spacetime manifold that correspond to the path of 
a light ray have zero distance to each other, so that any 
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L -ball around any of these points contains all the points of 
the light path; but, intuitively, not all these points are 'near' 
to each other. 
However, the topology of a spacetime manifold can be defined 
rather simply with the help of temporal ordering^ This essen­
tially works as follows. The basis of open sets of the topology 
is defined by the Alexandrov intervals. The Alexandrov interval 
of two events a and b consists of all events chronologically 
between a and b, i.e., of all events inside the intersection 
of the lightcones of a and b (see fig. 5)· The topology thus 
Alexandrov interval 
fig. 5 
defined is called the Alexandrov topology which coincides with 
the spacetime manifold topology in those cases where 'strong 
causality' holds г-1 
Yet, in spite of this intimate relationship between the 
topological and the ordering structure of a spacetime manifold, 
it remains that both are of a different nature; not all topo­
logical properties can be expressed in terms of the ordering 
structure. Therefore it is important to clearly distinguish 
between both kinds of properties. 
b) Topology of time. Given a spacetime M, how can the topology 
of time be derived from the topology of spacetime? I will treat 
this problem both from a local and a global point of view. 
1. The topology of time from a local point of view. Locally the 
situation is rather simple, since locally any spacetime mani­
fold looks everywhere the same, viz., like a flat Minkowski 
spacetime. The latter is the direct product of E-* and E (E 
represents space and E represents time). This means that, local-
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ly, tine has everywhere the same topological properties on the 
spacetime manifold, or better property. Indeed, there is but one 
topological property which completely determines the local topo-
37 logical structure of the manifold: the number of dimensions. 
Within the standard picture of time this number is equal to 
one, since time is homeomorphic to E and the number of dimen-
sions of E , dim (E ), is one. 
2. The topology of time from a global point of view. Earman, 
in an article entitled "How to talk about the topology of time", 
has discussed this difficult problem in detail, especially 
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with regard to the question whether time is open or closed. 
He approaches it along two different lines which he calls 
resp. the injection and the projection approach to the problem 
of the topology of time. The idea behind the injection approach 
is to "relativize talk about the topology of time to a given 
space point."''-' In that case, the topological properties of 
time are derived from the topological properties of a given 
set of worldlines on M (defined by a time-like vector field 
V on M). A characteristic feature of this approach is that time 
can be open at one point of space but closed at another, de-
pending on whether the worldlines through those points are 
open or closed. Moreover, the topological properties of time 
may depend upon the coice of the set of worldlines on M (or 
the corresponding choice of V). Earman gives the example of 
the Godei spacetime. On this spacetime two different sets of 
worldlines can be defined, one leading to the conclusion that 
time is closed at each point of space,the other, on the contra-
ry, to the conclusion that time is open at each point of space. 
Thus, it is not the spacetime manifold itself that determines 
completely the topological properties of time at a certain 
point of space, since the determination of this topological 
structure depends also upon the given set of worldlines, at 
least within the injection approach. 
In the projection approach, on the other hand, it is assumed 
that M admits a partition into a family of time slices /Í. In 
that case the projection topology of the factor-space ШЛ 
can be taken to be the topology of time. This approach, however, 
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has the disadvantage that the assumption about the partitiona-
bility of M into time slices is very strong and therefore severe­
ly restricts the applicability of the projection method; for 
instance, it cannot be applied to the Godei universe. Moreover, 
it leads to rather awkward conclusions such as the possibility 
of a closed time for a Minkowski spacetime. 
Neither the injection nor the projection approach allows 
an adequate treatment of the problem whether time is open or 
closed, or, more generally, to determine the global structure 
of time for a given spacetime. But even if a procedure for de­
termining unambiguously the topological structure of time for 
a spacetime M were available, then still the following compli­
cation would occur. For supposing that according to such proce­
dure a spacetime M has a non-standard topological structure 
for time, e.g., that time is closed, then this non-standard 
temporal feature of M can often be eliminated by going to a 
so-called 'covering spacetime', M', which is observationally 
indistinguishable from M, but which does not exhibit this 
non-standard temporal feature, i.e., for this covering space-
time M' time is not closed but open1.0 An example of such a 
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transition to a covering spacetime with the standard topolo­
gical structure of time is given schematically in fig. б5%ог 
an observer in spacetime Ά, time is closed, but for an obser­
ver in spacetime B, which will have the same observations as 
the one in spacetime A, time is open. 
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Thus it should be kept in mind, as Earman remarks, that 
"non-standard time structures (e.g., branching and circular 
times) have a non-intrinsic character in that under very gene-
ral conditions they can be interpreted away in I'avor of standard 
time structures." There are, however, exceptions; for example, 
the closed timelike curves in a Godei spacetime cannot be elimi-
nated by going to a covering spacetime, since it is simply 
connected and therefore it is its own universal covering. 
The upshot of the foregoing is that speaking about the topo-
logy of time, and particularly, about the global properties of 
time, is at least hazardous within the spacetime approach:"It 
turns out to be harder to talk meaningfully about the topology 
of space and time than has been generally realised." 
But let us now turn to a discussion of the local topological 
structure of time, or better, to the local temporal topologi-
cal aspects of a spacetime. 
Discrete versus continuous time. Physical time in the standard 
picture is a one-dimensional continuous manifold. This is the 
case for both Newtonian absolute time and time in RT (in RT 
time is a one-dimensional submanifold of the four-dimensional 
spacetime manifold). These two properties of time, its conti-
nuity and one-dimensionality, are usually taken for granted; 
but whenever their self-evidence is put into question, then 
discrete time or multi-dimensional time are presented as alter-
natives to the standard picture. 
What does it mean for time to be continuous and one-dimensio-
nal? A proper treatment of this question makes it necessary to 
recall the definitions of continuity and of the number of 
dimensions of a space. 
-Continuity. The fact that the elements of a set constitute a 
continuum is related to the type of ordering of the elements 
of the set. Given a set S with a total ordering relation R, 
we can distinguish at least between a discrete, a dense and 
a continuous order: 
a) Discrete order. Let S be the set of natural numbers and R 
the usual arithmetical order relation. This type of order is 
called discrete. The number of elements between any two elements 
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of the set is finite and characteristic for this type of order 
is the fact that the notion 'next element1 is well defined. 
b) Dense order. Let S be the set of rational numbers and R 
again the usual arithmetical order. In a dense order, the 
number of elements between any two elements of S is no longer 
finite but denumerably infinite, and therefore the notion 
'next element' is meaningless. 
c) Continuous order. Let S be the real numbers and R as above. 
In this case the number of elements between two elements of S 
is no longer denumerably infinite, but superdenumerably infi-
nite. Here too, the notion 'next element' is meaningless. 
Intuitively, the most conspicuous property of a continuum 
is the fact that it does not have any 'gaps'. For the reals 
this is reflected in the fact that they are Cauchy complete. 
Cauchy completeness formalises this absence of gaps in a con-
tinuum in the following way: in a continuous set any conver-
ging sequence of elements of S has a limit which is an element 
of the set itself. It can easily be shown that the dense order 
of the rationals does not meet this requirement and that they 
are therefore Cauchy incomplete. Consider all the rationals 
smaller than ]/2·, clearly the sequence composed of these does 
converge, but it does not converge to an element of the set 
of rationals itself. The set containing both the rationals and 
all these limit numbers is the set of the reals; it has the 
very nice property that any converging sequence has a limit 
which is an element of the set itself, i.e., of the reals. 
There are no gaps in the reals. 
Let S,be the set of instants of time and R the 'earlier than 
or simultaneous with' relation. Again, three types of temporal 
ordering can be distinguished, viz., a discrete, a dense and a 
continuous temporal order. For discrete time, the number 
of instants in a time-interval is always finite and the notion 
'next instant' is well defined. For dense, resp. continuous 
time,this number of elements in a time-interval is denumerably 
infinite, resp. superdenumerably infinite; for both the notion 
'next instant' is meaningless. Dense and continuous time are 
infinitely divisible in the sense that for any time-interval 
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there exists an instant which lies exactly halfway, given the 
standard metrics; this is not the case for discrete time. 
It should be remarked that the distinction between discrete, 
dense and continuous time is based upon the order type of the 
instants of time and only involves set-theoretic concepts. It 
is not necessary that a topology is given on S. Therefore con­
tinuity (in the sense of completeness), denseness and discrete­
ness, as defined above, are not strictly topological concepts. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen shortly, there is an intimate 
relationship between a discrete order type of a set and a dis­
crete topology. 
-The number of dimensions of a space. The number of dimensions 
of a space is a genuine topological property. I will malee use 
of the definition of Menger because it corresponds closely to 
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our intuitive view of the dimensions of physical space. It for­
malises the fact that, for instance, a three-dimensional room 
is bounded by two-dimensional walls. Menger's definition runs 
as follows: 
a)The empty set has dimension -1. 
b)The dimension of a space is the least integer η for which 
every point has arbitrary small neighborhoods whose bounda­
ries have dimension less than n. 
According to this definition the Euclidian line L with the usual 
topology is one-dimensional: dim(L)=l. An interesting conse­
quence of this definition is that both discrete and dense time 
are zero-dimensional, since the only possible topology on a 
set with a finite or denumerably infinite number of elements 
is the discrete topology, and for any set with the discrete 
topology, the number of dimensions is zero. Thus, discrete 
time is always zero-dimensional. On the other hand, continuous 
time is not necessarily one- or more-dimensional, since conti­
nuous time with the discrete topology is zero-dimensional. 
Because the number of dimensions of a space is a topologi­
cal property, the one-dimensionality of time cannot be infer­
red directly from any of the temporal order properties. Thus, 
the linear ordering of the instants of time does not imply that 
time is one-dimensional. Indeed, it is possible to construe a 
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one-to-one correspondence between the points of a plane and the 
points of a line. Therefore the points of a two-dimensional 
plane can be given a total orderj and the same applies for the 
points of η-dimensional space. Likewise, the instants of two-
or η-dimensional time can be given a linear order. But, of 
course, the open sets defined with the help of this linear or­
der do not form a basis for the topology of two- or n-dimensio-
nal time. 
Thus the linear ordering of the instants of time does not 
lead immediatsly to the conclusion that time is one-dimensional; 
at least two additional assumptions are necessary. First, the 
instants of time must constitute a continuum under the temporal 
order relation 'earlier than or simultaneous with'. Secondly, 
since this still leaves open the possibility for zero- and n-
dimensional time, the open sets defined by this order relation 
must form a basis for the topological structure of time. Without 
these two assumptions, non-standard time conceptions like zero-
dimensional discrete time and multi-dimensional continuous time 
cannot be ruled out. Since both these non-standard time concep­
tions are occasionally proposed by physicist, it is worthwhile 
to consider them in some detail. 
-Zero-dimensional discrete time. In the standard conception of 
discrete time, the process of dividing a time-interval is sup­
posed to have a 'natural' end; in carrying out the process of 
division, we reach a point where it is no longer possible to 
divide the remaining time-interval in still smaller parts. 
Time is conceived of as built up from time-atoms, also called 
time-quanta or chronons. Within this picture of discrete time, 
the time-atoms are assigned a fixed duration. Physicists have 
tried to estimate the length of these time-atoms on theoretical 
-27 -2k grounds; values in the order of 10 -or 10 are often 
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mentioned. 
I will now try to make this picture of discrete time more 
precise in order to see whether it is coherent. The number of 
time-atoms in an interval of discrete time is always finite; if 
not, time would be dense or continuous. This implies, as we 
have seen already, that discrete time is zero-dimensional. 
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Nevertheless, this discrete zero-dimensional time is depicted 
as built up from one-dimensional time-atoms which are assumed 
to be homeomorphic to the standard closed interval. Grünbaum 
51 calls this kind of space 'singly extended discrete space'. 
This picture seems to 'save' the one-dimensionality of time by 
not ascribing it to time as a whole, but to the internal con-
stitution of the time-atoms; the question is whether this can 
be done coherently. The answer will be negative, because this 
picture of discrete time leads either to two unrelated tempo-
ral ordering relations, one inside the time-atoms, and one for 
the time-atoms as a whole; or a tacit appeal has to be made to 
a kind of continuous 'background' time, in which the time-atoms 
are embedded. 
In short, the situation is as follows. Let R be the exter-
' e 
nal ordering relation which arranges the time-atoms into a chain, 
and let R. be the internal order relation which orders the 
instants of the n-th time-atom. This view involves two complete-
ly independent temporal ordering relations and two different 
types of instants of time. For discrete time as a whole, the 
time-atoms are the instants, ordered by R , whereas inside the 
time-atoms there is a second type of instants which form a 
bounded continuum and are ordered by R.. Because these two 
temporal ordering structures are completely independent of 
each other, this picture of discrete time involves two diffe-
rent time concepts of which one is discrete (between the time-
atoms) and the other continuous (inside the time-atoms). 
A way out of this unsatisfactory situation seems to be of-
fered by an additional embedding of all the time-atoms in a 
one-dimensional continuous background time. This corresponds 
to the intuitive picture of discrete time, in which time-atoms 
are supposed to lie 'next' to each other, or touching each 
other:52 
"Many people have difficulty in imagining time to be "atomic" 
in structure because they believe this would imply the 
existence of temporal gaps which must themselves be part of 
time in contradiction of the hypothesis. On the contrary, 
however, the "atomicity" of time refers only to the indivisi-
bility of the chronon. In principle, chronons could be 
imagined as being like a row of pebbles which touch each 
other, so that there would be no gaps between them." 
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This way of looking at discrete time solves the problem of the 
two independent time concepts since the embedding of all the 
time-atoms in a continuous background space yields one unique 
temporal ordering relation which encapsulates both R and the 
R.. This overall temporal ordering relation is nothing else 
than the ordering of the points of the one-dimensional conti-
nuous background space. But this concept of time hardly can be 
called discrete, for the original time-atoms have become closed 
intervals (whether or not lying next to each other or touching 
each other) of this one-dimensional continuous background time 
which functions as a kind of 'supertime1. The discrete topolo-
gy of the time-atoms is lost since they are no longer closed 
and open. 
Clearly then, the association of one-dimensional continuous 
time atoms with discrete time is problematic. But the same ap-
plies for the notion 'minimal duration'. The expression 
'minimal duration' stands for a minimum (unequal to zero) in 
the accuracy of time measurements. Whether or not such minimal 
duration,i.e., a lower bound in the accuracy of time measure-
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ments, actually exists, is a rather controversial matter. 
It is, however, interesting that very often the existence of 
a minimal duration is regarded to be a consequence of the dis-
creteness of time: the exact location of the moment at which 
an event takes place within a time-atom would be impossible. 
But the reverse is also thought to be true: the existence of 
a minimal duration is interpreted as conclusive evidence for 
the discreteness or quantization of time. 
But there is no logical relationship between the notions 
of discrete time and minimal duration. A lower bound in the 
accuracy of time measurement is compatible with both discrete 
and continuous time. The quantization or discreteness of time 
does not imply the existence of a minimal duration anymore 
than the quantization of, e.g., the impulsmoment implies the 
existence of a lower bound in the accuracy with which the 
latter can be measured. There is no reason to assume that in 
principle the outcome of a time measurement in case of discrete 
time could not be exact; only for discrete time the set of all 
M 
possible outcomes of a time measurement constitutes a discrete 
set?5 
Clearly, the fact that the usual picture of discrete time, 
as built up from one-dimensional time-atoms, is obscure and 
even incoherent, does not imply that this notion itself can be 
disregarded completely; there is no reason to belief that any 
interpretation of discrete time is necessarily inconsistent 
(especially not if the notion of a one-dimensional time-atom 
is dropped). Therefore discrete time stays a viable alternative 
for continuous time. 
-Multi-dimensional time. There have been only a few attempts to 
use 'multi-dimensional time' concepts in physical theories 
and sofar these have not been very fruitful. For instance, 
formulations of unified field theories occasionally make use 
of five- m stead of four-dimensional spacetime manifolds. 
At first sight, such theories open a way for introducing a 
two-dimensional time, provided the signature of the metric is 
(+++—). Usually, the interpretation of this fifth coordinate 
as a second time coordinate is based solely upon the fact 
that in the metric it has the same sign as the original time 
coordinate. It is, however, highly questionable whether this 
formal analogy between this fifth coordinate and the original 
time coordinate provides sufficient reason to speak of a second 
time coordinate and thus of two-dimensional time, since it 
would require the additional introduction of notions like 
'past', 'present' and 'future' relative to this second time 
coordinate. 
In this respect the distinction between parameter time and 
coordinate time (see ch. II) is of special interest, for it 
shows a possibility to avoid this difficulty with regard to 
a multiplicity of notions like 'past' etc. in the case of 
multi-dimensional time. As far as these notions 'past', 'pre-
sent' and 'future' are related to the notion 'flow of time', 
they pertain to parameter time and not to coordinate time; 
coordinate time makes abstraction of all aspects of time which 
are related to 'temporal becoming' (see ch. III). From this 
point of view, the multi-dimensionality of coordinate time 
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does not necessarily involve the existence of different time-
flows, contrary to the multi-dimensionality of parameter time. 
Therefore, a multi-dimensional coordinate time appears to be 
more readily acceptable than a multi-dimensional parameter time. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of discrete or multi-dimensio-
nal time into physics would, without any doubt, be attended by 
many conceptual problems. In spite of these, however, both 
conceptions of time constitute real alternatives for the stan-
dard conception of time. Therefore physicists have tried often 
to 'prove' that physical time is one-dimensional or that space-
time is four-dimensional by reducing it to some other funda-
mental fact about nature.' But all these attempts, without 
exception, take at least two presuppositions for granted: a) 
the fact that space, time or spacetime is continuous, and b) 
the validity of one or more physical theories. From an episte-
mologica! point of view, the first of these presuppositions 
is of particular interest. 
Let us begin by taking a look at the continuity of physical 
time from the point of view of empirical data. Certainly, the 
continuity of time cannot be derived directly from these data. 
In his discussion of the 'empirical significance of continuity 
postulates', Newton-Smith reaches the conclusion that all 
relevant data compatible with Newton's mechanics which is based 
upon continuous time, are equally compatible with 'Notwen's' 
mechanics which is based upon dense time. According to Newton-
Smith, this is a clear case of 'underdetermination of theories 
by experimental facts'. In other words, it would be impossible 
to design a crucial experiment which would enable us to make 
a decision between Newton's and Notwen's mechanics, based 
resp. upon continuous and dense time. In this respect it is 
instructive to note that in recent work on the differentiable 
and topological structure of the spacetime manifold, the con-
tinuity of spacetime is introduced either explicitely by way 
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of an axiom , or it is implicitely being assumed. 
As for the choice between discrete and continuous time, the 
situation is in principle the same as for dense and continuous 
time. I have already pointed out that the existence of a mini-
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mal duration is compatible, contrary to what is very often 
assumed, with both discrete and continuous time. Therefore, the 
actual existence of such minimal duration could not settle the 
question. 
Assuming that, in principle, a decision cannot be reached 
on basis of empirical data, one could still try to justify the 
choice for continuous time by pointing to the fact that giving 
up this standard picture of time creates a great number of new 
conceptual problems. But of course, a fair comparison of the 
conceptual problems involved in the different concepts of time 
and the associated physics would be possible only if the alter-
natives were worked out with the same degree of sophistication 
as the standard approach. This is not the case. These alter-
natives have never been developed so extensively as to become 
serious competitors for standard physics based upon continuous 
time. But even if they had been developed, then it would still 
be necessary, in order to evaluate these different approaches, 
60 
to compare and weight the various conceptual problems involved. 
It is highly dubious whether the choice for continuous time 
can be justified convincingly in this manner. 
In view of this situation, a hard-boiled conventionalist 
might claim that, since all alternatives are equally compatible 
with the available data, the decision to use discrete or conti-
nuous time has to be reached by a convention, and that therefore 
the problem is really a pseudo-problem. However, most physicists 
would judge the situation otherwise; for them it does matter 
whether time is continuous or discrete. There can be no doubt 
that the hypothesis of the continuity and one-dimensionality 
of time which lies at the basis of Newton's fluxion-calculus 
and the differential calculus, was extremely fruitful during 
the last three centuries: all basic laws of physics are given 
in terms of differential equations. In general, there is no 
practical need for the physicists to put this hypothesis into 
question. The interesting question is under what conditions 
physicists would be prepared to reconsider or to give up the 
standard picture of one-dimensional continuous time and would 
start working on one of its alternatives. 
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Temporal orientability. I shall first have a short look at tempo­
ral orientability within the space and time approach and then 
go to the definition of temporal orientability of a spacetime 
6l 
manifold. In principle, nothing new is added in the latter; 
only the details are more complicated. 
In the neighborhood of each moment of time, i.e., locally, 
a future and past orientation of time, also called '+' and '-' 
orientation, can be defined. The problem is whether this can 
also be done for time as a whole, whether a global distinction 
between past and future orientation of time can be defined 
coherently. This is not always possible; for example, compare 
with each other figures 7a and 7b, representing resp. linear 
time and some rather 'pathological' time concept, in which time 
is a 'weird mixture' of linear and circular time. At the points 
χ and x' we choose a future orientation for time (indicated 
by the '+' arrow). Starting from the future orientation at 
fig. 7a fig. 7b 
these points, the future orientation at other points y and y' 
is defined in the following way: transport a vector pointing 
in the + orientation from χ (χ') to y (y') so that during 
transport the vector stays parallel to the line representing 
time; the future orientation at y (y') is then given by the 
orientation of the transported vector at y (y'). For the time 
of fig. 7a, this definition gives a globally coherent distinc­
tion between two opposite time orientations; but this is not 
so for the time of fig. 7b. Going along route ex to point y' 
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and along route /i , does not lead to the same result for the 
future orientation at y'. Starting from x' with a future poin­
ting vectorj we end up again at x', after having traversed the 
whole loop, with a past pointing vector. Therefore a global 
distinction between past and future orientation of time is 
not possible in the situation of fig. 7b; such a time is called 
non-orientable. Time is called orientable if, as in fig. 7a, 
a global distinction between past and future orientation of 
time is possible. 
Temporal orientability of a spacetime manifold is defined 
in the same vein. Again we make use of transporting timelike 
vectors along curves. Take an arbitrary point χ of M; at χ all 
timelike vectors fall apart into two classes, those pointing 
in the past and the future orientation of time. Next, take any 
closed curve through x, and choose a future (or past) oriented 
vector at x; transport this vector in a continuous way along 
this curve keeping it timelike. After transporting it in this 
way around the closed curve, two situations can occur: the 
original vector and the transported one have the same orien­
tation at x, i.e., they lie both within the future (or past) 
lobe at x, or they have opposite orientations. In the former 
case, the curve is said to be orientation preserving, in the 
latter not. Now, a spacetime M : s called temporally orientable 
if and only if for all χ every closed curve through χ is orien­
tation preserving. By selecting one of the two orientations, 
a temporally orientable manifold becomes a temporally oriented 
manifold. Spatial orientability of a spacetime manifold is 
defined analogously. 
If a spacetime M is temporally orientable, it is not neces­
sarily also spatially orientable; if it is both spatially and 
temporally orientable, then it is also orientable as a whole. 
Generally, if a spacetime is orientable in two of the three 
ways mentioned (temporally, spatially and as a whole), then 
the third one also follows. 
Temporal orientability is not a purely topological property 
of the spacetime manifold M; it is sometimes connected with 
the metric of M. However, every spacetime manifold M which is 
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simply connected is both space- and time-orientable, independent-
ly of its metric. 
Whereas the details of the definition of temporal orientabi-
lity are well understood, its physical significance is rather 
obscure. The problem is in what physical sense a temporally 
orientable manifold differs from a temporally non orientable one, 
and whether on physical grounds temporally non orientable 
manifolds can be ruled out as possible models for our universe. 
This is a complicated matter, especially because it involves 
one of the global aspects of spacetimes. 
A discussion of the empirical significance of the temporal 
(non) orientability of a spacetime manifold must take into 
consideration the well-known fact that for any temporally non 
orientable (t.η.о.) spacetime manifold a corresponding covering 
spacetime manifold can be found that is temporally orientable 
. 65 (t.o.). The problem can therefore be posed in the following 
way: is it possible to distinguish in physical terms between 
a t.n.o. spacetime M and its t.o. covering spacetime M1. If 
not, then it would always be possible to eliminate t.n.o. 
spacetimes in favour of their corresponding t.o. covering 
spacetimes. 
There is a strong argument for the physical indistinguisha-
bility of a t.n.o. spacetime and the corresponding t.o. space-
time. It is due to Geroch and Horowitz and in short it runs as 
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follows. Locally, both manifolds look exactly the same, al­
though globally they look different, since the "only effect of 
taking the universal covering spacetime is to possibly produce 
several copies of each local region in the original space-
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time..." Now, in view of the fact that all fundamental laws 
of physics are local laws, it is impossible to distinguish on 
basis of these laws alone between both types of manifolds, since 
they differ only globally. The conclusion would therefore be 
that, as far as the laws of physics are concerned, the tempo­
ral orientability resp. non orientability is not a relevant 
property. 
But although there is no direct link between the local laws 
of physics and the t.o. or t.n.o. of spacetimes, there neverthe-
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less exists an indirect connection between both-which concerns 
the time reversal invariance of physical laws. In t.n.o. space-
time, the laws of physics have to be time reversal invariant. 
It is easy to see why this has to be the case. In a t.n.o. 
spacetime it is not possible to distinguish globally between 
two opposite time orientations, but time reversal non invariance 
of physical laws implies that certain processes governed by 
these laws take place relatively to one orientation of time 
only, irrespective of where or when they take place. Therefore, 
time reversal non invariance of physical laws implicitely 
presupposes that it makes sense to speak of two opposite time 
orientations for the whole manifold, i.e., globally, and thus 
it presupposes temporal orientability. On the other hand, time 
reversal invariance of laws is compatible with both a t.o. 
and a t.n.o. spacetime manifold. 
Thus the existence of time reversal non invariant laws 
implies that temporally non orientable spacetimes can be elimi­
nated as possible models for our actual universe. For the mo­
ment, it is assumed that at least for one kind of processes 
the laws governing them are not time reversal invariant, viz., 
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the famous T-violation in weak interaction processes. Never­
theless, this T-violation does not allow the conclusion that 
the spacetime models for our actual universe must be temporally 
orientable since the assumption that Τ is violated in those 
processes is based upon the validity of the CPT theorem and 
70 the observed violation of CP.' Therefore, T-violation in those 
processes is coupled with CP violation; this implies that "the 
strongest conclusion to be drawn from such arguments, using 
the presently observed symmetry violations in elementary-particle 
physics, is that our spacetime must be total-orientable. One 
cannot conclude from this, for example, that our spacetime 
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must be separately time- and space-orientable." 
Therefore, the question whether our actual spacetime is tem­
porally orientable or not is still open. I do not know of any 
convincing argument that it should be temporally orientable. 
In ch. Ill,I will show that the existence of time asymmetry 
(usually called 'the arrow of time')in our universe does not 
чі 
imply that our spacetime is temporally orientable, 
Reviewing the foregoing, it is clear that the determination 
of the topological structure of physical time is not a simple 
matter. Our analysis shows that it is not necessary to elevate 
the standard picture of physical time to an unassailable dogma, 
since the available data are not powerful enough to determine 
completely and unambiguously the structure of physical time. 
This is an important conclusion; it does not show a defect of 
physical theories, on the contrary, it gives room to the 
scientific imagination. 
k2 
ΙΛ The metrical structure of time. 
The complete description of the structure of physical time 
requires more than the ordering and topological structures, for 
these do not capture the length of time-intervals. This aspect 
of physical timej which concerns duration, i.e., the amount 
of time elapsed between two events, is formalised in the metri-
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cal structure of time. The fact that time can be measured by 
clocks makes it necessary to endow time with a metric. As soon 
as a metric is ascribed to time, it makes sense to speak about 
the length of a time-interval and about two time-intervals 
having the same length. 
Within classical Newtonian physics, the metric of time is 
completely independent from the metric of space; both space 
and time have their own metric. The metric of time is a measure 
for the flow of absolute time which "...flows equably without 
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relation to anything external...". Two observers using identical 
ideal clocks, i.e., clocks which, without being disturbed, 
correctly measure the flow of absolute time, will always agree 
on the amount of time they measure for any time-interval ir­
respectively of, for instance, their state of motion. Thus, 
the time measured between events A and В along curve « by an 
ideal clock is equal to the time measured along curve/з by an 
ideal clock (see fig. 8). In other words, synchronised clocks 
time 
A 
fig. 8. 
at event A are still synchronous at event B, independently of 
the way they move in between. Parametrising the curves 
between A and В with absolute time t, makes it possible to 
^з 
state the foregoing in a different way: the integral of dt 
(the differential of absolute time) between A and В is path-
independent : В В 
For all и and all^ : J dt = J dt =φ· ¿dt =0; 
A A 
absolute time t, therefore, is integrable. 
The situation, however, becomes more complicated in the 
theory of relativity. When starting from spacetime as the funda-
mental spatio-temporal entity, two separate metrics are no 
longer assigned to space and time, but now there is but one 
metric for spacetime intervals (this metric is of the indefinite 
2 i к Riemannian type: ds = g.,dx dx , i,k=l,..,4). Whereas for 
IK 
Newton both the spatial and the temporal distance between two 
events have objective significance, in RT only the spacetime 
distance between two events is invariant. The way this space-
time distance is split into a spatial and a temporal distance 
is observer dependent. 
This results in a totally different behaviour of ideal clocks. 
Of course, these can no longer be said to correctly measure 
the flow of absolute time, but instead they have to be defined 
as being free from any disturbances which could slow down or 
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accelerate these clocks. Consider again the situation of 
fig. 8. According to RT, two ideal clocks synchronised at event 
A are generally no longer synchronous when brought together 
at event B, after having travelled along different routes OÍ 
and/3 · Although two observers travelling along «. and/7 use 
identical ideal clocks, they observe that their clocks measure 
different amounts of time between the events A and B, contrary 
to what was the case for absolute time. So, a universally valid, 
absolute measure of time does not exist. This can also be 
expressed in the following way: parametrise the curves« and 
/i with proper time X , i.e., the amount of time elapsed along 
curves « and/j as measured by an ideal clock moving along them; 
then generally, the following inequality holds forcx^/î: 
^dr i J à Τ =$ βάΠ 0; 
A A 
¿Jij 
thus, proper time Γ is not integrable over spacetime trajecto­
ries. 
Compared with the situation in space, the foregoing is not 
exceptional, for in space too, the distance between two points 
depends upon the trajectory between them. But whereas in space 
there is a minimum distance between any two points, in space-
time there is a maximum distance in proper time between any 
two points, one of which lies in the lightcone of the other. 
In other words, taking the integral of dt over all possible 
timelike trajectories between A and B, there is exactly one 
trajectory Y for which the integral takes on a maximum value 
(see fig. 9)· This trajectory is called the 'geodesic' between 
A and B. In flat Minkowski spacetime this geodesic is the 
straight line through A and B, which is the trajectory of an 
inertial observer for whom both events happen at the same 
place; while in curved spacetime, this geodesic is the trajec­
tory of a freely falling body going through A and B. In the 
following, I will restrict myself to flat Minkowsi spacetime 
of STR. 
Thus a clock moving along the geodesic between A and В 
measures more time than any other clock moving along any other 
timelike trajectory between those events. This is the well-
known time-dilatation effect of RT. This time-dilatation effect 
which involves a real difference in time of two clocks at B, 
should be carefully distinguished from the reciprocal time-
dilatation effect which occurs when the time measurements of 
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two observers 0 and 0' in uniform motion relatively to each 
other, are compared. From O's point of view the clock of 0', 
which he regards to be in motion, is slowed down relatively to 
his own clock. But because of the relativity of uniform motion, 
the argument can be reversed, and therefore from 0IJs point 
of view, the clock of 0 is slowed down. This time-dilatation 
is reciprocal, whereas this is not the case for the real dif­
ference in time of clocks in В ( fig. 9). Because of this 
reciprocity, the slowing down of clocks in uniform motion is 
an apparent phenomenon. 
The reciprocal character of the time-dilatation effect of 
clocks in uniform motion, is one of the basic ingredients, 
together with the non-integrability of proper time, of the 
famous twin paradox, to which I will turn now. This paradox 
can briefly be described as follows. Consider the diagrams of 
fig. 10a and 10b in which the trajectories of two twins Ь^ 
and t. are drawn, as seen resp. by twin t and twin t-. In 
fig. 10a, t. is at rest, while in fig. 10b, t^ is at rest. 
Suppose that at 0 both twins synchronise their ideal clocks; 
what is then the situation at E? From t1's point of view, fig. 
10a, the clock of t_ will be lagging begind at E because the 
clock of t., travelling along the geodesic between 0 and E, 
will have measured the maximum amount of time between 0 and E. 
Therefore, t will conclude that t is 'younger' at E. Although 
this, by itself, is a rather remarkable fact, there is never­
theless nothing paradoxical about it; it is just a fact about 
0 x' 
fig. 10a fig. 10b 
ne 
the behaviour of clocks. The paradox arises when the whole 
situation is described from t 's point of view, fig. 10b, for 
t? will reach exactly the opposite conclusion since he regards 
himself to be at rest, and therefore to be travelling along 
the geodesic between 0 and E. Thus, he will conclude that 
twin t. is 'younger' at E. 
Relativity theory seems to lead to a contradiction, for 
precisely, because of the relativity of motion, it should not 
natter whether we regard t to be at rest (fig. 10a), or tp 
(fig. 10b). Yet, so the standard argument continues, there is 
no real contradiction, for the situation between the two twins 
is not symmetric at all; they are not physically equivalent, 
since either t^ or t- feels some accelerations during his trip 
from 0 to E and, therefore, it is possible to determine unam-
biguously which one of them travels along the geodesic between 
0 and E, and which one travels along the broken line: if t2 
feels the accelerations, at event C, then the situation of 
fig. 10a obtains, and t? will be 'younger' than t1; if t. 
feels the accelerations, at event C', then the situation of 
fig. 10b obtains, and t will be 'younger' in E. Thus, the 
twin who has undergone some accelerations during his trip from 
0 to E, will be 'younger' at E. 
This is more or less the argument behind the twin paradox. 
Instead of entering into a discussion of the vast amount of 
literature on this twin paradox, I would like to argue three 
important points that might contribute to a clarification of 
the problems involved: 
l.the consistency of STR is not affected by the twin paradox, 
2.accelerations are not fundamentally relevant, and 
3.it is highly misleading to speak of a 'slowing down' of 
clocks. 
ad 1) That the whole problem of the twin paradox does not have 
any consequences for the consistency of STR as a mathematical 
theory is easily demonstrable. Within STR two observers are 
equivalent if and only if there exists a Lorentz-transformation 
between the two reference frames tied to these observers. 
However, the transition from reference frame x,ct (the rest 
frame of twin t.) to x',ct' (the rest frame of twin tp) in 
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fig. 10 does not correspond to a Lorentz-transformation, for 
each Lorentz-transformation transforms a straight line into 
a straight line. But in the transition from the situation of 
fig.10a to the one of fig. 10b, the straight line representing 
the trajectory of twin t. is transformed into a broken line. 
Therefore, statements about the behaviour of clocks made on 
basis of fig. 10a and 10b cannot contradict each other, because 
either the two diagrams represent two different physical situa­
tions in which case it is no problem that in one t is 'younger' 
and in the other t~, or they represent the same physical situa­
tion as seen by two observers which are not equivalent, because 
there is no Lorentz-transformation between them. The latter 
case applies to the situation of the twin paradox: because the 
twins are not physically equivalent, there is no symmetry be­
tween them and therefore it is not possible to reverse the 
argument in the twin paradox. 
Another problem altogether is to point out the physical cause 
of the difference in age of the two twins. Very often this problem 
is solved by an appeal to the accelerations felt by one of the 
twins. This brings us to our second point. 
ad 2) Apart from the objections one could raise against explicit­
ly introducing an antropomorphism, accelerations cannot physi­
cally explain the difference in age of the two twins in E, 
because the whole paradox can be rephrased in such a way that 
it is not necessary at all to refer to physical accelerations. 
This shows, moreover, that there is no need to translate the 
whole problem in terms of general relativity, on the basis of 
the argument that accelerations are involved and that therefore 
If) 
STR cannot adequately deal with this matter. To avoid accelera-
77 tions is quite simple.''If, instead of using one clock in 
fig. 10a moving along ОСЕ, two clocks are used, one of which 
moves uniformly along ОС and the second along CE, as illustra­
ted in fig. 11, then accelerations do not occur. Indeed, in С 
the clock moving between CE is synchronised with the clock 
moving between OE. When the readings of the clocks in E are 
compared, then again the same difference in time will be obser­
ved. Yet, there has not been any acceleration of a clock at all. 
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fig. 11 
This 'three-clock' reformulation of the twin paradox shows 
therefore that the acceleration of the clock in С (see fig. 10a) 
cannot be the physical cause for the different readings of the 
clocks in E, since the same difference occurs in fig. 11 with-
7 ñ 
out any accelerations taking place. Of course, if we go back 
from the three-clock situation to the one of the twin paradoXj 
with only two clocks, then accelerations must enter the discus-
sion, for otherwise the two clocks would never meet again in 
E after having been synchronised in 0. But although accelerations 
necessarily take place, and enable us to decide which one of 
the twins is younger at E, they cannot account for the time 
difference at E. Moreover, if the twin paradox is not formu-
lated in topologically Euclidian flat spacetime (E^xE), but 
in flat spacetime with the topology S xE, then it is possible 
that both twins move along geodesies between 0 and E; in other 
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words, they will not undergo any physical accelerations. Never-
theless, their clocks will have different readings in E. This 
again indicates that accelerations are not essential for an 
explanation of the difference in age of the two twins in E. 
ad 3) There are two reasons why it is misleading to speak of 
'slowing down' of clocks, especially within the context of the 
twin paradox. First, speaking of slowing down of clocks makes 
an implicit appeal to the idea of absolute time; and secondly, 
it seduces us into a physical explanation of this slowing 
down proces of clocks. 
The 'slowing down interpretation' of the situation in fig. 
10a runs somewhat as follows. The real time difference between 
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the two events 0 and E is the difference measured by twin t 1; 
twin t, measures a smaller amount of time between the same 
events, not because the path in time from 0 to E is shorter 
along his trajectory, but because his clock is slowed down 
during the proces of measurement. Twin t„ registrates a smaller 
number of ticks between 0 and E, not because there is less time 
along his trajectory, but because his unit tick becomes longer 
during the measuring proces. Thus, the concept of an absolute 
time is retained by virtue of introducing a slowing down 
proces of clocks. 
But, given this interpretation, the next question is of 
course, how we can physically explain this slowing down of 
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clocks. Usually, the accelerations at С (fig. 10a) are regar­
ded to be the physical cause for this slowing down proces. But 
as we have seen just above, these accelerations cannot account 
for the slowing down of the clocks because of the three clock 
version, in which the same time difference occurs without any 
physical accelerations of clocks. Moreover, in view of this 
three clock version, we have to ask how it will ever be possible 
to reconcile the reciprocal slowing down of clocks c. and c^, 
c 2 and c, and finally c, and c., with the real difference in 
time at E. It appears that any physical explanation of the 
slowing down of clocks must inevitably run aground here on 
account of the relativity of uniform motion. 
Clearly, the 'slowing down interpretation' does not lead 
us anywhere; but, how then is the time difference at E to be 
explained? If we really face up to the consequences of the fact 
that proper time is not integrable,i.e., <p<lti 0, and free 
ourselves from the idea of absolute time, then the above dif­
ficulties disappear completely; for then, it is superfluous 
to introduce any slowing down of clocks and, a fortiori, to 
search for physical interaction processes which could eventual­
ly explain this mysterious slowing down proces. The essential 
point is the recognition that we are dealing here with matters 
of a geometrical nature. 
'An analogy with space clarifies this approach. Consider again 
the situation of fig. 9, but now interpreted as paths in space, 
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not in spacetime. The distance between A and В along the geode­
sic is shorter than the distance between A and В along any 
other trajectory. This is a fact about geometry (the triangle 
inequality). We do not want nor need to physically explain this 
fact by arguing that the meter stick along non-geodesic paths 
shrinks and that consequently along those paths a longer dis­
tance will be measured. But precisely this kind of argument 
is used in the 'slowing doim interpretation'. Instead of reali­
sing that the dependence of the distance in time between two 
events upon the trajectory between those events, is simply a 
fact about the geometry of spacetime, some kind of hypotnetical 
slowing down of clocks is introduced. But there is no need to 
explain the time difference at E in such a way, since it is 
a basic geometric fact. Therefore, any construction to make 
the time difference at E intelligible, for instance in terms of 
signal procedures as used by Böhm, is superfluous; they show 
only the consequences of this basic geometrical fact, but they 
cannot explain this fact itself for it belongs to the axioma-
tic structure of the geometry itself. Only by keeping this in 
mind, can we avoid getting caught up in a network of spurious 
questions. 
The rejection of the notion of absolute time has brought 
about yet other kinds of problems, such as the problem of the 
epistemologica! status of the congruence of time-intervals. 
Within the Newtonian framework, the congruence of time-intervals 
is an intrinsic property of those intervals. The equality of 
time-intervals is determined by the flow of absolute time and, 
as the latter is independent of anything external, the former 
is too; whether or not two intervals are equal in length is a 
question of facts. However, the rejection of absolute time 
changes the situation. Reichenbach has convincingly shown that 
"the equality of succesive time intervals is not a matter of 
knowledge but a matter of definition. As for spatial congruence, 
a certain rule must be laid down before the comparison of 
Op 
magnitudes is defined." To speak of the equality of time-
intervals makes sense only after the appropriate coordinative 
definitions have been given. Of course, our choice of a 
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coordinative definition is conditioned by our desire to make 
our description of physical reality as simple as possible. But, 
as Reichenbach remarks, this "simplicity has nothing to do with 
truth, since it is merely descriptive simplicity." In other 
words, the statement that two time-intervals are equal in 
84 length can only be 'conventionally true'. 
This analogy in the epistemologica! problems concerning the 
metric of space on the one hand and the metric of time on the 
other, is not surprising since in the spacetime approach both 
coalesce into the spacetime metric. In both instances, the same 
kinds of problems are encountered. 
But with respect to time, Mittelstaedt has pointed out a 
particularly interesting problem which he refers to as the 
85 problem of the 'Einheit der Zeit'. This problem is also related 
to the abandonement of the notion of absolute time. To Newton 
it was self-evident that there existed just one fundamental 
metric for time: the intrinsic metric of absolute time. Physical 
processes of whatever kind could provide a more or less accurate 
'sensible measure' thereof. A 'true' sensible measure of abso-
lute time could only be reached in case of a perfectly isolated, 
completely undisturbed periodical system which would constitute 
an ideal clock. One could say that, according to Newton, in a 
certain sense all physical processes had to 'obey' the rhythm 
of absolute time: any ideal clock, of whatever nature, whether 
mechanical or gravitational or, for us also, electromagnética!, 
could provide an exact measure of the one fundamental metric 
of absolute time. 
But as soon -as the idea of an absolute time is abandoned, 
the situation becomes at once more problematic. There is no 
a priori reason to assume that different kinds of physical 
processes will lead to one fundamental metric of time. Consider, 
for instance, the time-scales defined by a mechanical, an 
electromagnética! and a gravitational periodical system. Empiri-
cally, we know that these time-scales 'match' to a very high 
degree of accuracy. In other words, a mechanical, electromagné-
tica! and gravitational clock, once they are synchronised, stay 
synchronous to a very high degree of accuracy. Newton would 
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interpret this in terms of one fundamental metric of time. 
However, there is no a priori reason to assume that indeed these 
different time metrics are in harmony. Usually, the assumption 
that indeed, once synchronised, these different clocks stay 
synchronous, is taken for granted. The hypothesis that all 
kinds of independent physical systems -mechanical, electromag-
nética!, gravitational, thermodynamical, quantum mechanical-
ultimately lead to one fundamental metric for time is called 
by Mittelstaedt the principle of the 'Einheit der Zeit': ' 
"Es ist zweckmässig, an dieser Stelle noch einmal of ein 
Phänomen einzugehen, , nämlich die Einheit der Zeit. 
Dabei wollen wir wiederum unter der Einheit der topologi-
schen Zeit die einheitliche Zeitrichtung aller Vorgänge ver-
stehen und unter der Einheit der metrischen Zeit das ein-
heitliche Zeitmass verschiedener und voneinander unabhängiger 
Vorgänge." 
The 'Einheit der Zeit' is not only connected with the metrical 
structure of time, but it can be expanded to each of the 
structural levels of time, as indicated in the above quotation 
by Mittelstaedt. However, his interpretation of the 'Einheit 
der topologischen Zeit' in terms of the 'einheitliche Zeit-
richtung aller Vorgänge' is rather misleading, since the 
direction of time (die Zeitrichtung) is not a topological pro-
pery of time at all (see ch. III). Therefore it would be better 
to interpret the 'Einheit der topologischen Zeit' as the assump-
tion that different kinds of physical processes will ultimate-
ly lead to the same topological structure of time. 
The principle of the 'Einheit der Zeit' has mainly a heuris-
tic, methodological function. This can be seen as follows. 
Suppose that, after carefully comparing the metrics ascribed 
to time on the basis of inertial and gravitational systems, the 
two resulting metrics, T- and Τ , appear to be non-linearly 
ι g 
related. (Linearly related time functions are not of interest 
since they lead to the same congruence classes on the set of 
time-intervals.) This means that the most 'natural' unit of 
time for gravitational processes varies relatively to the 
most 'natural' unit of time for inertial processes, since these 
units of time have been chosen so that the equations descri­
bing the behaviour of gravitational and inertial systems look 
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as siir.ple and intelligible as possible. Usually T. and Τ are 
ι S 
chcsí-n so that resp. the inertial mass η (res^ mass) and the 
gravitational constant G do not vary in time. But if T. and 
Τ are non-linearly related, then it is impossible to chose 
S 
the metric of time in such a way that both m and G are constant 
in time: relatively to T., G will be time dependent and relative­
ly to Τ , m will be time dependent. Henceforth, the principle 
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of the 'Einheit der Zeit' functions as a methodological rule 
stating that we should try to find out which metric of time 
is the more fundamental one; in other words, that we should 
attempt to discover which type of phenomena, gravitational 
or inertial, is to be regarded as more basic. Once this issue 
is settled, the next step is of course to explain why, if e.g. 
the inertial phenomena are considered to be more basic and 
therefore T. is taken to be the fundamental metric of time, 
ι fìfì 
the gravitational constant G changes relatively to the time T.. 
Without any doubt, the majority of physicists would not ob-
ject to the use of the principle of the 'Einheit der Zeit' as 
a methodological rule. Nevertheless we have to ask for a ratio-
nale for its use in this way. According to Mittelstaedt, the 
principle of the 'Einheit der Zeit' is a consequence of the 
more general principle of the 'Einheit der Physik'. ° 
"Man wird sich natürlich fragen, welche Gründe eigentlich 
dafür existieren, die Einheit der Zeit als ein methodisches 
Prinzip bei der Auswahl eines geeigneten Zeitmasses zu 
benutzen. Die dargestellte Verbindung dieses Prinzips mit 
der Vorstellung einer Hierarchie von Theorien macht deutlich, 
dass die Konzeption, die dem Prinzip der Einheit der Zeit 
zugrunde liegt, die Einheit der Physik ist. Damit ist die 
Vorstellung gemeint, dass alle bekannten Theorien sich 
entweder aus einer fundamentalen Theorie herleiten lassen 
oder in einer Theorie zusammengefasst werden können." 
So, it is a fundamentally reductionist position that grounds 
the belief in the validity of the principle of the 'Einheit 
der Zeit'. But, as Mittelstaedt continues and I fully agree 
with him, the idea of a fundamental metric of time could be 
• • n · 9 0 an illusion: 
"Das methodische Prinzip der Einheit der Zeit findet seine 
Rechtfertigung daher in dem Gedanken, dass es eine wirklich 
fundamentale Zeitmetrik tatsächlich gibt und dass es nur 
darauf ankommt, diese Zeit auch zu finden. Es ist wichtig, 
sich klar zu machen, dass die Hoffnung, das Prinzip der 
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Einheit der Zeit könnte tatsächlich zur Auffindung dieser 
Zeit führen,auf der unausgesprochenen Voraussetzung berührt, 
dass es die Einheit der Physik gibt. Dafür aber sprechen 
weder theoretische noch experimentelle Gründe. Die Einheit 
der Physik könnte eine Fiktion sein, die sich niemals ver-
wirklichen lässt. Bei der Beurteilung des Phänomens der Ein-
heit der Zeit muss man daher zwei Stufen sorgfältig unter-
scheiden. Die Zeitmasse, die in der Physik mit Hilfe der 
Prinzipien der Einfachheit und der maximalen Erklärungs-
kraft gewonnen werden, führen mit sehr hoher Genauigkeit 
auf einer einheitliche Zeitmetrik. Das ist ein empirisches 
Faktum. Die Feststellung, dass diese Zeitmasse darüber 
hinaus entweder exact übereinstimmen oder dass eines dieser 
Zeitmasse fundamental ist und die anderen Zeiten sehr schwach 
davon abhängen, ist jedoch eine Folge der Anwendung des 
Prinzips der Einheit der Zeit. Durch dieses methodische 
Prinzip wird die Möglichkeit, verschiedene gleichwertige 
Zeitmasse in der Physik einzuführen, grundsätzlich ausge-
schlossen. Es ist eine offene Frage, ob man sich dadurch 
wesentliche theoretische Strukturen verstellt." 
There is however one theory in which indeed the principle 
of the 'Einheit der Zeit' is rejected as a methodological prin-
ciple. This happens in the theory about kinematic relativity 
of Milne, in which he uses two different time-scales, t and f , 
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which are logarithmically related to each other. In the 
f-scale, Newtonian physics is valid and so it is "finally to 
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be identified with the 'uniform' time of physics". The t-scale, 
on the other hand, is to be applied in cosmologica! matters: 
"nature, as it were, knows only t-measures in these cosmologica! 
93 questions."^ In the t-scale, the gravitational constant is 
time dependent. According to Milne, these two time-scales are 
equivalent: "...they constitute two different languages, and 
the statement of any property of the system can be made in 
either language.'v The description of the phenomena at the 
cosmologica! level, leads to congruence classes of time-inter-
vals (t-scale) which are different from the congruence classes 
of the time function used in ordinary physics (r-scale). In 
Milne's theory, 'local time' and 'global time' have different 
metrics, but both are equivalent and thus neither one is more 
fundamental. Here, the principle of the "Einheit der Zeit' 
as a methodological rule is not obeyed; no attempt is made to 
discover which metric is more fundamental than the other. Both 
metrics are accepted as equally fundamental. 
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1.5 Conclusion. 
The transition from the concept of absolute time, as introdu-
ced by Newton in his Principia, to the notion of time as used 
in the spacetime approach of RT, represents a drastic step in the 
physicist's conception of nature. RT prompted a profound revi-
sion, at the order, topological and metrical level, of our 
long-standing and seemingly self-evident ideas about time, 
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anchored 'unerkannt im Unbewussten' as Einstein expressed it. 
We do not necessarily have to think of physical time as a con-
tinuous straight line. The structure of time is not fixed 
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a priori, as Kant thought it was. We have come to realise that, 
besides the standard picture of time, there exist many other 
possibilities for the structure of time. 
I have reviewed some of the epistemologica! problems engen-
dered by this insight. In view of the failure of the Kantian 
a priori conception of the structure of time, the most obvious 
alternative is to look for ' a posteriori evidence' in nature 
in order to determine the actual structure of physical time. 
But as we have seen, the matter is not altogether as simple 
as that. The known empirical data fit different conceptions 
of time; but even worse, certain •conventionalistic strategies' 
show that whatever the future empirical data may be, they can 
be made to fit different time concepts. This Poincaréan con-
ventionalistic point of view regards all alternative time 
concepts as roughly equably viable and maintains that our 
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choice of one of them is essentially free. Strange as it may 
sound, this closes the circle and brings us back to a kind of 
a priori conception of the structure of physical time: the 
determination of the actual structure of time is not based 
upon, nor derived from what is empirically given. But it is 
not a priori in the Kantian sense, for despite being a priori 
in the sense of being independent of our experience, the 
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properties of time are, nevertheless, of a contingent nature. 
Looking at the great impulse given to the study of time by 
RT, it is rather remarkable that quantum mechanics, that other 
paramount achievement of twentieth century physics, had little 
or no influence upon our conception of time. In the standard 
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representation of quantum mechanics, physical observables are 
represented by (hermitian) operators acting on state functions 
in a Hilbert space. But this theory is not based upon nor does 
it contain a new theory about the structure of time. Time in 
quantum mechanics is usually assumed to be homeomorphic to E. 
However, time plays a rather obscure role in quantum mechanics. 
But here we broach upon the subject matter of the next chapter, 
which concerns the geometrical nature of time in physical 
theories. 
ы 
Appendix. 
The following description of relativistic spacetimes is taken 
99 from Earman. 
Relativistic Space-times. 
By a relativistic space-time M I shall mean a four-dimensional 
differentiable manifold equipped with a Lorentzian metric. 
Roughly, a manifold is a Hausdorff topological space that is 
locally Euclidian. A topological space is said to be connected 
if it cannot be decomposed into nonempty disjoint open sets. 
Each point of a topological space belongs to a maximally con­
nected subset called the component of the point, and the space 
is partitioned by its components. For a differentiable manifold, 
connectedness implies path-connectedness; that is, if M is con­
nected, then every pair of points can be joined by a path. 
The Lorentzian nature of the metric of M permits one to define 
in each tangent space Τ , χ e И, of К an object С called the 
null cone at x. If the Sector ueT , then u is siid to be 
timelik"i~(respectively, null, spacllike) if u lies inside (on, 
outside) С . M is said to be temporally orientable if it admits 
an everywhere-defined continuous time-like vector field V; 
intuitively, this means there is a continuous division of the 
lobes of the null cones of M into two classes, one of which is 
to be interpreted as the "past" lobes, the other as the 
"future" lobes 
A connected and temporally orientable M has two temporal orien­
tations; the choice of one of these corresponds to a choice 
of the future direction of time. (Let u*T and νβ Τ , x.yeM, 
be two timelike vectors. Define the relation R(u,v) to hold 
between u and ν just in case u points into the same lobe of С 
as does ν when it is parallel-transported to y. R is an equiva­
lence relation, and the quotient of the set of timelike tangent 
vectors of M by R has two elements.) The choice of a temporal 
orientation for M induces an orientation on curves of M; thus, 
a parametrized differentiable curve of M is said to be future-
directed if the positive tangent to the curve at any point χ 
lies in the future lobe of С 
If M is temporally orientable, it is possible to project out 
an enduring physical three-space S; by hypothesis, there is an 
everywhere-defined continuous timelike vector field V; the 
trajectories of this field form a three-parameter congruence 
of timelike curves which are interpreted as the world lines 
of the points of S, so S is the quotient of M by the equivalence 
relation S(x,y) which holds between x.yeM just in case χ and y 
both lie on the same curve of the trajectory, i.e., a point 
PéS is an S-equivalence class of points of M. 
A spacelike hypersurface H of M is a three-dimensional submani-
fold of M such that any displacement lying wholly within H is 
spacelike. A time slice of M is a global spacelike section of 
M, i.e., a spacelike hypersurface which is properly imbedded 
(is a closed subset of M) and which does not have boundaries. 
If M can be covered by a one-parameter family Η(λ) of time 
slices, then a time Τ can be projected out. Τ is the quotient 
of M by the equivalence relation T(x,y) which is defined to 
hold between x,yeM just in case χ and y both lie on the same 
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slice; i.e., an instant te Τ is an T-equivalence class of points 
of M. M has a cosmic time function if there exists an f: M—*• R 
such that f increases along every future-directed timelike 
curve, f can be used to define a Τ whose instants are given a 
strict simple order by the natural earlier than relation.... 
The space-time M employed in the special theory of relativity 
is Minkowski space-time. Choose any pseudo-Cartesian coordinate 
system and let the coordinates of points χ and y be respectively 
(χ ,χ ,χ ,x ) and (y ,y ,y
 Jy1);1t^e space-time length2s(y-x) 
ofnthg vector y-x is then ((y -x~) + (y -x ) + (y -x ) -
(y -x ) ) 5 . Define the relation χ «. y to hold between χ and y 
just in case it is possible for some causal signal to propagate 
from χ to y; i.e., s(y-x)^0 and y > χ . Then a continuous one-
to-one mapping f: M—»M is said to be a causal automorphism of 
К just in case both f and f preserve the relation « ; i.e., 
χ <:< у if and only if f χ « fy for every x,yeM. The set of all 
causal automorphisms forms a group С called the causality 
group, and С can be shown to be identical with the group G 
generated by the orthochronous Lorentz transformations plus 
translations and dilations. 
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II. ON THE GEOMETRICAL NATURE OF PHYSICAL TIME: PARAMETER TIME 
AND COORDINATE ΤΙΝΈ. 
Summary. 
The analysis of the standard scheme for the description of 
the evolution of a system, shows that time can function geome­
trically in two different waysj as a parameter or as a coordi­
nate. Whereas in the space and time approach of classical physics, 
only parameter time is used, both parameter-time and coordinate-
time occur within the spacetime approach of relativity theory. 
However, it is possible not only to formulate classical physics 
within the spacetime approach, but also to restate relativistic 
physics, at least the special theory of relativity, within the 
space and time approach. Generally, a transition from the space 
and time approach to the spacetime approach can be made rather 
easily. But a transition from the spacetime approach to the 
space and time approach is possible only in the case where the 
spacetime manifold admits of a foliation. The conditions under 
which a spacetime manifold can be foliated in a physically sig­
nificant way will be examined. 
It will be shown that certain philosophical problems usually 
associated with the special theory of relativity are not related 
to that theory itself, but arise from the spacetime formalism 
in which it is formulated. Finally, I shall argue against Reichen­
bach that the treatment of time as a coordinate is net only 
relevant for mathematical physics. On the contrary, the distinc­
tion between parameter and coordinate time also proves to be 
valuable for clarifying the structure of physical time. 
II.1 Introduction. 
In the previous chapter, I have analysed the 'internal' 
structure of time with the help of the language of differentiable 
manifolds provided by modern mathematics. The same language 
will also be of crucial importance for our next topic: the geo­
metrical nature of time. This no longer concerns the internal 
structure of time, but is related to the way physicists make 
use of the concept of time in their theories and to questions 
about the relations between time and other fundamental concepts 
appearing in those theories. In other words, this chapter deals 
with the role time plays in physical theories, and more in 
particular, with its geometrical role. 
In order to elucidate the meaning of the expression 'geome­
trical nature of time', let us focus our attention on the des­
cription of motion and ask how time functions in the different 
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ways motion is described in physics. Almost any motion, e.g., 
the motion of a particle in physical space or the evolution of 
a thermodynamical system, is represented according to the gene-
rally accepted standards of physics by way of a 'trajectory' in 
some kind of (abstract) space (see fig.12). Motion, here, is 
taken in the very broad sense of 'change', and therefore, an 
exception is to be made for certain types of change that cannot 
be represented in terms of a trajectory (at least for the mo-
ment), e.g., the 'discrete jump' of an atom from one energy-
state to another. Ordinarily, these trajectories are represen-
ted by 'parametrised curves*. Since however, in general, not 
parameter, Ispace' 
-trajectory 
fig. 12 
every curve in the space in which motion is represented, can 
be interpreted as corresponding to a physically realisable 
motion, restrictions have to be imposed upon the types of 
curves that can be called trajectories. Some of these restric-
tions are of a very general nature, such as those concerning 
the continuity and differentiability of the curves; others 
depend upon the nature of the (abstract) space in which motion 
is represented and upon the particular physical theory that 
is being used. 
The nature of the (abstract) space in which the motion or the 
evolution of a system is described, depends upon the physical 
system under consideration. The motion of a material body is 
usually represented by a trajectory in space (E ), or spacetime 
(E-'xE), both of which have a specific metric; whereas generally, 
the phase-spaces in which the evolution of thermodynamical 
systems is described, are taken to be only affine spaces. The 
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same applies to the parameters: while in the first case time 
is usually chosen as the parameter, in the second temperature 
can sometimes function as the parameter. Moreover, it should 
be noted that there is no unique way of describing the evolu­
tion of a particular physical system; neither the parameter, 
nor the space is fixed in a definite a priori way. Different 
choices of parameter and space are, in general, possible for 
the same physical system. One of the aims of this chapter is 
precisely to compare and evaluate two different ways of descri­
bing the motion of a material body (conceived of as a point-
particle) . 
The spaces involved in the description of the evolution of 
physical systems, are taken to be differentiable manifolds. 
Therefore, the general scheme for the standard description of 
motion in physics is constituted by a parameterised curve in 
some differentiable manifold. Because we presuppose continuity 
and differentiability, the use of this standard scheme, together 
with the restrictions upon the curves which represent physical­
ly realisable motions, puts severe limitations upon the type 
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of physics we are dealing with. 
Prom now on I shall confine myself to the description of 
change of place of a (point) particle, i.e., to locomotion. 
Time as well as space, usually play a fundamental role in the 
description of this kind of motion: physical space or spacetime 
is taken to be that in which the motion takes place, while time 
is used as a parameter, because at each moment of time, the 
position of the particle in space (spacetime) is uniquely deter­
mined. But as Dingle has rightly pointed out, it is by no means 
necessary to measure and represent change of place (locomotion) 
"by the space covered by the moving body in a given time." 
"Having no preconceptions in the matter at all", we could have 
chosen, according to Dingle, to construct some form of speedo­
meter or to use "the displacement of spectrum lines known as 
the Doppler effect. In taking space and time as the fundamen­
tal concepts for describing locomotion, physicists follow 
Galileo, who was the first to recognise the importance of time 
within this context. That was and still is considered to be one 
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of his most revolutionnary contributions to physics. Thus, 
besides the standard interpretation of the manifold in which 
the motion is represented as corresponding to physical space 
(or spacetime), and of the parameter as corresponding to time, 
other interpretations are in principle possible. 
This analysis mainly concerns the role of time in kinematics, 
i.e., the description of locomotion without considering dynami-
cal quantities like mass and force. Kinematics is central to 
those physical theories which fall under the heading of mecha-
nics. For the moment, I will concentrate upon classical mecha-
nics of Galileo and Newton, and upon relativistic mechanics of 
Einstein; later on, I will also turn to quantum mechanics. 
Therefore, the results of this analysis will pertain to rever-
sible mechanical time; 'reversible' because the laws of mecha-
nics are time reversal invariant (see ch. III). In the follo-
wing, I shall refer to the geometrical nature of reversible 
mechanical time simply as the geometrical nature of time. 
Within the context of this standard scheme of the description 
of motion, 'the geometrical nature of time' refers to the nature 
of the relationship between time and the basic geometric entities 
involved in this scheme: the manifold in which the motion is 
represented and the parameter. Time can be related in fundamen-
tally different ways to the manifold in which motion is descri-
bed. If it is part, a submanifold, of that manifold, then it 
functions as a coordinate; if it is 'external' to the manifold, 
it functions as a parameter. This leads to the distinction between 
parameter time and coordinate time each of which plays a different 
geometrical role in the description of motion. 
The transition from Newton's to Einstein's way of describing 
motion, is marked by a transformation in the geometrical natu-
re of time, at least in the standard formulations of both. In 
Newton's description of motion, time functions only as parameter. 
Motion takes place in absolute space and is parametrised by 
absolute time; to each moment of absolute time, there corres-
ponds a unique position in absolute space. Moreover, absolute 
space and time are conceived as completely independent entities; 
In the description of motion this independence is reflected in 
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the fact that the parameter and the space manifold are completely 
independent of each other. But in the standard formulation of 
relativity theory, this picture thoroughly changes. Now time, 
besides being a parameter in the form of proper time, is also 
treated as a coordinate, since according to the Lorentz-transfor-
mations space and time transform in a similar manner. This change 
in the geometrical nature of time, from parameter time in classi-
cal mechanics to the couple of parameter and coordinate time in 
relativistic mechanics, is paralelled by a transformation of the 
notions of space and of time into the single concept 'spacetime'. 
It is important to note that sofar I have been referring 
to the by now standard formulations of classical and relativis-
tic mechanics. With regard to these, indeed, the change in the 
geometrical nature of time is one of the most conspicuous 
features. Newton's space and time approach, with only parame-
ter time, is replaced by the spacetime approach, in which both 
parameter time and coordinate time occur. This has had a tho-
rough influence upon the physicist's conception of nature; 
not (material) objects, but events are regarded to be the ul-
timate constituents of the external world, and these events 
simply are, they cannot be said to be happening. This position 
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is most clearly stated by Weyl: 
"The objective world simply is_, it does not happen. Only to 
the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the 
life line of my body, does a certain section of this world 
come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuous-
ly changes in time." 
According to this line of thought, the replacement of Newtonian 
mechanics by Einsteinian mechanics, commits us to a considera-
ble change in our thinking about the constitution of physical 
reality. It goes without saying that such a far-reaching change 
in the physicist's conception of nature gave rise to many 
philosophical issues; some of these will be discussed later 
on. For a critical examination of these philosophical problems, 
however, it should be born in mind that both Newtonian and 
Einsteinian mechanics can be formulated in non-standard ways: 
relativity theory, at least the special theory, can be formu-
lated with the sole use of parameter time, i.e., within the 
space and time approach, and Newtonian mechanics can be formu-
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lated with the use of time as a coordinate, i.e., within the 
spacetime approach. As a result, the space and time and the 
spacetime approach become separated from specific physical theo-
ries; they can, therefore, be regarded as two different ways 
or two different languages for describing motion. Thus, one 
ought to be very careful to distinguish the philosophical pro-
blems belonging to the theory of relativity proper, and those 
resorting from the use of the spacetime formalism in the stan-
dard formulations of relativity theory. 
In order to get a clearer insight into the geometrical nature 
of time and into the consequences of treating time as a parame-
ter and/or as a coordinate, I shall proceed in the following 
way. First, I shall recall (sect. 2) the definitions of parame-
ter and coordinate. Then I shall discuss (sect. 3) some general 
features of the space and time approach, involving only parame-
ter time, and the spacetime approach, involving both parameter 
time and coordinate time, to the problem of the description 
of motion. Sections 4 and 5 contain applications of both ap-
proaches to resp. Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. Thereafter, 
I shall turn (sect.6) to the problem of translating the spacetime 
approach into the space and time approach and vice versa. There 
it will also be pointed out that a number of philosophical pro-
blems are wrongly associated with the special theory of relati-
vity. Sect. 7 contains a brief examination of the geometrical 
nature of time in quantum mechanics. In the final section, I 
shall first expose two attempts to make use of the distinction 
between parameter and coordinate time within dynamics; there-
after, I shall argue that this distinction contributes to a 
better understanding of physical time. 
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II.2 Parameter and coordinate. 
A discussion of the difference between parameter time and 
coordinate time, requires a statement of the definitions of a 
parameter (more in particular , of a parametrised curve), and 
of a coordinate function. 
Let M be an η-dimensional differentiable manifold and I the 
standard open interval on the reals. A parametrised curve C(t) 
on M, with parameter t, is a mapping from I into M: 
C: Rr>I * M 
t ι » C(t)=m(t). 
A parameter, therefore, simply is a variable, ranging over the 
standard open interval of the reals (I); more general defini­
tions of a parameter are possible, but they are not relevant 
within this context. In the following we will take С to be a 
differentiable curve, which means that the mapping С is dif­
ferentiable. 
The same curve in M can be parametrised in an indefinite 
number of different ways. In general, all these parametrisa-
tions are equivalent; the choice of a particular one is arbi­
trary. From a physical point of view, however, restrictions 
are imposed upon the way a certain curve can be parametrised; 
the class of allowable reparametrisations of a curve is, physi­
cally, very important. For instance, within Newtonian mecha­
nics, only linear transformations of parameter time (t^at+b) 
are allowed. 
It is not necessary to recall the precise definition of a 
coordinate system on M. For our purposes, the following rough 
characterisation'is sufficient. Given open subsets U of M and 
W of R n, a coordinate system χ on U consists of a set of func­
tions (x^, ,x ) from U to W such that χ is a homeomorphism 
(a one-to-one bicontinuous map) between U and W. These functions 
assign to each point m e U its coordinate values x ^ m ) , . . . . , 
χ (m). A coordinate function, therefore, is given by a mapping 
from M to R; it is a numerical function on M: 
x.: u c M »-VCR x: Uc M >· W C R n 
m » *x.(m) m ι > (x1 (m), . . ,χ (m) ) 
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Since a coordinate system is a homeomorphism, all the topologi­
cal properties of domain U and codomain W are equal. Locally, 
there is just one topological property that completely deter­
mines the structure of the manifold: the number of dimensions. 
That the number of dimensions of U is equal to the number of 
coordinate functions x., is a fact often taken for granted. 
However, this is not self-evident, but was proven by Brouwer; 
be showed that the number of dimensions of Euclidean n-space 
(which is the ordinary space of η real variables) is exactly n.' 
These definitions clearly show the difference between a 
parametrised curve and a coordinate function. A parametrised 
curve is a mapping from the reals to the manifold, whereas a 
coordinate is a mapping from the manifold to the reals; they 
are dual mappings: ° 
parameter coordinate 
R > M M > R 
But the difference between both gets obscured in case M=R, for 
then we obtain the following scheme: 
parameter coordinate 
R > R R + R 
Suppose, furthermore, that the mapping producing the parametri-
sation of R is a homeomorphism; then any difference between 
both notions disappears. (Moreover, by choosing the identity 
morphism as the coordinate function, the difference between 
a point of the manifold and its coordinate also disappears, and 
thus χ stands for both a point of the manifold and for its 
coordinate value.) Under these special conditions, the notions 
of a parametrised curve and a coordinate function have the same 
meaning: a coordinatisation of the reals is at the same time 
a parametrisation of the reals. In general, however, the two 
should be carefully distinguished. 
Because a parametrised curve is given by a mapping, each 
parameter value corresponds to a unique element of K. In terms 
of locomotion,this means that we can 'follow' the motion of a 
particle in M: for each parameter value it is possible to locate 
the particle in M. Only in very exceptional cases can the same 
goal can be reached with the help of a coordinate function. 
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Given a coordinate system on M and a curve C, the latter can be 
'parametrised' by one of the coordinate functions x., iff the 
function x. is a bijection between the points of the curve and 
the reals; if so, the values of the parameter for the points of 
С can be chosen so as to be equal to the χ.-coordinate values. 
In this way, it is possible to identify a parameter and a coor­
dinate, a fact that will become important when we are going 
to discuss the problem cf the intertranslatability of the space-
time and the space and time approach. 
Another important aspect of a parameter is that it is 'extrin­
sic' or 'external' to the manifold: the parametrisation of a 
curve in M is in principle completely independent of the struc­
ture of M. This, of course, cannot be said of a coordinate sys­
tem. The fact that very often, in case M is a metric space, a 
curve in M is parametrised by the arclength along the curve from 
a fixed point, does not contradict this statement. The arclength, 
indeed, is determined by the structure ( the metric) of M; but 
the value of the parameter does not necessarily have to corres­
pond to the arclength along the curve. 
Finally, the following point concerning the physical signi­
ficance of coordinates deserves our attention, especially with 
regard to the space and time coordinates used in general relati­
vity. Einstein has shown that the idea that differences in 
space and time coordinates have a direct physical significance 
in terms of measurements with rigid rods or standard clocks, 
g 
must be put aside: 
"We therefore reach this result: In the general theory of 
relativity, space and time cannot be defined in such a way 
that differences of the spatial co-ordinates can be directly 
measured by the unit measuring-rod, or differences in the 
time co-ordinate by a standard clock." 
As a result, differences in coordinate time values between events 
have no direct physical significance; this difference in 
coordinate values is not a direct measure of the time elapsed 
between those events. On the other hand, the values of a para­
meter in general, and of parameter time in particular, are 
chosen so as to have direct physical significance. That they 
can so be chosen at all, follows from the fact that the parame­
trisation of a curve in a manifold M is in principle independent 
68 
of the structure of M. 
The foregoing has far-reaching consequences for the physical 
status of parameter time and coordinate time; whereas in fact 
parameter time is always chosen so that differences in parameter 
time are invariant, or have an absolute character, coordinate time 
cannot always be defined in this way. Therefore, in case both 
parameter time and coordinate time are used for the description 
of motion, as in the spacetime approach, parameter time is, 
from a physical point of view, the more fundamental notion of 
time. 
I shall now turn to a discussion of some general features of 
the description of motion, both in the space and time approach, 
where only parameter time is used, and in the spacetime approach, 
in which parameter time and coordinate time are used together. 
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II.3 Parameter time and coordinate time. 
A. Parameter time in the space and time approach. 
In the space and time approach, the motion of a particle 
is described in the following way: 
Parameter: Time Manifold: Space 
C: I ν M 
t , *• m(t) 
Space is that in which motion occurs, and time is that b¿ which 
motion is parametrised. In the physical 'universe of discourse' 
corresponding to this approach, the idea of particles placed 
in space play an important role, more so than the concept of 
event. Space and time are, in all respects, independent of each 
other; for instance, a metric is ascribed separately to space 
and time. 
By interpreting the parameter in the general scheme for the 
description of motion as time, we have, unconsciously, fixed 
rather strongly the internal structure of (parameter) time, 
because the domain of the mapping giving a parametrised curve 
('parameter space'), is always chosen as homeomorphic to I. 
And thus, parameter time becomes homeomorphic to I; within the 
spacetime approach, this choice of a linear parameter time can, 
as will be seen shortly, clash with a cyclic coordinate time. 
This general scheme does not in any way restrict the struc-
ture of the manifold corresponding to physical space. Usually, 
M is taken to be homeomorphic to the Euclidean three-space E^; 
but, in principle, there is nothing against M being homeomorphic 
to the three-sphere S , or to a torus S xS . Even the number 
of dimensions of M could be chosen differently (unequal to three). 
The determination of the structure of physical space raises 
many epistemologica! problems, which, however, are not relevant 
within this context. 
All continuous differentiable curves in M belong to the class 
of trajectories: each of them represents a physically realisa-
ble motion. Curves of all different kinds of shapes thus belong 
to the class of trajectories. This will no longer be true in 
the spacetime approach. But also single points of M represent 
trajectories. These 'degenerated' curves in M are produced by 
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constant mappings for which the range in M consists of just one 
pointj to all parameter values, there corresponds the same point 
in M. The interpretation in terms of motion is obvious: such 
a trajectory represents a particle at rest; the particle is 
at the same place in space at different moments of time. Within 
this framework, time is not essential for the description of 
10 
rest. It is a remarkable feature of the space and time approach 
that the distinction between motion and rest is reflected in 
the shape of the trajectories. This feature of the space and 
time approach favours a physical interpretation of nature in 
which motion and rest are regarded as two fundamentally dif-
ferent states of a particle. In the history of physics this 
point of view was standard until the seventeenth century under 
the influence of Aristotle who regarded motion and rest as op-
posites. This vision on motion and rest is opposed to the modern 
one in which there is no fundamental difference between the 
11 two, because rest is regarded as a motion with zero velocity. 
Although from a mathematical point of view the choice of 
a particular parametrisation of the trajectories is arbitrary, 
the parametrisation is fixed physically by the following require-
ment: the difference in parameter values for two points on a 
curve must be equal to the time elapsed between the two corres-
ponding events as measured by a comoving standard clock,i.e., 
a clock which travels along with the particle. This determines 
the parametrisation completely except for a multiplicative 
constant (the unit of the standard clocks), and an additive 
constant (the origin of parameter time). It is rather obvious 
to choose the additive constants for different trajectories 
so that all events corresponding to the origin of parameter 
time are simultaneous. But then, it does not follow that 
-generally- events with the same value for parameter time are 
simultaneous, since that would imply a strong presupposition 
about the behaviour of clocks, which cannot be justified a priori 
and which, moreover, is contrary to the actual behaviour of 
clocks. 
B. Parameter time and coordinate time in the spacetime approach. 
In the spacetime approach, motion is described by a parame-
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trised curve in spacetime: 
Parameter: Time Manifold: Spacetime 
C: R ί> M 
t ι > m(t). 
Time is again chosen as the parameter. We see immediately the 
need for distinguishing time as a parameter from time as a sub-
manifold of the spacetime manifold,i.e., time as a coordinate. 
Even as space is constituted by points which are interpreted 
as the possible locations or places of particles, so spacetime 
is constituted by points which are interpreted as possible 
locations for events: the points of spacetime are event-locations 
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at which an event is or is not present. In the spacetime approach 
the analogue of a material object can be defined as follows: 
to the set of events we apply the equivalence relation of 
'genidentity' which is the material counterpart of the logical 
notion of identity. The equivalence classes, generated by the 
relation 'being genidentical with', represent material objects; 
each equivalence class contains all the events belonging to 
the history of a particle. 
Usually, the spacetime manifold is considered to be four-
dimensional: three space-coordinates and one time-coordinate. 
The question of the choice of the number of space-coordinates 
was already mentioned in the space and time approach; the issue 
of the number of dimensions of coordinate time, I have already 
discussed in ch. Ι (ρ.3Ό. The spacetime manifold does not 
necessarily possess a metric for spacetime intervals, which is 
physically significant. We will see that, whereas Newtonian 
spacetime does not possess such a metric, relativistic spacetime 
does. 
Contrary to the situation in the space and time approach, 
not every continuous differentiable curve in M represents a 
physically realisable motion. For instance, curves such as in 
fig. 13 (p.72), which represent particles travelling back and 
forth relatively to coordinate time, are usually not regarded 
to correspond to physically realisable motions; therefore 
they are not admitted as trajectories or worldlines. Also the 
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t (coordinate time) 
χ (space coordinate) 
fig. 13. 
class of degenerated curves, given by the constant mappings, do 
not have any physical meaning. 
Moreover, the spacetimes of which coordinate time is cyclic, 
or which, more generally, possess closed worldlines, present 
a special problem. In that case, a conflict arises between the 
ordering of events relatively to coordinate time and relatively 
to parameter time, since both have different structures. Where­
as the events on such a closed worldline possess a cyclic order 
relatively to coordinate time, they have a linear ordering rela­
tively to parameter time. One way to remove this conflict would 
be to modify the general scheme for the description of motion 
so that the domain of the function С is not homeomorphic to I, 
but, instead, homeomorphic to the circle S . 
The aforementioned problems can be avoided by excluding 
spacetimes possessing closed worldlines and by adopting the 
general rule that only those curves will be admitted as world-
lines of real particles for which the coordinate time function 
is a bijection between the points of the curve and the reals 
(in order to exclude curves like in fig. 13)· This is a very 
important restriction upon the worldlines, which will be of 
special interest with regard to the problem of the transla­
tion of the spacetime approach into the space and time approach. 
A closer determination of the class of worldlines on general 
terms is not possible; but, as will be seen later on, physical 
assumptions can still narrow down the class of curves repre­
senting physically realisable motions. For the parametrisation 
of the worldlines, we will adopt the same rule as in the space 
and time approach. The same remark with regard to the simulta-
73 
neity of events applies. 
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II.Ί Newtonian space and time and Newtonian spacetime. 
To illustrate both the treatment of time as a parameter in the 
space and time approach and the use of time as a coordinate and 
parameter in the spacetime approach, I shall now consider 
Newtonian physics both in the classical version, as given by 
Newton himself, and in the fourdimensional version. In the 
next section, I shall do the same for relativistic physics. 
A. Newtonian space and time: absolute time as a parameter. 
In the Principia, Newton introduces the absolute and relative 
15 
notions of time, space and motion: 
"Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from 
its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything 
external, and by another name is called duration: relative, 
apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external 
(whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the 
means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true 
time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year." 
"Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to any­
thing external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative 
space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute 
spaces; " 
"Absolute motion is the translation of a body from one abso­
lute place into another; and relative motion, the translation 
from one relative place to another." 
These concepts determine the framework within which Newton con­
structs his kinematics and dynamics. In the same text, he also 
clarifies the distinction between the absolute and relative 
conceptions of time, space and motion. In common affairs we 
can without any inconvenience use the relative measures of time 
and space. "But", he continues, "in philosophical disquisitions 
we ought to abstract from our senses, and consider things in 
themselves, distinct from what are only sensible measures of 
1 fi 
them." 'Relative' in this Newtonian sense is not to be confused 
with 'relative' in the specific Einsteinian sense, where it 
refers to the fact that space- and time-intervals are always 
measured relative to a certain reference frame; nor should 
'relative' be confused with 'relational1: relational theories 
about space and time (spacetime) deny that space and time 
(spacetime) are entities existing independently of matter 
(events), but, on the contrary, regard them as attributes of 
matter (events). These relational theories concern the ontolo-
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gical status of space and time, whereas 'relative' in the Newto-
nian sense concerns the epistemologica! status of space- and 
time-measurements. 
Of special interest to us is what Newton has to say about the 
relation between absolute space and absolute time. He is very 
clear on this point; absolute space and absolute time are com-
pletely independent of each other. Each exists in its own 
right; the phrases "absolute time without relation to any-
thing external" and "absolte space whitout relation to any-
thing external" show this beyond any doubt. Space and time are 
separate entities; space is 'external' to time and vice versa. 
Consequently, the flow of absolute time is independent both of 
the place in absolute space and of the change of place in absolu-
te space (i.e., absolute motion): absolute time is universal. 
The only connection between absolute space and time occurs 
by virtue of the concept of absolute motion, and therefore 
there is no question at all of blending together space and 
time into a four-dimensional spacetime as in the standard for-
mulations of relativity theory. For Newton, the external world 
consists of a three-dimensional absolute Euclidean space filled 
with material particles. Those material particles persist 
through absolute time. To each instant of absolute time, there 
corresponds a certain distribution of the material particles 
in absolute space, and the change of place in absolute space 
from one moment to another is called absolute motion. So, in 
the concept of change of place in absolute space, both absolute 
space and time are involved, but only as independent entities. 
Within this context, the general scheme for the description 
of motion of p. 69 takes the following form: 
Parameter: Absolute time Manifold: Absolute space 
C: R > M=E^ (Euclidean 3-space) 
t , > m(t) = (x(t),y(t),z(t)). 
For Newton, absolute space was necessarily Euclidean, but it 
should be noted that the absoluteness of space, in the sense 
of being independent of anything external, does not by itself 
17 
imply that space must be Euclidean. 'In this scheme, any conti-
nuous differentiable curve in M can count as the trajectory of 
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a particle. Particles at rest are represented by a unique point 
in M, and particles in uniform (or inertial) motion by straight 
lines. 
Because within Newtonian mechanics it is impossible dynamical-
ly to distinguish between particles at rest and particles in 
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uniform motion, the principle of relativity is valid; therefore, 
the description of motion of particles is uniquely determined 
except for the well-known generalised Galilei transformations 
which transform inertial motions into inertial motions: 
t' = at + b 
x' = ex + dt + e , 
where a,b,c,d and e are constants( d is the relative velocity 
of the two reference frames x,t and x'jt')· The class of dege-
nerated curves in M, corresponding to particles at rest, is not 
left invariant under these transformations. Therefore, from 
a dynamical point of view, the difference between motion and 
rest, reflected kinematically in the shape of the curves 
(degenerated or not), disappears. 
The choice of absolute time as the parameter is forced upon 
us by the following considerations. First, to each instant of 
absolute time there corresponds a unique place of the particle 
in absolute space; this is a conditio sine qua non for using 
absolute time as a parameter. Secondly, absolute time satisfies 
the requirement of being independent of the manifold in which 
the motion is described. Finally, differences in absolute time 
are, according to Newton, the same for all observers, and 
therefore this choice makes the parameter a physically inva-
riant quantity. 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that simultaneity is 
an objective property of events within Newtonian physics. More-
over, given ideal undisturbed clocks which correctly measure 
the flow of absolute time, each observer equiped with such a 
clock will measure the same absolute time difference between 
two events A and B, independently of his place and his state 
of motion. As a consequence, those ideal clocks behave very 
nicely: once two such clocks are synchronised, they will stay 
synchronous forever, whether or not one has been moving. This 
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makes it possible to parametrise trajectories in such a way 
that events with the same parameter value are simultaneous. Given 
the simultaneity of the events corresponding to the origins 
of the parametrisations, and the above behaviour of clocks, our 
convention for parametrising trajectories guarantees that the 
same parameter values are assigned to simultaneous events. The 
possibility of such a coherent invariant parametrisation of 
different trajectories is a characteristic feature of Newtonian 
absolute time. 
B. Newtonian spacetime: absolute time as parameter and coordina­
te. 
Since the elegant 'reformulation' of the special theory of 
relativity in the four-dimensional formalism of the spacetime 
approach by Minkowski, physicists have tried to reformulate 
Newtonian mechanics and gravitation theory into the same for­
malism. The important contributions in this field made by Frank, 
Cartan and Friedrichs, were followed up, about two decades ago, 
ι Q 
by the work of Havas and Trautman. J By reformulating Newtonian 
physics in the four-dimensional formalism of the spacetime 
approach so that its predictions are identical with those that 
can be derived from its classical formulation, a common 'univer­
se of discourse' is created for both classical and relativis-
tic theories. On the one hand, this is very interesting for the 
physicist because it puts him in a better position to appreciate 
the exact similarities and differences between both theories. 
But on the other hand, it is also of interest for the philoso­
pher of science; these reformulations of different theories 
into a common formalism (language) , may throw a new light on the 
issues involved in the problem of relating succesive theories 
concerning a particular domain of physical inquiry. It may, for 
instance, contribute to an evaluation of Feyerabend's rather 
extreme position that Newtonian and Einsteinian theories are 
incommensurable, and of the no less extreme position of the 
logical empiricists who keep to the dogma of reduction of both 
theories. Finally, these reformulations deserve our attention 
because they show that certain philosophical problems which 
are usually associated the theory of relativity, do not arise 
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from that theory itself, but from use of the spacetime formalism 
in formulating relativity theory. 
Bl. The structure of Newtonian spacetime. 
If a four-dimensional spacetime manifold is taken as the point 
of departure for formulating Newtonian physics, then the issue 
of saving or recovering the Newtonian analogues of absolute 
space and time presents itself. Yet, it can be solved rather 
easily by assuming that spacetime possesses a particular structu­
re. The key ideas behind this particular structure are summarised 
20 by Weyl as follows: 
"A definite structure is already ascribed to the four-
dimensional extensive medium of the external world if one 
believes in a severance of the universe in the sense that it 
is objectively significant to say of any two different events, 
•—Γ 
Figure 1. Graphic representation of stratification 
and fibration of the world. World line g of uniform 
translation. Light cone K. 
narrowly confined in space-time, that they are happening at 
the same place (at different times) or at the same time (at 
different places). All simultaneous world-points form a 
three-dimensional stratum, all world-points of equal location 
a one-dimensional fiber."According to this view we may des­
cribe the structure of the world as possessing a stratifica­
tion whose layers are traversed by fibers. (Through each 
world-point runs one stratum and one fiber; any one fiber 
intersects a stratum in but a single world-point.)" 
The beginning of a reconstruction of the Newtonian ideas of 
absolute space and time is made by assuming that 'being simul­
taneous with' and 'being at the same place' have objectively 
significant meaning. But to complete the interpretation of a 
stratum and a fiber in terms of the Newtonian ideas of absolute 
21 
space and time, we have to ascribe a metric to each of them: 
"One attributes furthermore to space and time a metrical 
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structure by assuming that equality of time intervals and 
congruence of spatial configurations have an objective 
meaning " 
The metric of each stratum is of course Euclidean, as was the 
case for absolute space. Note that Weyl refers to two different 
metricSj one for space and one for time, instead of a single 
metric for spacetime-intervals. The absence of a spacetime me-
tric in Newtonian spacetime is one of the most conspicuous 
differences with relativistic spacetimes. 
Like Weyl, Misner et al. also use stratification of the space-
time manifold as a tool for obtaining the Newtonian analogues 
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of absolute space and time: 
"How do the absolute space of Galileo and Newton, and their 
absolute time, fit into...."Newtonian spacetime"? The key to 
this fit is stratification; stratification produced by the 
universal time coordinate t. 
Regard t as a function (scalar field) defined once and for 
all in Newtonian spacetime 
t = t(P). LP: spacetime poing 
Without it, spacetime could not be Newtonian, for "t" is 
every bit as intrinsic to the Newtonian spacetime as the 
metric "g" is to Lorentz spacetime. The layers of spacetime 
are the slices of constant t -the "space slices"- each of 
which has an identical geometric structure: the old "abso-
lute space"." 
The type of mathematical construction referred to above by Weyl 
and Misner as stratification is commonly denoted by mathemati-
cians as foliation, and the manifolds to which it is applied 
are referred to as foliated manifolds. 
For our purposes, it is not necessary to go into all the 
24 details of the general definition of a foliation. Roughly, a 
three-dimensional foliation of a four-dimensional spacetime 
(also called a 'co-dimension one' foliation) consists of a 
splitting up of the spacetime manifold into a family of three-
dimensional submanifolds, called leaves, which are all disjoint. 
Thus the manifold is 'cut', so to speak, in 'slices' so that 
each slice represents space at a certain moment of time; these 
slices are referred to as strata by Weyl and as space-clices 
by Misner et al. (see fig. l4,p. 80). By so foliating the space-
time manifold, we obtain a one-parameter family of leaves L 
(t: element from R); the order in which these leaves are arranged 
by the parameter, corresponds to the temporal order of the events 
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fig. 14. 
Pictorial representation of a foliation of a 
spacetime. 
lying in those leaves. 
Thus a foliation transforms a spacetime manifold into an 
infinitude of space manifolds ordered by a parameter which re­
presents time. This immediately points to a difference between 
the reconstructed notion of absolute space and the original 
conception of absolute space by Newton. According to Newton, 
there existed but one unique absolute space, and the distribu­
tion of matter in this space varied in time. In the reconstruc­
tion, however, we are dealing with an infinitude of spaces. 
Mathematically, this infinitude of spaces can easily be reduced 
to one space by a suitable identification of points from dif­
ferent spaces (as will be pointed out shortly). 
Not all spacetime manifolds can be so foliated and thus not 
any arbitrary spacetime manifold allows for the reconstruction 
of the Newtonian absolute space and time. The spacetime must 
satisfy certain conditions (see appendix I). In the following, 
we will take M to be homeomorphic to E ; since this manifold 
is an open manifold and every open manifold admits a co-
dimension one foliation, this implies that we can proceed with 
the reconstruction of the analogues of Newton's absolute space 
and time from such a spacetime manifold. 
A foliation constitutes only the first step toward such 
reconstruction. By endowing each one of the infinitude of spaces 
with the same geometrical structure (Euclidean), and by assigning 
a fixed metric to the parameter used for 'labelling' the pile 
of leaves (spaces) -in such a way that differences in parameter 
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values correspond to differences in absolute time for the events 
in those leaves- we get closer to our goal. 
Here it should be stressed that the foliation of the space-
time manifold and these spatial and temporal metrics are to 
be regarded as part of the 'absolute' structure of the manifold 
(Misner et al. refer to the stratification as 'intrinsic' to 
the spacetime manifold and as 'given once and for all'; Weyl 
describes it as Objectively significant'). This means that 
the spacetime manifold is foliated into spaces and time in the 
same way for each observer, irrespectively of his state of 
motion. 
The determination of the metrical structure within each 
space (leaf) and of the metrical structure of the parameter, 
does not yet complete our task. The connection between the dif-
ferent spaces has still to be determined. This can be done by 
giving the worldlines of 'the points of absolute space',i.e., 
by giving for each point of a certain leaf L. the corresponding 
0 
points in each of the other leaves (more precisely, one must 
give a three-parameter congruence of curves; see appendix II). 
The interpretation of these worldlines as geodesies in space-
25 time determines the connection coefficients. The resulting 
structure of the spacetime manifold is all that is needed to 
reconstruct Newtonian physics in the spacetime approach. 
Two'different lines of approach can now be followed. In the 
first, Newtonian spacetime is taken as flat; not only each 
space (leaf) is flat, but their connection is such that the 
whole spacetime is flat (vanishing connection coefficients). 
In the second, Newtonian spacetime is taken as curved. In the 
former case, the gravitational force cannot be geometrised but 
a separate potential has to be introduced. In the latter case, 
the effects of gravitation upon matter can be incorporated into 
the geometric structure of Newtonian spacetime, analogously 
to the procedure followed by Einstein in the general theory of 
relatività. In the following I shall only consider flat Newto-
nian spacetime whose structure is rather complicated because 
it does not possess non-singular metric for spacetime intervals, 
as found in relativistic spacetimes. ' In fact, two different 
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metrics, one for spatial and one for temporal intervals, are 
necessary. This means that in a Newtonian spacetime, the 
combining of space and time into a single spacetime is only 
partially succesful. 
The structure of flat Newtonian spacetime is that of a fiber 
bundle. Within the description of flat Newtonian spacetime in 
terms of fiber bundles, two different approaches can be fol­
lowed : 
a) Time is chosen as the base space, and space as the fiber, 
as represented schematically in fig.15a. In this case, we 
encounter a unique time but a multiplicity of spaces. This 
is the situation which corresponds to a co-dimension one folia­
tion of a spacetime. 
/'times' along 
spaces 
(fibers) fibers, 
space 
Ί Γ-
fig. 15a fig. 15b. 
b) Space is chosen as the base space and time as the fiber 
(see. fig. 15b). Here we have a unique space and a multiplicity 
of times along each fiber (interpreted as a worldline). This 
approach corresponds to a co-dimension three foliation of 
spacetime: the leaves form a three-parameter family of one-
dimensional submanifolds (the fibers) of the spacetime. The 
'points' of the three-dimensional parameter space correspond 
to points of space. 
Obviously, the first approach is more appropriate for the des­
cription of Newtonian spacetime, since absolute time has direct 
physical significance, whereas from a dynamical point of view 
the objectivity of absolute space partly vanishes by virtue 
of the validity of Galilean relativity. 
B2. Motion in Newtonian spacetime. 
In Newtonian spacetime absolute time is a submanifold of 
the spacetime manifold and therefore absolute time is treated 
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as a fourth coordinate like the three space-coordinates. The 
arena of the external world is a four-dimensional spacetime 
continuum with an appropriate structure. In this arena, the 
motion of a particle is again represented by a parametrised 
curve : 
Parameter: ??? Manifold: Newtonian spacetime 
li 
C: R > M (homeomorphic to E ) 
Τ- ι * m(r) = (x(0,y(t-),z(f-),t(^). 
We are now, of course, confronted with the problem of finding 
a physically acceptable interpretation of the parameter f. In 
a physical discourse this parameter and the allowed class of 
reparametrisations must be defined in an objective way. Absolute 
time t, being part of the manifold in which the motion of a 
particle is described, and functioning as a coordinate, cannot 
as such function as the parameter, although it meets the re­
quirement of having physical significance. However, if the 
worldlines are parametrised so that the parameter-values cor­
respond to the readings of a comoving clock, then the result 
is that, because of the behaviour of clocks within Newtonian 
spacetime, the values of the parameter t can be chosen equal 
to the values of the coordinate time t along the worldline 
(or differing by a linear transformation). Havas, in reformu­
lating Newtonian mechanics in the four-dimensional formalism 
of the spacetime approach, notes this point, but he immediate­
ly adds, quite rightly, that absolute time as a parameter V 
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must be distinguished from absolute time as a coordinate t : 
"Clearly f [4he parameter] differs from ζ =+t the coordinate 
at most by an additive constant. However, we prefer to dis­
tinguish the two quantities notationally. First, this serves 
to emphasize that Τ is a parameter on the world line rather 
than a coordinate (and thus could have been chosen different­
ly from t), second, this renders the formulas of Newtonian 
and special relativistic mechanics much more symmetric..." 
This choice of parameter t meets the requirement of objectivity 
because differences in absolute time are objective. The 'price' 
to be paid is that a double role must be attributed to Newton's 
original absolute time in these four-dimensional reformulations: 
on the one hand, absolute time is treated as a submanifold 
of Newtonian spacetime and therefore functions as a coordinate, 
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whereas on the other hand, it also functions as a parameter in 
the description of motion and insofar absolute time is treated 
as a parameter, it is independent of the manifold in which 
motion is described. 
The fact that parameter time is equal in value to coordinate 
time is from a more general point of view, a pure coincidence 
and should not distract from the different geometrical nature 
of each of them; each plays a fundamentally different role in 
the description of motion. Absolute time can fullfill this 
double role within the four-dimensional reformulations of 
Newtonian mechanics because of the specific behaviour of clocks 
within the Newtonian framework: once ideal clocks are synchro­
nised, they stay synchronous forever, irrespective of their 
state of motion. In relativity theory this is no longer the 
case; clocks behave in a more complicated way and therefore 
also the relation between parameter time and coordinate time 
becomes more complicated. 
Since Newtonian spacetime is not a metric spacetime (as we 
already remarked, a non-singular spacetime metric does not 
exist), the parameter cannot be defined in terms of the arc-
length along the curve, as is usually done in relativity theory. 
Of course, it is as yet possible to parametrise the geodesies, 
corresponding to particles in uniform motion, in a natural way 
with the help of the affine parameter, which is taken to be 
equal in value to absolute time. But this method for parametri­
sing curves works only for geodesies and not fot curved world-
lines . 
Not any arbitrary curve in Newtonian spacetime represents 
the trajectory of a physically realisable motion. To avoid the 
awkwardness of one particle being at different places at the 
same moment of absolute time, only those curves belong to the 
class of trajectories which satisfy the condition mentioned 
on p. 72: the coordinate time function t must be a bijection 
from the points of the curve to the reals (or, in Weyl's ter­
minology (p.78):"any one fiber intersects a stratum in but a 
single worldpoint"). Any parametrised curve С satisfying this 
condition cannot only be given in its standard form: 
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С: (χ(*-),γ<Ϊ-),ζ(Γ),ί(ί-)), 
but because t is equal to t, we get, by elimination of f: 
C: (x(t),y(t),z(t),t). 
Thus the values of the space coordinates of the points of the 
curve С are given as functions of the values of the time coordi­
nate (the variable t in (x(t),y(t),z(t),t) stands for coordinate 
time!). But when coordinate time t is now reinterpreted as a 
parameter (in other words if we go from the spacetime approach 
to the space and time approach), then (x(t),y(t),z(t)) represents 
a curve in three-dimensional space parametrised by t. This 
shows immediately how important the 'bijection condition' is 
with respect to the problem of translating the spacetime ap­
proach into the space and time approach; without this bijection 
condition, the reinterpretation of coordinate time t as parameter 
time would not be possible. 
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II.5 Relativistic space and time and relativistic spacetime. 
The association of the concept of spacetime with the theory 
of relativity has become so common in physics that both seem 
to form an inseparable pair. Nothing, however, is less true; 
the original formulation of the special theory of relativity 
was given by Einstein in the space and time approach. Only two 
years after Einstein's first paper on relativity theory (1905)3 
Minkowski (1907) showed that this theory could be very elegantly 
rephrased by adding time as a fourth coordinate to the three 
space coordinates into a spacetime, now known as 'Minkowski 
spacetime'. In Einstein's original paper there is no reference 
at all to time as a coordinate or to the four-dimensional for-
malism. Therefore, in the same vein as we spoke of the reformu-
lations of Newtonian mechanics into the spacetime approach, we 
can speak of the reformulation of special relativity into the 
spacetime approach; but the specific structures of the corres-
ponding spacetimes differ in many respects, reflecting the dif-
ferent concepts of space and time in respectively classical 
and relativistic physics. In the following, I shall restrict 
myself mainly to the special theory of relativity. 
A. The special theory of relativity in the space and time 
approach. 
The key to relativity theory lies, as Einstein remarks in his 
autobiography,in the unmasking of the arbitrary character of 
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Newton's axiom of absolute simultaneity; the equivalence of 
all inertial observers ( the second postulate of special rela-
tivity) was, at least within classical mechanics, a well esta-
blished fact. Absolute simultaneity is abandoned by Einstein; 
instead the synchronisation of distant clocks becomes a matter 
of convention. But two observers in relative motion, using the 
same convention, will nevertheless disagree as to which events 
are to be called simultaneous; simultaneity has become obser-
ver dependent, and consequently, observers in relative motion 
will also disagree about the measurement of time intervals. 
Whereas for Newton, there is absolute motion in absolute 
space, motion becomes a relative phenomenon within special re-
lativity, because physically all inertial observers are equiva-
lent. Therefore, the motion of a particle cannot be described 
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in an observer independent way; it is always necessary to speci­
fy the observer 0 (the reference frame) relatively to which a 
particle is moving. With respect to this observer, the motion 
of a particle is again described by a parametrised curve in 
space. The observer 0 is at rest in that space and therefore 
his trajectory is given by a point in that space (usually it is 
assumed that 0 is at rest at the origin of the reference frame). 
We now have in principle a choice between two ways of parame­
trising the trajectories: either the trajectories are parame­
trised by time as it is measured by a clock which is at rest 
in space, i.e., time t as measured by the observer 0, or they 
are parametrised by time as it is measured by a clock moving 
along with the particle, i.e., by proper timef. Whereas in 
classical physics there would be no difference between these two 
procedures, in relativistic physics there is, since the rule 
that clocks, after being synchronised, remain synchronous is 
not valid. The first procedure is not appropriate, because the 
resulting parametrisation is not observer independent; an ob-
t 
server 0 , in relative motion with respect to 0, parametrises 
the trajectories differently by his time t'. The parametrisa­
tion by proper time, however, is observer independent. 
Thus, motion relative to observer 0 is described in the fol­
lowing way: 
Parameter: proper time Manifold: Space in which 
0 is at rest. 
C: R * M = E 3 
t ι ν m(r) = (x(î-),y(î-),z(r)). 
Within this relativistic context, it is no longer possible to 
parametrise the trajectories of different particles in the same 
coherent way as was possible within the classical framework 
where points on the trajectories with the same value for para-
meter time corresponded to simultaneous events. Generally, points 
on different trajectories with the same parameter time value 
are not simultaneous relatively to observer 0: parameter time 
has lost its universal character. 
Since within relativity theory the velocity of massive parti-
cles is always smaller than c, the velocity of light, only those 
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curves in space for which at each point the velocity relatively 
to 0 is smaller than c, represent physically realisable motions. 
In other words, if the curves are parametrised by time t as 
measured by 0, and not by proper time ΐ, then only those curves 
\ / 2 2 ? for which at each point v=ds/dt (ds= vdx +dy +dz ) is smaller 
than сj are trajectories of massive particles. Within the space-
time approach this condition on the curves can be expressed in 
a very simple geometrical way. 
Both ways of parametrising curves, by time t of observer 0 
and by proper time, are correlated. In the case of a particle 
in uniform motion relative to 0, the relation between both 
parameters is given by the famous time-dilatation formula (which 
is a special case of the Lorentz transformations): 
f = tVÌ-(v/c)^ 
For non-uniform motion, the reparametrisation of a curve С from 
time t to proper time t is given by: 
Г = f]/l-(v/c)¿\ dt 
This expression cannot only be interpreted as a reparametrisa-
tion of the curve C, but it can also be read as a relation 
between the parameter times of two different curves, viz., the 
parameter time t of the trajectory of 0 in space (which is a 
'degenerated' curve, consisting of just one point in space be-
cause 0 is at rest), and the parameter time t- of trajectory C. 
The second interpretation shows clearly that in the comparison 
of the parameter times of different trajectories, the relative 
velocity ν of the corresponding particles plays an important 
role. Thus, in spite of the fact that parameter time is defined 
as independent of the manifold, the correlation between the 
parameters of different trajectories cannot be given indepen­
dently of the manifold, because it is necessary to refer to 
the relative velocity of the particles. At this point, the inti­
mate relationship between space and time emerges within the 
space and time approach to the special theory of relativity. 
B. The special theory of relativity in the spacetime approach. 
This is the form in which special relativity is presented in 
most textbooks. The formulation of this theory in the four-
dimensional formalism of the spacetime approach takes as its 
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point of departure Minkowski spacetime which, in contrast with 
Newtonian spacetimej possesses a spacetime metric. The differen­
tial of the spacetime distance is given, in suitable coordinates, 
by:
 ч 
ds = \/(cdt) -dx -dy -dz . 
As is well known, this quantity is left invariant under the 
Lorentz transformations. Thus, only the spacetime distance 
between two events has objective physical significance and neither 
the spatial nor the temporal distance between them, considered 
32 independently of each other, are physically relevant: 
"Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed 
to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union 
of the two will preserve an independent reality." 
Motion in this Minkowski spacetime is again represented by a 
parametrised curve. The relativity of uniform motion, demands 
the arbitrary selection of an inertial observer with respect 
to whom motion is described. In the corresponding Minkowski 
spacetime, this observer will be at rest. Since Minkowski 
spacetime is homeomorphic to E and the parameter coincides 
with Einstein's proper time, we obtain the following scheme 
for the description of motion: 
Parameter: proper time 
R -
Ml 
Manifold: Minkowski space-
time in which 0 is at rest, 
¿I 
•> M = E 
-* m(r) = (x(^),y(t),z(f),t(r)). 
The trajectory of the observer at rest at the origin of Minkows-
ki spacetime is given by axis of coordinate time; the trajecto-
ries of observers in uniform motion with respect to 0 are given 
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by straight lines (see fig. 16). 
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Generally, differences in coordinate time t do not equal 
differences in parameter time Τ for points on a curve C. The 
relation between both is given by the same expression as in 
the space and time approach (see. p.88): 
Г = J as =_j!/L-(v/c)2'dt 
This equation can be interpreted in several ways; as in the 
space and time approach, it can be seen as a reparametrisation 
of curve С from time t to time f , or as determining the rela­
tion between the parameter times on different curves (viz., 
parameter time t of the trajectory of 0 and parameter time 
of the trajectory of 0'; see fig. 16). But now it can also be 
read as expressing a distance function from the manifold to 
the reals. 
Besides being unequal in numerical value, parameter time tr 
and coordinate time t also differ strongly with respect to their 
behaviour under Lorentz transformations. Because ds is left 
invariant, clearly parameter time is also left invariant under 
those transformations; but this is not so for coordinate time. 
The difference in parameter time for two points on a trajectory 
is the same for each observer, but the difference in coordinate 
time between the same points varies from one observer to the 
other. This non-invariant character of coordinate time in the 
special theory of relativity stands in sharp contrast with the 
invariant nature of coordinate time within Newtonian spacetime. 
Because Minkowski spacetime possesses a spacetime metric, 
the parametrisation of curves can be given in terms of the arc-
length along the curves( see the equation above:2"= J ds). This 
was not possible for Newtonian spacetime because there was no 
such spacetime metric. The fact that the parameter is defined as 
equal to the arclength along the curve, does not contradict the 
requirement that the parameter should be independent of the 
manifold in which motion is represented; for actually, the coor­
dinates and the metric in Minkowski spacetime are so chosen 
that for timelike worldlines the arclength along these curves 
agrees with the proper time measured along them. 
Finally, the class of curves representing physically réalisa-
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ble motions is more restricted in the Minkowski spacetime than 
in the Newtonian spacetime. In the latter, any curve satisfying 
the bijection condition ( see. p.84) belonged to the class of 
trajectories. But in the former, only those curves for which 
at each point the tangent vector lies within the lightcone at 
that point, represent physically realisable motions, since only 
for them the relative velocity of the particles with respect 
to observer 0, or to any other inertial observer 0', is smaller 
than the velocity of light. 
Whereas the special theory of relativity can be formulated 
within both the space and time and the spacetime approach, the 
situation with respect to the general theory of relativity 
which was originally formulated by Einstein in the four-dimensio-
nal spacetime formalism, is more complicated. A reformulation 
of this theory in the space and time approach has never been 
given. Indeed, the question is whether any such attempt could 
ever be successful. According to Graves, 
"it is still possible to state the principles of SR [the special 
theory of relativityj and give their physical significance 
without using the formalism of four-vectors and tensors; it 
is NOT POSSIBLE to do this in GR [the general theory of re-
lat ivityj . " 
Graves claims that the principle of "general covariance commits 
physics to the use of tensors....for the representation of all 
its fundamental quantities" and that therefore, the spacetime 
formalism has become indispensable for the formulation of the 
principles of general relativity. Einstein, however, is more 
careful in his evaluation of the role of the spacetime forma-
lism with respect to the general theory. For him there is no 
doubt that the "four-dimensional mode of consideration of the 
'world' is natural on the theory of relativity"; but he is less 
categorical than Graves with regard to the issue whether the 
four-dimensional formalism is an indispensable tool for formu-
lating general relativity for he remarks that "without it £the 
four-dimensional formalismj the general theory of relativity... 
would perhaps have got no farther than its long clothes." 
Surely, any attempt to reformulate general relativity in the 
space and time approach, would necescitate a revision of our 
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general scheme for the description of motion. Not only would 
space no longer be Euclidean, but the structure of space, the 
manifold in which motion is described, would have to vary in 
time. So far, it was tacitly assumed that the structure of the 
manifold in which motion is described is itself time independent; 
but this assumption would have to be abandoned. This would have 
far reaching consequences for the relation between the parame-
ter and the manifold,since they could no longer be chosen so 
that both are independent of each other. Therefore, within the 
space and time approach to general relativity, the intimate 
relationship between space and time becomes already manifest 
at this very fundamental level. However, it is not sure, whether 
this adaptation of the general scheme for the description of 
motion would allow for the reformulation of general relativity 
in the space and time approach. If indeed such a reformulation 
would not be possible, then contrary to the situation with res-
pect to the special theory of relativity, general relativity 
and the spacetime approach would be inseparable. 
The formulation of general relativity in the spacetime ap-
proach does not introduce any really new aspects in the scheme 
for the description of motion as it was given for the special 
theory of relativity (p.89), except for the fact that flat 
Minkowski spacetime is replaced by a curved Riemannian spacetime. 
This does not throw any new light on the role of parameter and 
coordinate time, the more so since locally, curved Riemannian 
spacetime looks like flat Minkowski spacetime. Therefore, what 
was said above about parameter and coordinate time in flat 
Minkowski spacetime stays valid locally. 
93 
II.6 Translation between the space and time and the spacetime 
approach: some philosophical issues. 
I now intend to summarise the conditions under whichj from a 
kinematical point of view, a translation between the space and 
time and the spacetime approach is possible, and to argue that 
the possibility of such translation throws a new light upon some 
philosophical problems which are usually associated with rela-
tivity theory. 
The translation from the space and time approach to the space-
time approach does not pose any serious problems. It can be 
achieved by simply taking as the spacetime manifold the direct 
product of the parameter space (time) and the manifold in which 
motion is described (space), and by assigning to the new para-
meter for the description of motion in this spacetime the same 
value as coordinate time, like it was done in the four-dimensio-
nal reformulations of Newtonian mechanics. 
The transition, however, from the spacetime to the space and 
time approach, is far more complicated. First, the spacetime 
manifold has to allow for an appropriate foliation for the re-
construction of space and time; certain spacetime manifolds 
do not allow for such foliation, e.g., spacetime manifolds 
4 homeomorphic to S . Secondly, if the spacetime satisfies the 
conditions for a co-dimension one foliation, then the class of 
trajectories, representing physically realisable motions, must 
at least satisfy the bijection condition. Trajectories of par-
ticles traveling back and forth relatively to coordinate time, 
as for instance occur in the Feynman-Stückelberg interpretation 
of a positron as an electron traveling back in time, must be 
excluded. Allowing for such curves as trajectories of real par-
ticles, would immediately destroy the possibility of parametri-
sing trajectories by coordinate time and therefore would make it 
impossible to identify coordinate time with parameter time. 
We have already seen that the formalisms of space and time 
and spacetime provide two different schemes, for the description 
of the motion of a particle, and that the special theory of 
relativity can be formulated within both. In other words, with 
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regard to the special theory of relativity which will be my 
present concern, a translation between both approaches is possi­
ble. This fact throws a new light upon certain philosophical 
problems which are usually associated with the special theory 
of relativity in its standard four-dimensional formulation; 
for a closer analysis shows that these problems are not related 
to the theory itself, as it is usually assumed, but that they 
are connected with the use of the spacetime formalism. To argue 
this point, I shall briefly consider the relation between the 
special theory of relativity and (i) determinism, (ii) the 
conception of a static universe, and (iii) the so-called 
'spatialisation of time'. 
(i) Determinism?'The special theory of relativity and determinism 
are often linked together, even to the extent that it is claimed 
that this theory rigorously implies determinism. Whenever deter­
minism is brought in connection with special relativity, then it 
is usually not understood in the Laplacian sense which says that 
at each moment it must be possible to predict (retrodict) in prin­
ciple the whole future and the whole past, but it is taken in the 
loose sense that the future is somehow fixed. In most cases, the 
argument is based upon the use of spacetime manifolds in formulating 
special relativity. It is claimed that in such spacetime the past, 
the present and the future are necessarily given all together 
and that therefore determinism must be valid. But apart from the 
fact that it is very difficult to give a precise meaning to the 
statement that the future is fixed, this argument from special 
relativity to determinism is not correct, because it presupposes 
that the special theory of relativity is invariably connected 
with the spacetime approach, which is certainly not the case. 
Moreover, whatever kind of determinism is implied by the use 
of spacetime manifolds, it is anyway not Laplacian determinism: 
indeed, within a spacetime the events are not necessarily func­
tionally related so that the predictability (retrodictability) 
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of the future (past) is possible. 
(ii) The conception of a static universe. According to Weyl, the 
theory of relativity has shown us the real nature of the objec­
tive world:"the objective world simply is, it does not happen" 
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(see p.63); in other words, the universe is a static 'block' 
universe. No real change occurs in such a world. Only relatively 
to a conscious observer "crawling upward along the life line" 
does it make sense to speak of change. 
But,of course,this does not only apply to relativistic space-
time; the same is true for Newtonian spacetime. Therefore, the 
absence of change in the relativistic case is not due to relati-
vity proper but to the spacetime approach in which it is for-
mulated. 
The real issue, therefore, is not whether relativity theory 
banishes change from our picture of the physical world, but 
whether the spacetime approach necessarily involves a static 
picture of the universe. On this point, the distinction between 
parameter time and coordinate time is of particular interest. 
The consideration of a spacetime manifold as such indeed shows 
that it will be difficult to introduce a sensible notion of 
change: all the events 'are there'. Insofar as coordinate time 
is part of the spacetime manifold we can say that relatively 
to coordinate time we cannot speak meaningfully about change. 
But the introduction of parameter time allows for a coherent 
notion of change. Por a given unparametrised worldline which 
is just a subset of events of the whole set, the notion of 
change can be introduced as soon as it is parametrised by para-
meter time. Change then occurs relatively to parameter time: 
for increasing values of parameter time, the world will look 
different along the world line. So, the situation is the same 
as in the space and time approach; there also the increase of 
parameter time is the basis of the change which occurs in the 
universe. Therefore, in as much as change can be regarded as 
real within the space and tine approach to physics, it can also, 
to the same degree, be regarded as real within the spacetime 
approach. 
(iii) The 'spatialisation of time'. The facts that (1) time 
is 'treated on a par' with the space-coordinates in relativity 
theory, (2) space and time are united into a spacetime, which 
implies that, through a constant of homogenisation (c: the velo-
city of light), time intervals are measured in units of length 
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(or conversely), and (3) the now and the flow of time and conse-
quently, the notion of change are sometimes denied a legitimate 
place within a physical discourse, have been interpreted as 
pointing toward a 'spatialisation of time', i.e., a conception 
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of time based on the model of space. 
But again, it should be realised that, although the special 
theory of relativity favours the use of the spacetime approach, 
it by no means necessitates the treatment of time as a coordinate, 
since this theory can also be formulated within the space and 
time approach. Moreover, the 'spatialisation of time* in the 
spacetime approach pertains only to coordinate time, not to 
parameter time. Coordinate time is indeed an almost completely 
spatialised time in the sense that structurally, a space coordi-
nate cannot be distinguished from the time coordinate. The fact 
that the time coordinate is in a special position because of the 
minus sign in the spacetime netric, is not due to a different 
internal structure of time. To the contrary, this special feature 
of time is related to the fact that only the time coordinate 
can be reinterpreted as a parameter for the parametrisation of 
worldlines. This possibility of identifying coordinate time with 
parameter time really distinguishes the time coordinate from 
the other three space coordinates. 
Parameter time, however, although it too is measured in units 
of length and partly has the structure of a space coordinate, 
is not identical in structure with a space coordinate because 
the full, complete structure of parameter time is much richer. 
In view of the important role of parameter time in the descrip-
tion of the evolution of a system (which by definition takes 
place from the past toward the future), the full structure of 
parameter time should also contain the distinction between 
the past, the present and the future and consequently, should 
comprise the flow of time. This supplementary structure of para-
meter time is precisely absent in both coordinate time and the 
space coordinates. Unfortunately, a full formalisation into 
a physical discourse of these aspects of parameter time has 
not yet been (or cannot be ?) achieved and therefore has not 
been used in our general scheme for the description of motion 
(see p. XIII-XVI). 
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This discussion shows that by separating the space and time 
and the spacetime approach from particular physical theories, 
a better insight into the origin of certain philosophical pro-
blems can be gained. Moreover, it clearly demonstrates that 
the distinction between parameter and coordinate time offers 
a fruitful tool for reformulating some of these problems. 
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II.7 The geometrical nature of time in quantum mechanics. 
In his famous paper "Ueber den anschaulichen Inhalt der 
quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik", Heisenberg writes 
in his discussion of the notion of the trajectory of an elec-
tron: 
"Gehen wir nun über zum Begriff 'Bahn des Elektrons'. Unter 
Bahn verstehen wir eine Reihe von Raumpunkten (in einem 
gegebenen Bezugssystem), die das Elektron als 'Orte' nach-
einander annimmt. Da wir schon wissen, was unter 'Ort zu 
einer bestimmten Zeit' zu verstehen sei, treten hier keine 
neuen Schwierigkeiten auf. Trotzdem ist leicht einzusehen, 
dass z.B. der oft gebrauchte Ausdruck: die '1 S-Bahn des 
Elektrons im Wasserstoffatom' von unserem Gesichtspunkt aus 
keinen Sinn hat. Um diese 1 S-'Bahn' zu messen, müsste nämlich 
das Atom mit Licht beleuchtet werden, dessen Wellenlänge 
jedenfalls erheblich kürzer als 10-°cm ist. Von solchem 
Licht aber genügt ein einziges Lichtquant, um das Elektron 
völlig aus seiner 'Bahn' zu werfen (weshalb von einer solchen 
Bahn immer nur ein einziger Raumpunkt definiert werden kann), 
das Wort 'Bahn' hat hier also keinen vernünftigen Sinn." 
Thus, at the microscopic level, we cannot, by continuous obser-
vation, trace the motion of a particle through space, because 
the interaction involved in the process of observation will 
disturb the motion of the particle in an unpredictable way. This 
is formally expressed in Heisenberg's uncertainty relation: 
Δ χ Δρ .^ +ι/2 . 
If the variation in the position of the electron is reduced to 
zero, i.e., if its place is exactly known, then the variation 
in the impulse is infinite, i.e., we do not have any information 
about its impulse.This means, in terms of spacetime diagrams, 
that exact knowledge of a point of the trajectory implies total 
ignorance about the tangent vector of the trajectory at that 
point; or vice versa, exact knowledge of the tangent vector 
implies total ignorance of the point of the trajectory. 
Heisenberg's considerations, therefore, seem to put into 
question the validity of the general scheme for the description 
of motion proposed at the beginning of this chapter. Рог if 
space is taken to be the manifold in which motion is described, 
then the notion of a trajectory does not make any sense ("keinen 
vernünftigen Sinn"), and, therefore, motion cannot be represen-
ted by a parametrised curve in space; given the initial position 
of a particle in space, the future positions of that particle 
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cannot be predicted. All that can be achieved in space is a 
statistical description of motion: the presence of a particle 
in a volume of space can be predicted with a certain irreducible 
probability. 
Although at first sight, the description of motion at the 
microscopic level appears to violate the general scheme, a closer 
look reveals that this is not necessarily so. By making an appro-
priate choice for the manifold M, it is possible to describe the 
evolution of a quantum mechanical system by a parametrised curve. 
But the price is rather high; the manifold in question is a 
highly abstract space, viz., a Hilbert space. The evolution of 
a quantum mechanical system can be represented by a trajectory 
in Hilbert space; the general scheme then becomes: 
Parameter: time Manifold: Hilbert space 
C: R > H 
t t V x1(t),x2(t),..,xn(t),.. 
Time again plays the role of the parameter, which is in agreement 
with the fact that time enters as a real parameter in the Schrö-
dinger equation. 
As a parameter, time plays a different role in comparison with 
space, for in the Schrödinger representation the position in space, 
as well as all other observables, are represented by hermitian 
operators. This fundamental difference between the time and 
space variables can be expressed by Dirac's distinction 
between 'c-numbers' and 'q-numbers': c-numbers are the variables 
of classical physics, satisfying the commutative law, whereas 
q-numbers are the quantum mechanical variables, which do not 
always satisfy this commutative law, like, for instance ρ and q 
in pq-qp=h/(2 Л' i). Now, whereas time t is a c-number, the space 
coordinates x. are q-numbers. Although this dissymmetry between 
space and time, and more generally, the fact that all observables 
except time which is merely a parameter, are represented by 
hermitian operators, is often experienced as awkward, none of the 
proposals to remove it by also replacing time as a parameter by 
time as an operator has yet proven to be successful. 
When going from non-relativistic to relativistic quantum me­
chanics, the picture of the geometrical nature of time becomes 
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even more complicated. A one-particle quantum mechanical system 
is now described by the Dirac equation. This equation is inva-
riant under Lorentz transformations. This suggests that time t 
is treated as a fourth coordinate. But the same variable is also 
used for parameter time since the evolution of a system is given 
relatively to the same variable t. Thus, at least parameter time 
and coordinate time are not distinguished notationally. But 
besides its formal treatment, the interpretation of the time 
variable is rather obscure. If time t is indeed a coordinate, 
then one would expect a sensible definition and interpretation 
of the expectation value of time,<£t>, analogous to the defini-
tion and interpretation of the expectation value of the space 
coordinates,< x.>. But a meaningful interpretation for the ex-
pectation value for time t is lacking. 
Presumably, a better insight into the geometrical nature of 
time in quantum mechanics, can be gained only after or together 
with a resolution of the problems concerning the interpretation 
of the quantum mechanical formalism. At this moment, the inter-
pretation of this formalism is very much deoated; in this dis-
cussion, the validity of the classical concepts of space ard 
time for the description of microscopic phenomena is also put 
into question. 
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II.8 Discussion. 
The distinction between parameter and coordinate time, presen-
ted here, is based mainly upon considerations about the structure 
of kinematics. In this final section, I shall briefly consider 
this distinction from the point of view of dynamics; its rele-
vance within the context of dynamics has been investigated by 
Lautman and Scheurer. Thereafter, I shall discuss Reichenbach's 
claim that the treatment of time as a (fourth) coordinate in re-
lativity theory is only a kind of mathematical trick and has no 
relevance for the physicist's conception of time. Contrary to 
Reichenbach, I shall argue that a consideration of the geometri-
cal nature of time can contribute to a better understanding 
of certain problems about physical time and that not only within 
mathematical physics, but also within the broader study of time, 
the spacetime approach with its distinction between parameter 
and coordinate time is more fundamental than the space and time 
approach. 
The ideas developed by Albert Lautman in "Le problème du 
temps", express essentially the same distinction between parame-
ter and coordinate time as exposed here; nevertheless, his star-
ting point is different from ours. Analysing the 'sensible pro-
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perties' of time, he reaches the following conclusion: 
"Il résulte de ces considérations que nous pouvons distinguer 
nettement deux sortes de propriétés sensibles du temps, celles 
qui se rattachant aux notions de DIMENSIONS et dJORIENTATION 
sont des propriétés GEOMETRIQUES du temps, et celles qui, se 
rattachant à la notion d'EVOLUTION, déterminent en particulier 
les propriétés DYNAMIQUES des corps." 
The dynamical aspects of time are related to the use of time as 
a parameter (of evolution) and the geometrical aspects to the 
49 . . . . . 
use of time as a coordinate. Whereas in our analysis, this distinc-
tion between parameter time and coordinate time is invariably 
bound to the general scheme for the description of motion, the 
origin of Lautman's distinction lies within the realm of pure 
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mathematics. That is why he speaks of an a prion deduction. 
"Le résultat fondamental de la déduction a priori que nous 
allons exposer est alors le suivant: cette dualité des as-
pects du temps, doués chacun de ces dissymétries propres 
n'apparaît pas seulement dans l'application des mathématiques 
à l'univers physique, c'est-à-dire en mécanique, mais existe 
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déjà au niveau des mathématiques pures, indépendamment de tout 
souci d'application à l'univers." 
More particularly, Lautman claims that the distinction between 
the geometrical and the dynamical aspects of time finds its ori-
gin in the distinction between a system of first order partial 
differential equations and the associated 'characteristic' equa-
Rl tions as defined by Monge·; the derivation with respect to time 
as a coordinate appears in the system of partial differential 
equations itself, whereas the derivation with respect to time 
as a parameter is found in the characteristic equations. More-
over, Lautman shows that also within the theory of differential 
equations the same result can be obtained. 
Of special interest is Lautman's analysis of the relation 
between the treatment of time as a parameter and time as a coor-
dinate within classical mechanics. He reaches the conclusion 
. 52 that both aspects of time are equivalent within that domain: 
"Il ne faudrait cependant pas, dans le domaine de la mécanique 
classique, exagérer cette différence entre l'aspect géomé-
trique et l'aspect dynamique du temps car il y a entre eux 
équivalence rigoureuse." 
This equivalence follows from the fact that the Hamiltonian 
principle of dynamics, from which all of classical mechanics 
can be derived, can be formulated in two different equivalent 
ways, viz., with the help of time as a parameter or with time 
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as a coordinate; In other words, within classical mechanics, the 
translation of the spacetime approach into the space and time 
approach (and vice versa) is not only possible at the level of 
kinematics, but also at the level of dynamics. This conclusion 
is indeed an important completion of our analysis, and, moreover, 
is in agreement with Havas's reformulation of Newtonian mecha-
nics in the spacetime formalism. 
The geometrical nature of time also plays a central role 
in Scheurer's attempt to formulate an unique scheme for Newto-
nian and Einsteinian mechanics. For him the distinction between 
parameter time and coordinate time is paralleled by a distinction 
between mass and proper mass at the level of dynamics. His 
formalism is centered around the use of the theory of differen-
tiable manifolds and the general scheme for the description of 
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motion; within this formalism, 
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"...l'accent est mis sur le rôle essentiel que joue la déter-
mination de la nature géométrique du temps: le temps paramè-
tre de Newton et le temps coordonnée d'Einstein." 
The geometrical nature of time is of prime importance, since, 
according to Scheurer, the treatment of time as parameter leads 
to Newtonian mechanics, whereas the treatment of time as coordi-
nate results in Einsteinian mechanics: 
"En résumé: quelle est la nature géométrique du temps (réversi-
ble): paramètre ou coordonnéee? La réponse a. cette question 
est digne d'intérêt: elle conduit à la dynamique classique 
de Newton dans le premier cas,à celle relativiste d'Einstein 
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"La différence essentielle entre paramètre et coordonnée per-
met de rendre compte des différences entre mécanique New-
tonienne et mécanique Einsteinienne. Pour Newton, la variété 
est l'espace R3 Э χ, et le temps t est le paramètre, tandis 
que pour Einstein, en relativité restreinte, la variété est 
l'espace-temps R^xR3 (x,t) et le temps propre t est alors 
introduit comme paramètre."5° 
However, the transition from parameter time to coordinate time 
not only involves changes at the level of kinematics, but also at 
57 the level of dynamics: 
"En effet, le temps t devenant coordonnée, pour continuer de 
traiter les mouvements dans l'espace-temps comme des courbes 
parametrisées, force était à Einstein d'introduire un nouveau 
paramètre sur la variété, soit le temps propre. Mais du même 
coup, au plan de la dynamique, force lui était également 
d'introduire une nouvelle masse, la masse au repos mQ, qui 
entretînt avec le temps propre le même rapport que la masse 
m avec le temps." 
Finally, this constant relationship between mass and time, proper 
mass and proper time, forms the basis of the reformulation of 
both Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics in terms of a unique 
dynamical structure, by means of the so-called Newton-Einstein 
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axiom: 
"Une transformation élémentaire permet de définir un seul 
schéma, valable pour tout variété où les mouvements sont re-
présentés par des courbes parametrisées: ce sera l'axiome 
de Newton-Einstein ... 
dxVp 1 = dt/mdif dxVp 4 = dr/m0." 
The equivalence between mass and energy can easily be derived 
59 from this axiom. 
Of special interest within our context is Scheurer's claim 
that the treatment of time as a parameter leads to Newtonian 
mechanics whereas the treatment of time as a coordinate leads to 
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Einsteinian mechanics. Since the use of time as a coordinate is 
neither a prerogative nor a necessary aspect of the special theory 
of relativity, and since Newtonian mechanics can be formulated 
with the use of time as a coordinate, a change in the geometrical 
nature of time at the level of pure kinematics cannot explain 
the difference between classical and relativistic mechanics. 
Therefore, Scheurer's thesis can only be valid provided the 
necessary changes at the level of dynamics are introduced, like 
the distinction between mass and proper mass and the Newton-
Einstein axiom, as indeed he does. 
Both Lautman's and Scheurer's work illustrate that the geome-
trical nature of time is also relevant within the context of 
dynamics. At this moment, however, the consequences for treating 
time either as a parameter or as a coordinate, for the structure 
of dynamics, are not at all clear. According to Lautman, the 
treatment of time either as a parameter or as a coordinate has, 
at least within classical mechanics, no consequences for the 
structure of dynamics; for Scheurer, on the other hand, the 
geometrical nature of time is of central importance, also within 
dynamics, since, under certain dynamical constraints, the treat-
ment of time as a coordinate or as a parameter leads to relati-
vistic, respectively classical mechanics. 
I shall now leave this controversial topic to consider the 
relevance of the distinction between parameter and coordinate 
time for the study of time itself. 
In his influential work. The philosophy of space and time, 
Reichenbach writes the following: 
"Whereas the conception of space and time as a four-dimensional 
manifold has been very fruitful for mathematical physics, its 
effect in the field of epistemology has been only to confuse 
the issue.... 
Our schematization of time as a fourth dimension therefore 
does not imply any changes in the conception of time... 
The properties of time which the theory of relativity has 
discovered have nothing to do with its treatment as fourth 
dimension. This procedure was already possible in classical 
mechanics, where it was frequently used. However, according 
to the theory of relativity the four-dimensional manifold 
is of a new type; it obeys laws different from those of 
classical theory." 
Reichenbach even warns us to be on our guard because "calling 
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time the fourth dimension gives it an air of mystery", and such 
expressions can easily be misunderstood or mislead us in our 
analysis of the concept of time. The properties of timej as 
exhibited by the theory of relativity, cannot be traced back 
to time being a fourth coordinate: 
"To demonstrate these changes in the conception of time we 
need not employ mathematical considerations. We can remain 
within the perceptual experience of time and develop every-
thing the theory of relativity teaches about time." 
Reichenbach is right in his claim that the treatment of time 
as coordinate does not by itself explain the properties of time 
disclosed by relativity theory. To show this, it is not even 
necessary to refer to the use of time as a fourth coordinate 
in classical mechanics, as Reichenbach does; it is sufficient 
to point to the fact that in Einstein's original version of 
special relativity, time is still treated as a parameter. 
But let us now turn to Reichenbach's claim that the "schema-
tization of time as a fourth dimension...does not imply any 
changes in the conception of time." He states, for instance, 
that "if we add time to space as a fourth dimension, it does 
not lose in any way its peculiar character as time.' TBut Reichen-
bach fails to distinguish between parameter time and coordinate 
time; and precisely coordinate time does lose much of its pecu-
liar character as time, i.e., it becomes spatialised to a very 
high degree, because its internal structure is identical to that 
of the space coordinates. It is distinguished from the space 
coordinates only by virtue of the possibility of its identifi-
cation with parameter time. This parameter time, however, does 
not lose in any way its peculiar character as time; its full 
structure would also have to comprise the notions of past, pre-
sent and future which precisely distinguish time from space. 
Reichenbach's point of view on this matter follows from his 
logical empiricist's position according to which only those 
properties determine our conception of time, which can be traced 
back directly to our "perceptual experience of time". This 
perceptual experience of time is supposed to be neutral, i.e., 
free from any mathematical or theoretical influences. Therefore, 
theoretical considerations, like the conception of time as a 
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coordinate, cannot affect our· conception of time. In general, 
however, no clear-cut borderline exists between observation and 
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theory. This is particularly true for time; it is quite simply 
impossible to give a description of what exactly constitutes 
our perceptual experience of time. If indeed it is accepted that 
the physicist's conception of time is an integration of experience 
and theory so that it cannot be decomposed into elements of 
both kinds, then the treatment of time as a coordinate is not 
just a mathematical trick relevant for the physicist, but should 
be taken seriously by the philosopher of science too. 
There can be no doubt tnat, within physics, the spacetime 
approach is more fundamental than the space and time approach; 
but contrary to Reichenbach, I do think that it is also more 
fundamental within the broader field of the study of time, in 
the sense that it provides a more powerful language for expres­
sing and dealing with the structure of physical time. There is 
nothing mysterious about treating time as a fourth coordinate, 
provided that it is realised that coordinate time always has 
a counterpart,viz., parameter time, and provided the relation 
between both is carefully kept in mind. 
An outspoken advocate of the spacetime approach in the study 
of time is Earman. In a paper with the rather provoking title 
"Space-time, or how to solve philosophical problems and dissol­
ve philosophical muddles without really trying", Earman has 
shown how long-standing philosophical issues about space and 
time can be fruitfully discussed if the notion of spacetime 
65 is taken seriously. His central claim is that the "failure to 
take space-time seriously has resulted in much philosophical 
debate about an ill-formulated issue. At the end of his article 
he writes the following: ' 
"But I think enough has been said to show that the failure of 
the philosophers fully to appreciate the fact that space-time 
is the basic spatio-temporal entity has led to an impoverish­
ment of that area of philosophy usually called the philoso­
phy of space and time. In the first place, it has been res­
ponsible for the fact that philosophers have overlooked the 
complex and subtle relations between space and time, that is, 
the spatial and temporal aspects of space-time. Secondly, it 
has led to a neglect of a powerful method for attacking 
philosopnical problems about space and time: take some thesis 
allegedly about space or time simpliciter and translate it 
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into a thesis about the structure of space-time; and then 
bring to bear all the known mathematical results and physi-
cal evidence about space-time structure. At the very least, 
this method produces some clarification, e.g., by reducing 
the original problem to a precise mathematical or physical 
question; at best, it can lead to a quick solution of the 
original problem or a dissolution of the original muddle, and 
it can also suggest new twists to old questions." 
Although I am somewhat sceptical about the Earman recipe for 
solving philosophical muddles, and although he too fails to 
recognise the dual geometrical nature of time, I do agree with 
his plea for the spacetime approach, but with emphasis on the 
fact that precisely also this distinction between parameter and 
coordinate time within the spacetime approach can help to re-
state and reformulate philosophical problems about time. 
All in all, the distinction between parameter and coordinate 
time proves to be increasingly important. Already, in the first 
chapter, I referred to its relevance for the problem of the 
number of dimensions of time. The present chapter has shown 
how it can contribute to a better understanding of the problem 
of change within the spacetime approach and to the problem of 
the spatialisation of time. 
Finally, this distinction proves to be useful for the next 
chapter, where the distinction between time asymmetry and flow 
of time will be introduced. Whereas time asymmetry is not rela-
ted to the notions of past, present and future, the flow of 
time implies them. Time asymmetry refers to a structural dif-
ference of the world in opposite time orientations, whereas the 
flow of time refers to the 'motion' of the now from the past 
toward the future. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the great 
confusion between these two notions originates from the fact 
that discussions of both concepts usually take place within 
the space and time approach, where only parameter time exists. 
Therefore, both time asymmetry and the flow of time necessari-
ly refer to parameter time. But the spacetime approach shows 
that time asymmetry pertains to coordinate time, whereas the 
flow of time refers to parameter time. Indeed, time asymmetry 
refers to an objective property of the processes in the space-
time manifold, whereas the flow of time is related to the notion 
of the evolution of a system; but the evolution of a system is 
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described with the use of parameter tine. Therefore, the flow 
of time is part of the structure of parameter time. 
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Appendix I. 
Foliation.68 
All manifolds and maps are C00. Let M be a η-dimensional manifold. 
A codimension q foliation of M (0áq<n) is a family F= {LÄ; <*•« kl 
consisting of arcwise connected subsets of M, called leaves, J 
with the following properties: 
i) Ь^ЛЬ^е if «¡¿oc', 
ii)4.AL.r=M» 
iii) Every point in M has a local coordinate system (и,у) such 
that, for each leaf L^, the arcwise connected components 
of и О Ц are described by xn"cl+l = constant, ,xn=constant, 
where χ,χ , ,χη denote the local coordinates in the 
system (υ,γΟ. In particular, every leaf of F is an (n-q)-
dimensional submanifold of M. 
For instance, the totality of integral curves of a non-singular 
vector-field on a η-dimensional manifold M constitutes a codimen­
sion n-1 foliation of M. A foliation can also be given by a 
submersion: let Q be a q-dimensional manifold (q^n) and let 
f: M—*Q be a submersion; then f induces a codimension q folia­
tion of M with the arcwise connected components being defined 
by f _ 1(x), χ 6Q. M has to satisfy certain conditions to admit a 
foliation. These conditions depend upon, among others, the num­
ber of dimensions of the manifold itself and upon the codimen­
sion of the foliation. For instance, for a closed manifold M 
to admit a codimension 1 foliation, the Euler number of M must 
be zero. Every open manifold M admits a codimension 1 foliation. 
Take M to be the four-dimensional spacetime manifold. We are 
interested in a codimension 1 foliation for obvious reasons: 
the three-dimensional leaves of the foliation are to represent 
the spatial submanifolds of M at different instants of time 
which itself is represented by the indexing set A. Thus intui­
tively speaking, the four-dimensional spacetime is sliced up 
into three-dimensional pieces, arranged in a one-dimensional 
array by the indexing set A. Not every spacetime M admits such 
a foliation. Newtonian spacetime and Minkowski spacetime which 
are both homeomorphic to E^, do so, because they are open 
manifolds. But, for instance, a spacetime manifold homeomorphic 
to S^ does not admit such a foliation because the Euler number 
is unequal to zero ( no non-singular vectorfield exists on S ). 
The next question is how to specify the foliation of the space-
time manifold. In Newtonian spacetime, this can be done in the 
way suggested by Misner (et al.): give a function f from M to 
R which is a submersion; then the leaves of the foliation are 
giveri by f^Cx), xeR. This foliation gets physical signifi­
cance by choosing f so that it assigns the same value to points 
which are simultaneous; thus f assigns to every event its 
absolute time coordinate. The leaves, then, are composed of 
all simultaneous events, and represent absolute space at dif­
ferent instants of absolute time. Thus by assigning objective 
physical significance to the foliated structure of Newtonian 
spacetime, the ideas of an absolute space and time can be 
'saved' in the four-dimensional approaches to Newtonian physics. 
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Appendix II> 
The following description of Newtonian-like space-times is taken 
from Earman. ° 
Newtonian-like Space-times. 
As in the case of a relativistic space-time, N is to be a four-
dimensional differentiable manifold: but N does not have a 
nonsingular space-time metric; rather it has two^separate metric 
structures. In more detail, N is tçpologically E , so that we 
have a global coordinate system {x^-J.^There is to be a one-
parameter family of hypersurfaces t(xi) which are topologically 
E3; these surfaces are to be interpreted as the planes of 
int s 
N is 
parameter congruence of curves λ°<(χί), «r =1,2,3, each of which 
intersects some surface t= constant, exactly once; these curves 
are to be interpreted as the world lines of the points of abso­
lute space. The spatial distance between two points lying on 
curves λ* and A* + d** is defined as (cL¿ dA^d У) i, where <£·/! is 
zero if « ¿/) and 1 if o<=/<¡ . Vie can always adopt a coordinate 
system such that t = x1) and A^x*; in this coordinate system the 
above expressions for the temporal and spatial intervals redu-
ce respectively to άχ^ and ((dxl)2+(dx2)2+(dx3)2)i
г
 showing 
that N can be thought of as ЕЗхЕ^. In what I shall call quasi-
Newtonian space-time, the planes of absolute simultaneity and 
the associated temporal metric are still present, but there is 
no distinguished congruence of curves oblique to the planes 
of simultaneity; any such congruence can be interpreted as the 
world lines of the points of 'space'. The spatial separation 
of two space-time points is well defined only if the points 
both lie on the same plane t = constant. If zMt) represents the 
world line of a particle, then the four-velocity u of the par­
ticle has components u1=dz1/dt. In a coordinate system in 
which t=x , the components of u are (u,l), u=dz/dx^. The spa­
tial velocity of the particle is given by the spatial component 
u of u, and this is not well-defined until the reference system 
is specified. However, it is easy to see that the instantaneous 
acceleration vçctor a is always tangent to a plane of simulta-
neity, since a^-n^O (in an inertial coordinate system a.1 = á^z:l/át ); 
thus it is naturally interpreted as,a spatial vector since it 
has no time component (when t=x\ ai=(a,0)), and it has a well-
defined spatial length, since the spatial separation of any 
two points lying in a plane of simultaneity is well-defined. 
So in the context of quasi-Newtonian space-time we can speak 
of the spatial acceleration of a particle. 
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III. TIME ASYMMETRY. 
Summary. 
It will be argued that the cluster of problems, generally 
referred to as the problem of the arrow of timej contains two 
subclusters of problems of a different nature, viz., the pro­
blem of time asymmetry and the problem of the flow of time. 
There is time asymmetry if the content of the world looks dif­
ferent, relatively to the two opposite orientations of time. 
While it is usually defined in terms of irreversible processes, 
I shall propose a more general definition which makes time 
asymmetry a probabilistic concept and in which time asymmetry 
is disconnected from irreversibility. A closer analysis more­
over shows that time asymmetry, as defined here, can be concei­
ved of as a regional phenomenon. 
In order to determine the connection between time asymmetry 
and the time reversal invariance of physical laws, the nature 
of the time reversal operator Τ will be discussed. Here the 
most important problem is to define Τ in a coherent way; it 
appears that different conventions for the action of Τ on phy­
sical quantities, are generally possible. 
Finally, it will be shown that, because of its regional cha­
racter, time asymmetry does not necessarily presuppose that 
the underlying spacetime must be temporally orientable, as it 
is very often assumed. 
III.l The arrow of time: time asymmetry and the flow of time. 
The arrow of time is one of the most controversial aspects 
of physical time. As used by the physicists, this notion 
'arrow of time' is supposed to be related to the distinction 
between past and future and the fact that time flows always 
in just one way, from the past toward the future. Thus, the 
arrow of time is said to point toward the future direction of 
time. Time has an arrow because nature abounds in irreversible 
processes. In everyday life we observe all kinds of irrever-
1 
sible processes: 
"It is obvious to everybody that the phenomena of the world 
are evidently irreversible. I mean things happen that do 
not happen the other way. You drop a cup and it breaks, and 
you can sit there a long time waiting for the pieces to come 
together and jump back into your hand. If you watch the 
waves of the sea breaking, you can stand there and wait for 
the great moment when the foam collects together, rises up 
out of the sea, and falls back farther out from the shore-
it would be very pretty!" 
Other examples can easily be added: the mixing of coffee and 
cream, a stone rolling down a hill, the growth of an organism 
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etc. We never observe tne reversal of these processes, viz., 
the spontaneous unmixing of coffee and cream, a stone roling 
up a hill by itself, persons growing younger instead of older. 
Not all of these complex irreversible processes are studied 
in physics; only a few kinds lend themselves to an exact quan­
titative treatment. Among these are processes involving friction, 
such as the demped pendulum, or heat conduction (heat always 
flows from the hot to the cool) and diffusion and mixing proces­
ses. The irreversible character of mixing processes is illustra-
2 ted by Feynman by the following example: 
"Suppose we have blue water, with ink, and white water, that 
is without іпк, in a tank, with a little separation, and 
then we pull out the separation very delicately. The water 
starts separate, blue on one side and white on the other 
side. Wait a while. Gradually the blue mixes up with the 
white, and after a while the water is 'luke blue', I mean 
it is sort of fifty-fifty, the colour uniformly distributed 
throughout. Now if we wait and watch this for a long time, 
it does not by itself separate. (You could do something to 
get the blue separated again. You could evaporate the water 
and condense it somewhere else, and collect the blue dye 
and dissolve it in half the water, and put the thing back. 
But while you are doing all that you yourself would be 
causing irreversible phenomena somewhere else.) By itself 
it does not go the other way." 
Indeed, no matter how long we wait, the spontaneous unmixing of 
both does not occur, and whenever we repeat the experiment, the 
mixing of both will take place. In other words, at the pheno-
menological level, the irreversible character of these proces­
ses appears as a law of nature. 
Because of these kinds of 'one way' processes, time is said 
to flow in just one way: from the past toward the future. The 
flow of time has a fixed direction, the direction of time. 
The everchanging 'present moment' or 'now' steadily moves into 
the future: future events become present and then they become 
part of the past. Within the Newtonian conception of time as 
a straight line, this flow of time can be pictured as the motion 
of a point, called the 'now' or 'the present', along this line 
in the direction of the future. 
Without any doubt, the arrow of time is one of the most in­
tricate and obscure aspects of physical time. The existing 
literature on the subject is filled with confusion and leaves 
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the impression that this field is still in its 'pre-paradigmatic' 
stage. There is no agreement as to what are the essential pro­
blems involved, how they should be stated, how they could pos­
sibly be solved. A sample of the issues raised contains ques­
tions such as: what is, from a physical point of view, the dif­
ference between past and future?; why can we have traces of the 
past but not of the future?; why can we remember past events 
but not future ones?; how can we reconcile the existence of 
irreversible processes with the time reversal invariant laws 
of classical and quantum mechanics?; how can we explain the 
constant growth of order and complexity in our universe?; why 
does time flow in just one way?; is the flow of time a physi­
cal phenomenon, i.e., is there a becoming in the physical world, 
or does it belong only to the realm of human consciousness? 
All these problems are said to be related to the problem of the 
arrow of time. 
The intricacy of the problems has caused a confusing termino­
logy in this field, which in turn has aggravated their obscurity. 
At least six notions are used in close connection and sometimes 
even as synonymous with the expression 'arrow of time', viz., 
•the direction of time', 'the anisotropy of time', 'the orien­
tation of time', 'the flow of time', 'time asymmetry' and, 
finally, 'irreversibility'. Their use, however, is by no means 
standardised. This makes it extremely difficult to get a hold 
on the problems, and to compare different opinions. 
In view of this, my first task will be to establish a defi­
nite terminology. In this respect, it is of fundamental impor­
tance to realise that the problem of the arrow of time contains 
two clusters of problems of a different nature: the problem 
of time asymmetry and the problem of the flow of time. 'Time 
asymmetry', also referred to as 'asymmetry in time', is related 
to the fact that the content of the world looks different in 
the two opposite orientations of time (see fig.17a ). For 
example, looking into the future-facing orientation of time, 
we observe the mixing of blue ink with water, but looking in 
the opposite orientation of time, the same process is never 
observed. On the other hand, 'the flow of time' is related to 
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the notions 'past', 'present' and 'future'. Whereas with respect 
to 'time asymmetry' all the moments of time are on the same 
footing (it is only necessary to refer to the two opposite orien­
tations of time), the 'flow of time' is related to the fact that 
one moment of time is singled out as the 'now' or 'present mo­
ment'; it is this everchanging 'now' that turns the near future 
into the near past (see fig.17b). 
flow of time 
past 
*-
future _ past •i future 
'+' orientation: π χ о 
A B A B 
t t 
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fig. fig. 
This distinction within the problem of the arrow of time, be­
tween the problem of time asymmetry and that of the flow of 
time is too often neglected. Much of the confusion in the 
existing literature is due to an ambiguous use of the notion 
of arrow of time, especially by physicists who use the term 
in both senses. 
This distinction between time asymmetry and flow of time 
was first clearly made by Grünbaum, who also stressed the danger 
of confusing both concepts, but he used a different terminology: 
instead of speaking of time asymmetry and flow of time, he uses 
the terms 'anisotropy of time' and 'temporal becoming'. I prefer, 
however, to use the expression 'time asymmetry' (or 'asymmetry 
in time'), which I adopt from Davies' book The physics of time 
7 
asymmetry, because the expression 'anisotropy of time' leaves 
the impression that it deals with a property of time itself, 
whereas in fact it refers to a property of the content of the 
8 
world, i.e., of the processes which take place. Moreover, unlike 
expressions such as 'the arrow of time' or 'the direction of 
time', 'time asymmetry' has the advantage of avoiding any as-
9 
sociation with the flow of time. 
The difference between time asymmetry and the flow of time 
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can be clearly stated by means of the notions of parameter time 
and coordinate time which were introduced in the previous chap-
ter. In a spacetime manifold, events are ordered relatively to 
coordinate time. If this ordering is such that the spacetime 
manifold looks different relatively to the two opposite orien-
tations of coordinate time, then time asymmetry obtains. Thus 
time asymmetry can be said to pertain to coordinate time. The 
flow of time howeveri is based upon the notion of change; but 
in this spacetime picture, change is linked to parameter time 
by virtue of the constant increase of parameter time along a 
trajectory ( see. p.95)· Due to this increase of parameter 
time, an observer can be said to be moving along the trajectory 
and to have the impression of a changing universe. Therefore, 
the flow of time is related to parameter time. 
Obviously, the two opposite orientations of time are not 
equivalent for the kinds of irreversible processes mentioned 
earlier; they only take place relatively to one orientation of 
time but not to the other one. Nevertheless, it is quite gene-
rally assumed that the laws of physics governing these proces-
ses do not distinguish between the two orientations of time; 
in other words, it is assumed that these laws are valid for 
both orientations of time. Now, if indeed this is the case, 
i.e., if these laws are time reversal invariant, how is it then 
possible to explain, or at least to make plausible, the occur-
rence of these kinds of irreversible processes? This problem 
becomes especially acute within the context of statistical me-
chanics, where indeed the fundamental laws are time reversal 
invariant. For instance, how is it possible to account for the 
irreversible character of mixing processes, such as ink with 
water, in a purely statistical mechanical description? All in 
all, from a physical point of view, time asymmetric processes 
are extremely interesting facts. Both this and the next chapter 
will deal exclusively with this phenomenon of time asymmetry. 
The main problem concerns the reconciliation of time asym-
metry with the laws of physics. This will be the subject of 
chapter IV; but first it is necessary to give a detailed ana-
lysis of the notion of time asymmetry itself. This will be done 
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in the next section, where I shall propose a probabilistic defi­
nition of time asymmetry which will be supplemented, in sect. 
III.3, by a discussion of the time reversal operator Τ and 
of the notions 'temporally reversed process' and 'time reversal 
invariance of physical laws' which are of the utmost importance 
for an understanding of the physical status of time asymmetry. 
Finally, I shall investigate, in sect, 111.4, the relation be­
tween time asymmetry and temporal orientability, since the 
definition of time asymmetry is based upon the distinction be­
tween two opposite time orientations. 
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III.2 Time asymmetry. 
In this section I shall proceed in the following way. First 
I shall present two definitions of time asymmetry, as found in 
the literature, A close examination of both shows that they 
have serious shortcomings; one of the main objections against 
both is that they put to much emphasis upon the role of irrever-
sible processes. A more general definition of time asymmetry 
will then be proposed. I shall try to show that, although this 
definition itself is not without problems, it can nevertheless 
serve as a useful point of departure for further inquiry. 
Davies, who coined the expression 'time asymmetry', describes 
10 it as follows: 
"Time asymmetry is here taken to mean the basic fact of nature 
that the contents of the world possess a structural distinc-
tion between past and future facing orientations." 
He strongly underlines the fact that time asymmetry is not a 
property of time itself but of the contents of the world. There-
11 fore he explicitely rejects the expression 'asymmetry of time'. 
Davies refers to a structural distinction between the two 
opposite time orientations, but he is surprisingly vague about 
12 
what this means: 
"The two directions of time in the following sense - toward 
the past and toward the future - are known from common ex-
perience to be fundamentally distinguished physically... For 
example, we remember the past. Moreover, this asymmetry 
with respect to the two time orientations is also readily 
recognized in laboratory physics. Indeed, practically all 
phenomena of nature appear to be asymmetric in time." 
This description of time asymmetry does not help us very much 
to understand the precise nature of the 'structural distinction 
between past and future facing orientations'. Davies' example, 
that we can remember the past, is at the very least problematic 
since it refers to the notion of the past which, as we have 
stated in the introduction, is related to the flow of time, 
not to time asymmetry. Neither does his remark that "practically 
all phenomena of nature appear to be asymmetric in time" bring 
us any further, since it is not clear what it means for phenomena 
to be asymmetric in time. Davies becomes more precise as soon 
as he relates time asymmetry with irreversibility; he claims 
that "thermodynamic macroscopic irreversibility does imply an 
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asymmetry in time". Thus, irreversible macroscopic phenomena 
are asymmetric in time. 
The qualification 'macroscopic' in 'thermodynamic macrosco-
pic irreversibility' is important since Davies distinguishes 
between macroscopic and microscopic irreversibility; whereas 
macroscopic irreversibility implies time asymmetry, this is 
14 
not necessarily the case for microscopic irreversibility. 
This is due to the fact that time asymmetry, according to Davies, 
is a valid concept only within a macroscopic description of 
the physical world, because it refers to a "collective property 
15 of physical systems in (space-)time." 
I shall not follow Davies in his restriction of the use of 
the notion 'time asymmetry' to the macroscopic description of 
the physical world. It is possible to define it, as will be 
seen shortly, so that it can be applied coherently to micros-
copic systems as well. Consequently, there is no need to intro-
duce, like Davies, a distinction between macroscopic and micros-
copic irreversibility. Moreover, irreversibility can be defi-
ned so that the size of the systems involved is not relevant 
(see sect. Ill .3). 
Irreversibility plays a crucial role not only in Davies' 
description of time asymmetry, but also in Grünbaum1s version 
1 & 
(he does not speak of time asymmetry but of anisotropy of time): 
"..the existence of irreversible processes structurally dis-
tinguishes the two opposite time senses as follows: there 
are certain kinds of sequences of btateb of systems specified 
in the order of decreasing time coordinates such that the 
same kinds of sequences do not likewise obtain in the order 
of increasing time coordinates. Accordingly, if there are 
irreversible kinds of processes, then time is anisotropic 
[asymmetric.] . " 
Contrary to Davies, Grünbaum is very clear about the precise 
meaning of what constitutes a structural distinction between 
the two opposite time orientations. Again, irreversibility is 
the key concept; time asymmetry is based upon the existence 
of irreversible processes. 
These can be of two different types. Following Mehlberg, 
Grünbaum speaks of weak or de facto irreversible processes and 
17 
strong or nomological irreversible ones. De facto (weak) irre-
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versibility obtains when the reversal of a proces is never or 
almost never observed, but is not forbidden by the laws of phy-
sics, whereas in the case of nomological (strong) irreversibili-
ty the reversed proces is forbidden by those laws. 
Grünbaum allows for time asymmetry to be based upon nomolo-
gical and de facto irreversible processes, thereby creating the 
impression that, in one shape or another, irreversibility is 
a necessary condition for time asymmetry. The emphasis is again 
put upon the existence of irreversible processes; this is but 
one step away from the identification of time asymmetry with 
irreversibility. It is precisely this standard coupling between 
time asymmetry and irreversibility that I shall try to avoid, 
by defining time asymmetry without any explicit reference to 
irreversibility. The feasibility and usefulness of such defi-
nition appears from the following consideration. 
In fact, the equivalence of both time orientations is destroy-
ed through the existence of irreversible processes, whether 
they are of a de facto or nomological nature. But the interesting 
question is whether the existence of these processes is a neces-
sary or only a sufficient condition for the existence of time 
asymmetry. It appears that it is only a sufficient condition, 
for indeed also perfectly reversible processes can furnish a 
sufficient basis for time asymmetry. Suppose that instances 
of a kind of process A occur relatively to the future and the 
past orientation of time; in other words, that the kind of 
process A is reversible. Consider the case in which the proba-
bility for the occurrence of instances of A relatively to the 
future orientation of time differs from the probability for 
the occurrence of instances of A relatively to the past orien-
tation. In that case, the contents of the world looks diffe-
rent, depending on the past and future orientation of time. 
And thus time asymmetry obtains relatively to processes of the 
kind A, although A is reversible (and also de facto reversed). 
Grünbaum considers only a special case of time asymmetry, in 
which one of the probabilities is zero or almost zero, i.e., 
the case in which the processes involved are de facto or nomo-
logically irreversible. 
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Hence, the following definition of time asymmetry appears to 
be more appropriate: 
Time asymmetry is the basic fact of nature that the contents of 
the world shows a structural difference between past and future 
facing orientations in the sense that there exist certain kinds 
of processes A,B.. such that the probability for the occurrence 
of instances of А,В.. relatively to the future facing orientation 
of time, denoted by Ρ (Α),Ρ (В)..differs from the probability 
for the occurrence of the same kinds of processes relatively to 
the past facing orientation, denoted by Ρ (Α),Ρ (В)..; that is, 
P+(A) i P"(A), 
P+(B) i P"(B). 
This definition has the advantage of making a clear separation 
between time asymmetry and irreversibility; the existence of 
time asymmetry is not exclusively linked with the existence 
of irreversible processes; time asymmetry is a more general 
notion then irreversibility. 
It is easy to see that Grünbaum's definition of time asymme-
try, in terms of irreversible processes, is just a special case 
of our definition. In the limit case, where Ρ (A)=0 and 
Ρ (A)> 0(where a real chance exists that instances of A occur 
in the future facing orientation, but where, relatively to the 
past facing orientation, this chance is about zero), we recover 
the case of de facto irreversible processes. The corresponding 
type of time asymmetry will be called 'de facto time asymmetry'. 
But in the case of Ρ (A)> 0 and Ρ (A) = 0 (where the occurrence 
of instances of A relatively to the past facing orientation of 
time is ruled out be the laws of physics), nomological irrever­
sible processes are involved, and thus, the corresponding 
type of time asymmetry will be called 'nomological time asymme­
try' . 
The apparent innocence of this definition of time asymmetry 
cannot conceal some real problems which require closer examina­
tion. First, and most important, there is the problem of defi­
ning the probabilities Ρ (Α), Ρ (В) etc. Then, there remains 
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an important time asymmetric process that is not covered by this 
definition, viz., the expansion of the universe. Finally, it 
will be necessary to reformulate this definition so that it 
contains only probabilities relatively to the future facing 
orientation of time; in other words, we must redefine the proba­
bilities P~(A), Ρ (3).. into probabilities relatively to the 
future facing orientation: Ρ (A)—*· Ρ (?). A closer examination 
of these topics, especially the first one, will show that 
this definition is more complicated than might be expected at 
first sight. 
The probabilities Ρ (A) etc. 
Probabilities play an important role in our definition of 
time asymmetry. This definition makes time asymmetry a probabi­
listic concept, and it is therefore very much in line with 
Reichenbach's conception of time asymmetry. According to Reichen­
bach, time asymmetry is "a matter of probability and statistics" 
and he states that "the statistical nature of time direction 
[time asymmetry] appears to be the ultimate outcome of all in-
19 quiries into the nature of time." But because time asymmetry 
is a matter of probability, it requires reference to an ensem­
ble of systems, for which the relevant probabilities are well 
defined. But how is it possible to determine whether a given 
set of physical systems behaves like an ensemble'? In his Direc­
tion of time, Reichenbach studies in detail the statistical 
behaviour of an ensemble of 'branch systems' and he shows that 
under certain conditions such an ensemble of branch systems 
behaves asymmetrically in time. But he has little to say about 
the conditions under which a given set of branch systems can 
be conceived of as an ensemble of branch systems. 
The problem can be put in another way. In reality, we never 
directly measure probabilities, but only relative frequencies. 
The question now is under what conditions inferences about 
probabilities can be made on basis of the observed relative 
frequencies. In the case of time asymmetry, the problem takes 
on the following form. Consider a finite region of spacetime 
Δ Λ = Δ 3 Χ Δ Τ , and suppose that a large number N of processes 
of the kind A take place in ΔΏ.. Note carefully that N is the 
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sum of the number of instances of A relatively to the future 
orientation of time, η , and the number of instances of A rela­
tively to the past orientation, η : Ν = η +n~. The relative 
frequencies with regard to the past and the future orientation 
of time, denoted by respectively Ρ (A) and F (A), are given by: 
P"(A) = g- and F+(A) = g-. 
Now, the problem can be stated in a simple way: under what con­
ditions is F (A) etc. an adequate measure of Ρ (A) etc.? This 
is one of the central epistemologica! problems of probability 
20 theory for which there is as yet no straightforward solution. 
Moreover, assuming that it would be possible to spell out in 
detail the conditions under which the transition from frequen­
cies to probabilities would be allowed, then it would still 
be very dubious whether there actually are any kinds of proces­
ses А, В etc. for which indeed these conditions would be satis­
fied so that it would be possible to determine for those kinds 
of processes the relevant probabilities. 
Most of the damage due to these difficulties with respect 
to the probabilities involved, can be avoided by simply restric­
ting the use of the notion of time asymmetry to finite regions 
of spacetime; in that case the relevant probabilities can in 
principle be given in terms of the relative frequencies, as 
was indicated above. Time asymmetry is then conceived of as a 
regional phenomenon. This however, is precisely what is to be 
expected if time asymmetry, as it is almost generally assumed, 
is of a de facto nature, for in that case the time asymmetric 
behaviour of systems is not due to the laws of physics but to 
the prevailing boundary conditions in that part of the universe 
21 
where these time asymmetric processes occur. These boundary 
conditions do not necessarily have to obtain everywhere on the 
spacetime manifold. Accordingly, time asymmetry does not neces­
sarily obtain for the whole of the spacetime manifold. Thus, the 
existence of time asymmetry is restricted in three different 
ways : 
a)to particular kinds of processes А,В etc. 
b)to a (finite) region of space,Δ5, 
c)to a (finite) span of timejAT. 
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Of coursej if the relevant boundary conditions prevail in the 
whole universe, then time asymmetry is of a'global' character; 
the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the restriction to a 
finite time interval. 
This restriction of time asymmetry to finite regions of 
spacetime, however, does not solve all our problems. It works 
quite smoothly for those kinds of processes whose reversal is 
(almost) never observed, such as the mixing of blue ink with 
water. Their time asymmetric behaviour is evident from direct 
observations; relatively to the future orientation of time, 
always the mixing process M is observed, never the unmixing. 
Therefore, for any 'known' spacetime region, the relative 
frequencies are given by F (M)=l and F (M)=0. Because we never 
come across counterinstances, the inductive inference is made 
to the lawlike irreversible character of these processes. 
But now suppose that the comparison of the relative frequen-
cies of a process A for a finite spacetime regionaß shows that 
they are just slightly different. In that case, the time asym-
metric behaviour of processes of the kind A is more problematic. 
Then we have to make sure that these relative frequencies are 
not dependent upon the choice of ¿SI, for if they are, a dif-
ferent choice forли might lead to just the opposite conclusion 
with respect to the time asymmetric behaviour of this kind of 
process. 
Naturally, the most conspicuous kinds of time asymmetric 
behaviour observed in daily life concern processes whose rever­
sal is never or almost never observed. This is the only kind 
of time asymmetry considered by Grünbaum. But it would be wrong 
to conclude from this that time asymmetric processes for which 
F (A) and F (A) are only slightly different, are irrelevant. 
They might have played a role in the evolution of the univer-
se, especially in the early stages. Consider, for instance, 
the stage in the evolution of the universe at which there still 
was thermal equilibrium between radiation and electrons and 
?? positrons. This means that the temperature in the universe was 
still sufficiently high (> 6.10 K) for electron-positron 
creation from radiation to occur: 
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A: 2 γ —> e + e (electron-positron creation) 
In the situation of thermal equilibrium, the rate of creation 
of electron-positron pairs from radiation equals the rate of 
annihilation of those pairs (this annihilation is considered to 
be the reversal of proces A, and is denoted by A ): 
r + — A : e + e —? 2 jf (electron-positron annihilation). 
In other words, the rate of creation of electron-positron pairs 
relatively to both orientations of time is the same, i.e.: 
P+(A) = P"(A). 
Thus, during this stage of the evolution of the universe, there 
is no time asymmetry with regard to processes of the type A. 
But due to the expansion of the universe, the temperature con­
stantly drops; at a certain moment, it reaches a value which is 
about equal to the treshold temperature for the creation of 
electron-positron pairs from radiation. Above this value the 
γ -rays do contain enough energy for the creation of electron-
positron pairs and the probability for the occurrence of this 
proces is high enough to maintain equilibrium between radiation 
and matter. But below this value, the radiation does not con­
tain enough energy to create electron-positron pairs, and there­
fore the probability for the occurrence of this kind of process 
rapidly decreases. So, in the process of cooling down, the uni­
verse reaches a point at which the equilibrium between radiation 
and electrons and positrons can no longer be maintained. From 
that moment on, 
P+(A) < P"(A). 
Because of the changing boundary conditions in the universe, the 
probabilities become unequal and from that moment on, time 
asymmetry obtains relatively to processes of the kind A. At the 
beginning there is only a slight difference between Ρ (A) and 
Ρ (A), but as the temperature drops further, the discrepancy 
between them grows increasingly larger, until the probability 
for the creation of electron-positron pairs becomes about zero; 
then only annihilation takes place, until electrons and posi-
trons "disappear as major constituents of the universe. 
This example clearly illustrates that time asymmetry 
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with respect to a perfectly reversible process can be caused 
by changing boundary conditions in the universe (the cooling 
down of the universe). Moreover, it shows that the existence 
of time asymmetry can be limited to particular time intervals, 
during which the relevant probabilities can only be slightly 
different. 
Cosmologica! time asymmetry. 
It is evident that the given definition of time asymmetry 
cannot be applied to such long term processes as the expansion 
of the universe. For such a unique process, Ρ (A), etc. is no 
longer meaningful and thus a probabilistic approach to time 
asymmetry is not appropriate. Nevertheless, the expansion of 
the universe is clearly a time asymmetric process; sometimes 
it is even regarded to be the most fundamental time asymmetric 
process to which all other kinds of time asymmetry are to be 
reduced. For instance, the asymmetry in the creation and anni­
hilation of electron-positron pairs is caused by the expansion 
of the universe. The starting point for our definition of time 
asymmetry, however, was not this overall time asymmetric pro­
cess, but the time asymmetric behaviour of systems observed 
in daily life. This time asymmetric behaviour can best be 
characterised in a probabilistic way, in spite of the fact that 
maybe ultimately this time asymmetric behaviour is due to a 
unique time asymmetric process, viz., the expansion of the 
universe. 
Transformation of P"(A) into P+(?). 
I now come to the last topic in connection with our defini­
tion of time asymmetry; it concerns the fact that this defini­
tion contains probabilities relatively to the past facing orien­
tation of time. Actually, we cannot verify directly whether 
a process A takes place relatively to the past orientation of 
time. We can only observe processes as they take place relative­
ly to the future orientation of time; in other words, we cannot 
'go back in time' in order to see whether processes of the kind 
A have taken place in the past orientation of time. What we 
can observe is whether both A and the reversal of A take place 
relatively to the future orientation of time. Thus, the defini-
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tion must be restateci so that it contains only probabilities 
relative to the future orientation of time. This can easily 
be achieved since the probability for the occurrence of instan­
ces of A relatively to the past orientation of time is by defi­
nition equal to the probability for the occurrence of instances 
of the reversal of A, denoted by Ar, relatively to the future 
— + г 
orientation of time: Ρ (A)=P (A ). Therefore the inequality 
P~(A)?!P+(A) can be rewritten as Ρ (Ar)¿P (A); thus, time asym-
metry obtains with respect to processes of the kind A if the 
probabilities for the occurrence of instances of A and A are 
different, provided both are taken relatively to the future 
orientation of time. 
While it is intuitively quite clear what is meant by the 
'temporally reversed process of A' in instances such as mixing 
processes (the reversal of the spontaneous mixing of blue ink 
with water would be the spontaneous unmixing of both), the 
physical definition of the reversal of a process is often far 
more difficult. To this important problem I shall return in the 
next section, since it is intimately connected with the nature 
of the time reversal operator T. 
To compensate for this review of problems related to this 
conception of time asymmetry, I shall now turn to some of its 
positive aspects to show that it can nevertheless serve as a 
promising starting point for further analysis. The main advan-
tage of this conception of time asymmetry is that it discon-
nects time asymmetry from irreversibility contrary to the stan-
dard conceptions of time asynmetry which are based upon irre-
versibility. It is not necessary to identify time asymmetry 
with irreversibility; time asymmetry can exist even if all the 
processes in the world are reversible. Therefore, this concep-
tion of time asymmetry is clearly compatible with the alleged 
time reversal invariance of the physical laws, whereas if time 
asymmetry is based exclusively on irreversible processes, it 
is more problematic to reconcile the existence of time asym-
metry in our actual universe with the time reversal invariance 
of the laws of physics. 
But there are some other interesting features to this con-
ception of time asymmetry. I have already pointed out that it 
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is easily compatible with the idea that time asymmetry is a 
regional phenomenon. Two important points remain to be discussed: 
a)time asymmetry as defined above is not necessarily a macros-
copic phenomenon, and b)time asymmetry is, in principle, not 
a property of individual processes. 
a)The first point concerns the relation between time asymmetry 
and the existence of two levels of description, respectively 
the macroscopic and the microscopic. In the literature, it is 
rather often claimed that time asymmetry is only relevant for 
a macroscopic description of physical reality. According to 
this point of view, only macroscopic systems can behave asym-
metric in time; time asymmetry is not meaningful in a micros-
copic description because all microscopic processes are rever-
sible: a clear example of the standard coupling of time asym-
metry and irreversibility'. Consider again the mixing of blue 
ink and water. The collisions between the individual molecules 
are all perfectly reversible. Therefore, it is claimed that 
the asymmetric behaviour can only be a property of the co]lec-
tive behaviour of the molecules, which shows itself at the macros-
copie level. A typical proponent of this point of view is Davies: 
"Contrary to widespread belief, time asymmetry is only a type 
of description, relevant to the macroscopic worldview of the 
physicist. But nothing yet discovered in nature requires 
individual atoms to experience time asymmetry, the very 
essence of which is the collective quality of complex sys-
tems . . " 
But starting from our conception of time asymmetry there is no 
reason why it should not or could not be applied to microscopic 
processes. We have already seen that it can be meaningfully 
applied to the microscopic processes of creation and annihila-
tion of electron-positron pairs. Consider also the radioactive 
decay of J Uranium atoms: 
A: 25°U -^· 23l,Th + w particle. 
Instances of A frequently take place in our region of the uni-
verse, but instances of Ar almost never. Therefore, F+(A)>F (Ar), 
and thus, time asymmetry obtains for this kind of microscopic 
processes in our region of the universe. In spite of the fact 
that this microscopic process is usually regarded to be rever-
sible, since the laws governing this type of radioactive decay 
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are supposed to be time reversal invariant, it nevertheless 
shows time asymmetric behaviour which is certainly not the re-
sult of the collective behaviour of many interacting molecules. 
Thus it is not necessary to restrict the use of the notion 
of time asymmetry to the macroscopic description of the world. 
On the ether hand, I do agree with Davies that time asymmetry 
is not a quality of individual atoms. 
b)Time asymmetry, as it is defined here, is not a property of 
individual systems or processes. Time asymmetry is essentially 
a probabilistic concept; this means that an individual process 
of the kind A is not asymmetric in time, but that time asymmetry 
obtains relatively to many instances of the kind A. Of course, 
in the limiting case where the probability for the reversed 
process is zero or approximately zero, it will be possible to 
distinguish the past from the future orientation of time by a 
single instance of A. For instance, when we are shown two pic-
tures of blue ink and water in respectively an unmixed and a 
mixed state, we can infer with absolute certainty the temporal 
order in which both pictures were taken, provided the system 
'blue ink with water' was closed between the two moments these 
pictures were taken: the picture showing the unmixed blue ink 
and water was taken before the other one. In those limiting cases, 
the time asymmetric behaviour becomes a property of the indivi-
dual systems. 
The same still applies if the pictures of the unmixed and 
mixed blue ink and water are replaced by two photographs of 
respectively an 'ordered' and 'unordered' deck of playing cards, 
of which we know that one was produced from the other by shuf-
fling it. Because the probability that shuffling an unordered 
deck of cards will produce an ordered one is extremely small, 
we infer that the picture of the ordered deck of cards was taken 
before the unordered one. With the help of this example, it is 
easy to show that the number of cards in a deck determines to 
a large degree the possibility of ascribing an asymmetric charac-
ter to the process of shuffling. Indeed, any decrease in the 
total number of cards of the deck will increase the probability 
for the (spontaneous) occurrence of the reversed process ( from 
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an unordered te an ordered deck); in the case of a small number 
of cards ( e.g., 4 or 5 ) there is a fair chance that the picture 
of the unordered deck was taken before the ordered one, because 
shuffling that small number of unordered cards could very well 
produce an ordered deck of cards. Thus, a decrease in the num­
ber of cards in a deck shows clearly the probabilistic nature 
of the time asymmetric character of the shuffling process. 
Still one problem with respect to our definition of time 
asymmetry remains to be discussed, viz., the definition of the 
г . . . 
reversed process A of A. From a physical point of view the 
definition of A r is not at all a trivial matter. In this issue, 
the time reversal operator Τ plays an important role. 
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III.3 (Ir)reversibility and the time reversal operator T. 
Although our conception of time asymmetry is not based expli­
citly on irreversible processes3 it goes without saying that 
irreversible processes are of primary importance with regard to 
time asymmetry as observed in daily life. My intention so far 
has not been to claim that irreversibility is irrelevant for 
time asymmetry; instead I have tried to clarify the relation 
between both concepts in order to avoid the widespread identi­
fication of time asymmetry with irreversibility. 
In everyday life, it is quite clear what is meant by irrever­
sible processes; processes are called irreversible if the rever­
sed process cannot occur. It is tacitly assumed that it is clear 
what constitutes the reversal of a process; for mixing processes, 
it is the unmixing of the components and for a demped pendulum, 
it is the spontaneous swinging of the pendulum etc. In this 
section, however, it will be seen that, from a physical point 
of view, the definition of the reversal of a process is rather 
complicated and that the time reversal operator Τ plays an impor­
tant role in this issue. 
A turning point in the systematic study of irreversible proces­
ses in physics is the work of Carnot, Clausius and Thompson on 
heat phenomena, dating from the 19 century. They formulated 
for the first time the second law of phenomenological thermo­
dynamics which states that the entropy of a closed system in­
creases or stays equal, but never decreases. This entropy con­
cept permits a thermodynamical classification into reversible 
and irreversible processes: those during which the entropy does 
not change are called reversible, and those for which the entro­
py increases are called irreversible. This is the standard ap­
proach in physics to the problem of irreversible processes and 
that is the reason why the concept of entropy plays such a domi­
nant role in the discussions of time asymmetry (see ch. IV). 
Here, I shall follow a different course. First, this classi­
fication of reversible and irreversible processes on the basis 
of the concept of entropy is not very close to our experience 
(we do not directly observe entropy in nature). But secondly, 
and more importantly, this classification is too narrow. In the 
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next chapter, I shall discuss irreversible processes where the 
role of entropy is rather controversial. 
I shall now expose how a precise definition of irreversibili-
ty can be given within a physical context without reference to 
the concept of entropy. Given a closed system à. ; let this system 
go through an evolution and let this evolution be described 
physically by a parametrised curve in some phase space (see ch. 
II). In other words, system â. goes through a process A which 
can be decomposed into a sequence of states in some phase space, 
parametrised by time t: 
A: A(ti) A(t) A(tf), t ^ t t t f . 
A(t·) and A{t~) are respectively the initial and the final state 
of the system. In order to determine the reversed process of A, 
let us consider this process A from a time reversed point of 
view. Clearly, from this time reversed point of view, the tem-
poral order of the states will be reversed. But this is not the 
only thing that will change; the states themselves will also 
look different if time is reversed. For instance, if the state 
of the system A is given in terms of position and impulse of its 
component particles, then, from the time reversed point of view, 
the positions will be the same but the impulse of the particles 
will change sign since, intuitively, time reversal corresponds 
to motion reversal. Generally, the state A(t) will be different 
from its time reversed counterpart; this time reversed state 
of A(t) will be denoted by Ar(t). A(t) represents the states 
of system à. as observed relatively to the future orientation of 
time, and A (t) as observed relatively to the past orientation. 
The relation between A(t) and Ar(t) is given by the time rever-
sal operator T; Ar(t) is the result of the action of Τ on A(t) 
considered as a state function in some space: 
Ar(t)= T.A(t). 
As will shortly be seen, the precise definition of the action 
of Τ on physical quantities which are necessary for characteri­
sing the state of a system, is not always a trivial matter. 
Thus, if system à- , relatively to the future orientation of 
time, goes through a process A, then, from the time reversed 
point of view, system 3i goes through the following sequence of 
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states: Ar(tf) Ar(t) Ar(t^. )· The definition of the 
reversed process of A is now obvious: the reversed process of A, 
A , is the process A as seen from the time reversed point of 
view. Thus, A is given by the following sequence of states: 
Ar: Ar(tf) Ar(t) Ar(ti). 
The reverse of a process is, therefore, not just the reversed 
order of the states of the original process, but it is given by 
the temporally reversed states in reversed order. 
The definition of reversibility now follows immediately: a 
process A is called reversible if both A and A are allowed by 
the laws of physics to occur relatively to the future (or past) 
orientation of time. If not, the process is irreversible. 
The assumption that system à. is closed during the process A 
also applies to the reversed process A . More generally, if 
certain constraints C.....C apply to the system i when it goes 
through the process A, then in the definition of the reversed 
process of A, the same constraints apply, but as seen from the 
time reversed point of view, i.e., T(C.)....T(C ). 
Once again, the reversibility of a process A does not by it-
self imply that both A and A in fact do occur with the same 
frequency. The existence of the appropriate initial conditions 
( see ch. IV ) is of primary importance. If, relatively to the 
future orientation of time, the initial state corresponding 
to A (tf) de facto never or seldom occurs, but the one corres-
ponding to A(t.) does, then the reversal of process A will never 
or seldom take place. In the latter case, A is usually called 
de facto irreversible (see p.ll8). Yet, this expression ,is ra-
ther misleading, since, according to the above description, 
these processes are reversible, in spite of the fact that the 
reversed process does not de facto take place. It would have 
been more appropriate to refer to them as 'de facto irreversed' 
processes instead of as 'de facto irreversible'. 
Whether or not a process A is reversible, depends upon the 
character of the laws governing that kind of process. It will 
be clear by now that if the same laws are valid relatively to 
both orientations of time, the processes governed by those laws 
will be reversible. In other words, time reversal invariance of 
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physical laws implies reversibility. It is not necessary to actu­
ally reverse the course of time or to let time, so to say, 
'flow backward' in order to test the time reversal invariance 
of physical laws. Sklar describes the following procedure for 
determining whether the laws governing a system are time rever-
sal invariant: J 
"We start off with a system in state S, allowing it to evolve, 
after time Dt to state S.. At the same time we start off with 
another system, exactly like the first, except that its initi­
al state is the 'time-reversed state' of the final state of 
the original system. Call this new state Τ(3/!Π If the laws 
of nature are time-reversal invariant, then at the end of 
interval Dt we will find the second system in the state T(S), 
the time-reversed version of the original state of the first 
system." 
It is, however, crucial to choose the proper 'time-reversed 
state', T(S 1), and to insure that all the constraints are also 
taken from the time reversed point of view. I shall now turn to 
this problem in which the nature of the time reversal operator 
Τ plays a central role. 
In order to determine the time reversed state Ar(t) of A(t), 
the action of Τ on A(t) must be known; given the action of Τ 
on all physical quantities necessary for specifying the state 
of the system 3., not only A r(t), but also the reversed process is 
fixed. Moreover, if the behaviour of the laws governing the 
system 3 under Τ is known, then it can be determined whether 
or not the proces A is reversible or not. 
The time reversal operator Τ transforms t into -t, but does 
not affect the position of a particle in space, x: 
T: (x,t) ι—» (x,-t). 
Therefore, the velocity ν of a particle also changes sign under 
T: 
Τ: ν ι * -v. 
Thus, time reversal corresponds to motion reversal. Accordingly, 
the time reversal operator Τ is usually defined in physics as the 
-~ ^ 26 
operator which reverses momentum, p, and spin, s: 
Τ: ρ ι • -p 
T: s , > -1. 
Thus, if the state of a particle is given by position, momentum 
and spin, A=(x,p,S), then the action of Τ on A is given by: 
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Τ: A = (x,p,s) ь > A r = (х,-"?,-"?). 
However, the effect of Τ on x,p and s does not suffice to deter­
mine whether a process is reversible or not; indeed, the effect 
of Τ on every physical quantity necessary for describing the 
state of a system and the laws governing that system should 
be defined. Usually this definition is not explicitly provided 
by the physicists. Τ must be defined coherently for all physical 
quantities involved. The resulting problem is best illustrated 
by the following two examples: the second law of Newton which 
is the standard example of a time reversal invariant law, and 
the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics which is the 
standard example of a time reversal non invariant law. 
1) Newton's second law. 
Within classical mechanics, the acceleration of a particle with 
mass m under a force F is given by Newton's second law: 
π -·· d χ F = m. a = m — ρ . 
The state of the particle is completely determined by giving its 
place and velocity: A=(x,v); thus A r is given by (x,-v). 
The determination of the action of Τ on this second law is 
somewhat more complicated. In the first place, the following 
rule must be introduced: 
T(x.y) = T(x).T(y). 
Thus, Τ is a morphism with respect to multiplication (and addi­
tion). Now, applying Τ to this law yields: 
T(F) = T(m.a) = T(m).T(a). 
Because the acceleration a is the second derivative with respect 
to t, it does not change sign under T; thus, 
T(F) = T(m).a. 
Next comes the action of Τ on m. The invariance of m under Τ 
follows from the definition of the action of Τ on p: T(p)=-p, 
which implies that T(m)=m. Of course, the action of Τ on ρ can 
be defined differently: T(p)=p, in which case m does change 
sign under T. As a consequence, the kinetic energy of a parti­
cle would also change sign under T. Given the standard conven­
tion that m does not change sign under T, the proof of the 
time reversal invariance of the second law of Newton is not yet 
complete, since we also mus't determine the action of Τ on F. 
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a)In case of the gravitational force F^, 
= G l ' J -
m^ .nip 
2 
г 
the assumption that T(F )= F is correct, irrespectively of 
ε s 
whether or not mass changes sign under T, but on condition that 
the gravitational constant G does not change sign under T. If G 
were to change sign under T, the attractive gravitational force 
would become a repulsive force. Thus, given the conventions that 
T(m)=m and T(G)=G, Newton's second law is time reversal invari-
ant in case F stands for the gravitational force. 
b)In case of the Lorentz-force F.., acting on a particle with 
electric charge e moving in a magnetic field B, 
F, = e.vxB, 
the determination of the action of Τ is more complicated, since 
we must know the action of Τ on e and B. The invariance of this 
Lorentz force under Τ is usually made plausible by arguing 
that, besides v, also В changes sign under Τ since "the magnetic 
field itself is produced by moving charges, and under time rever-
27 
sal of these charges the field changes sign.'.' This is true, 
however, if it is tacitly assumed that the electric charge e 
28 does not change sign under T, i.e., T(e)=e. In that case indeed, 
F is invariant (and thus also Newton's second law with F equal 
to F^): 
T(F)=T(e).T(v).T(ê)=e.(-ν).(-В)=e.v.B=F . 
But again, the question arises why the assumption that e does 
not change sign under T, should be made? 
It is not at all obvious that e does not change sign under T, 
especially in view of Feynman's and Stueckelberg's interpreta­
tion of a positron as an electron 'going back in time', which 
2Q . 
suggests that e does change sign under T.'With regard to this 
problem, the distinction between parameter time and coordinate 
time is of interest since the action of Τ on e can be defined 
differently for parameter time (proper time) and for coordinate 
time. Let us assume that coordinate time reversal, denoted by 
Τ , does not change the sign of e: 
T0(e) = e, 
ізб 
but that, on the other hand, parameter time reversal, Τ , does 
change the sign of e, as suggested by the Feynman-Stueckelberg 
interpretation of a positron: 
Tp(e) = -e. 
This distinction between Τ and Τ has interesting consequences 
for the interpretation of the CPT theorem. If, indeed, Τ does 
change the sign of electric charge, then its effect on e is the 
same as the effect of the charge conjugation operator С However, 
in the CPT theorem, С is more generally interpreted as the parti-
cle-antiparticle conjugation, so that it can also be applied to 
particles without electric charge. The same, more general, inter­
pretation of parameter time reversal Τ is possible: parameter 
time reversal corresponds to particle-antiparticle conjugation.-^ 
But with this interpretation of С as parameter time reversal 
Τ , the CPT invariance of physical laws receives a purely geo­
metrical meaning. This becomes immediately clear as soon as it 
is realised that the time reversal operator Τ in the CPT theorem 
stands for coordinate time reversal Τ ; in view of the equiva­
lence of С with Τ , the CPT invariance of physical laws becomes 
the Τ PT invariance: in order to produce a completely reversed 
Ρ
 c 
fig. 18. 
description of, e.g., the motion of a particle, not only the 
orientations of the space coordinates (P) and time coordinate 
(T
c
), but also the direction of the increase of the parameter 
of the trajectory (T ) should be reversed (see fig. 18). These 
considerations show that beside the standard convention, other 
definitions for the action of of Τ on e can be envisaged. 
2) The second law of phenomenological thermodynamics. 
The standard example of a time reversal non invariant law is 
the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics, usually given 
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dt 
where S(t) is the entropy as a function of time. But whether or 
not this law is indeed time reversal non invariant depends upon 
the definition of the action of Τ on S. There are two options 
here : 
a) T(S)=S. This is the standard convention. In this case the 
second law is time reversal non invariant: 
m
,dS^ dS _ _ _>. dS y η 
T ( dt ) --at ^0-' d t 4 0 · 
Because 
dS- ψ- , 
e 
where dQ is the heat supplied to the system and Τ stands for 
absolute temperature, it follows that Τ does not change sign 
under time reversal: 
т(т
е
)=т
е
, 
provided that heat, as a form of energy, does not change sign 
under T. In the same manner, the action of Τ on all other thermo-
dynamical quantities, like heat capacity and friction coefficient, 
has to be defined coherently. 
b) T(S)=-S. If this convention is adopted, then the second law 
of phenomenological thermodynamics is again time reversal invar­
iant : 
u d t ; dt * υ· 
If the action of Τ on S is defined in this way, then this implies 
that absolute temperature Τ has to change sign under Τ as well. 
Although it is not standard to assume that T(S)=-S, Stueckelberg 
has shown that this assumption is possible, provided the action 
of Τ on all the other thermodynamical quantities is defined 
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in a coherent way. Thus, whether or not the second law of phe­
nomenological thermodynamics is time reversal invariant, depends 
upon which convention is adopted with regard to the action of 
Τ on the thermodynamic quantity S. 
These two examples suffice to show that it is not always ob­
vious how the operator Τ acts on physical quantities. In general, 
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different paths to define coherently the action of Τ on physical 
quantities can be followed. As in these two examples, the time 
reversal operator Τ has to be defined explicitly in every domain 
of physics in order to determine whether the laws in those do­
mains are time reversal invariant. In quantum mechanics, for 
instance, the time reversal operator is given in the form of an 
anti-unitary transformation (in contrast to the time-evolution 
operators which are given by unitary transformations). 
It is important to realise that the evolution of a system 
can be described in different ways depending upon the characte­
risation of the state of the system. This implies that the no­
tion of the time reversed state of a system is not uniquely de­
fined, which again has important consequences for the apparent 
reversibility or irreversibility of the processes. 
Consider the situation in which the state of a gas is given 
in terms of pressure P, absolute temperature Τ and volume V: 
A = (P,T
e
,V). 
Following the standard convention for the action of Τ on Ρ, Τ 
and V, we get: 
T(A) = A r =(P,T ,V) = A. 
Thus, the time reversed state of the gas is identical with the 
original state. But, the same gas can be described in another 
way, viz., by specifying the places x. and the momenta p. of 
the molecules of the gas: 
A' = (x.,p.). (i=l,....,N; N: the number of 
1 1
 molecules in the gas) 
In this case, the time reversed state T(A') is not identical 
with the original state A: 
T(A') = A'r= (x^-^) i A. 
This shows that it does not always make sense to speak about the 
time reversed state of a system ì as such. The nature of the 
time reversed state depends upon the (dynamical) quantities by 
which the state of system i is characterised. Consequently, also 
the meaning of the temporally reversed process of a system de-
pends upon the particular description of the evolution of the 
system. For example, if the evolution of a gas is described in 
terms of Ρ, Τ and V: 
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then the reversed process A is given by: 
Ar: (Pi.T^.V,). »<P 0.T e o,V 0). 
But ifj on the other hand, the evolution of the same gas is 
described with ~x. and p\ , then: 
A' 
and: 
(Xi.Pi)- ,-.1 -Is -?· (xi»Pi), 
А'
Г
:(Зс^-^) 
-Их-j^-Pi)· 
This has far-reaching consequences for the problem of (ir-) 
reversibility. The evolution of a system may look irreversible 
in one description, whereas it may look reversible in another. 
Consider a bar with an initial Gaussian temperature distribution 
(fig. 19a). According to the macroscopic law of heat conduction, 
(к : coefficient of heat conduc­
tion; X> 0) 
this system will have, after a period at, a temperature distri­
bution as given in fig. 19b; in other words, the probability of 
àT
 v ΥΤ 
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bar bar 
fig. 19a fig. 19b 
finding the system in the state of fig. 19b after time^tis 1. 
However, according to the same law, the probability of observing 
the temporal reversal of this process, i.e., a transition from 
the state of fig, 19b to the state of fig. 19a, is zero. In this 
macroscopic description, the process is irreversible, due of 
course to the time reversal non invariance of the macroscopic 
law of heat conduction. 
However, in a microscopic description of the same process 
in terms of places and momenta of the molecules constituting the 
bar, the situation becomes quite different. Assume that in this 
microscopic description, the initial state of fig. 19a is given 
by (3?.,p.) and the final state of fig. 19b by (x. ,p ). According 
1 1 l i 
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to the laws of classical mechanicsj the system evolves determi-
Π 0 1 л 
nistically in At sec. from (χ.,ρ.) to (χ.,pT); in other words, 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
the probability of finding the system in state (x.,p.) after 
-»0 -»0 1 1 Δ. t s e c , given that tne initial state is (x.,p.)j is 1· But 
in this description, the same applies to the reversed process 
from (xT,-p.) to (x.,-p.): the probability of finding the sys-
1 1 r\ λ 1 
tem in state (x.,-"p.) after At s e c , given that the initial 
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state is (x-j-p,·), is also 1. Due to the time reversal invariance 
of the laws of classical mecnanics, this microscopic description 
of the evolution of the system is reversible. 
Thus, even if, in a macroscopic description, the evolution 
of a system looks irreversible, there remains the possibility 
that in a microscopic description, the evolution of that system 
looks reversible. A paradox arises as soon as it is assumed that 
the macroscopic description should be completely reducible to 
the microscopic description: how is it possible to reconcile 
macroscopic irreversibility with microscopic reversibility? 
More generally, if at a certain level of description, the laws 
of nature violate time reversal invariance, then it remains 
possible that at another, more fundamental or less fundamental 
level of description, time reversal invariance is not violated. 
Thus, in principle it appears possible that a process which 
looks reversible in a macroscopic description, looks irreversi­
ble in a microscopic description. In those cases, however, a 
reduction of one level of description to the other, becomes 
problematic. 
Until about two decades ago, time reversal non invariant laws 
were known from the macroscopic, or phenomenological level of 
description, but it was more or less generally assumed that at 
the microscopic level of description, the laws were time rever­
sal invariant. This changed with the discovery of T-violation 
in processes governed by the so-called weak interaction force; 
for instance, the decay of a neutron into a proton, an electron 
and a neutrino in beta decay, is governed by the weak interac­
tion force. 
Roughly, the discovery of T-violation in microscopic process-
es was the result of the following argument. Assuming that the 
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laws governing the weak interaction obey certain very general 
conditions, it can be shown that, although the exact form of 
3 r :) these laws is unknown, they have to obey the famous CPT theorem. ' 
Now, given the validity of the CPT theorem for the weak interac­
tion force, the T-violation follows from the discovery that in the 
decay of a neutral К meson, which is governed by the weak inter-
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action, the PC symmetry is violated. To save the PCT symmetry, 
it is therefore necessary that the Τ symmetry be violated as well. 
There is, however, no direct evidence of the time reversal 
non invariance of this decay process because tne temporal re­
versal of this process, has (not yet) been studied in concreto. 
Indeed, no direct comparison of the original process and its 
temporal reversal has been possible in practice. As yet, only 
indirect evidence is available; the presumed T-violation is 
based upon the assumptions that the weak interaction force obeys 
the CPT theorem and that the interpretation of the CP violation 
in the decay process is correct. In contrast, it has been pos­
sible to make a direct comparison between the original process 
and its temporal reversal for processes governed by the strong 
nuclear force and the electromagnética! force. But no violation 
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of Τ was found. 
The relevance of this presumed time reversal violation for 
the problem of time asymmetry, has been a point of controversy. 
If one starts with the idea that the only basis for time asym­
metry is to be sought in the time reversal non invariance of 
physical laws, then the discovery of the Τ violation in weak 
interaction processes is of primary importance since here, for 
the first time, we encounter time reversal non invariant laws 
at the microscopic level. Thus, the possibility presents itself 
to reduce macroscopic irreversibility to nicroscopic irreversi­
bility. But, as was stressed earlier, the existence of time 
asymmetry does not hinge exclusively upon the time reversal non 
invariance of physical laws. On the contrary, even if all the 
(fundamental) laws of physics are time reversal invariant, then 
time asymmetry can still exist. Moreover, it is hard to see how 
this T-violation in weak interactions can account for the time 
asymmetric behaviour of systems observed in everyday life; this 
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'T-violating' process has only been observed in physical labora-
tories under highly artificial conditions. Of course, this does 
not exclude that it may have been of importance for the time 
asymmetric behaviour of the universe in its early stages. All 
in all, this leads to the conclusion that the relevance of T-
violations in weak interactions for the problem of time asymme-
try should not be overestimated. It does not contribute to a 
solution of the problem of the time asymmetric behaviour of 
systems observed in daily life; every adequate theory about time 
asymmetry, should in the first place solve that problem. 
IkJ, 
III.4 Time asymmetry and temporal orientability. 
A spacetime manifold M is temporally orientable, if it is 
possible to distinguish globally in a coherent way between two 
opposite time orientations. A temporally orientable spacetime 
becomes temporally oriented by choosing one of the time orienta-
tions as the positive one; in principle, this choice is arbitrar 
At first, the temporal orientability (or orientedness) of 
the spacetime manifold seems to be relevant to time asymmetry, 
for in the definition cf time asymmetry, reference is made to 
two opposite time orientations. But a closer analysis will show 
that there is almost no connection between time asymmetry and 
temporal orientability (or orientedness) of spacetime. Specifi-
cally, I shall examine the following two questions:!) does the 
temporal orientedness of a spacetime manifold imply time asym-
metry, and ii) does time asymmetry imply the temporal orientabi-
lity of the spacetime manifold? 
ad i) A temporally orientable spacetime is transformed into a 
temporally oriented spacetime by arbitrarily choosing one of 
both orientations of time as the positive or the future orien-
tation. Thus, any temporally orientable spacetime, whether or 
not its content looks different depending on the orientation of 
time, i.e., whether or not time asymmetry prevails in that 
spacetime, can be transformed into a temporally oriented space-
time. The temporal orientedness of a spacetime does not imply 
time asymmetry, and any attempt to search for a basis for time 
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asymmetry in that direction, must fail: 
"Time-orientability is merely a necessary condition for physi-
cally singling out the past and the future senses of time 
uniquely as such. For it assures only the globally consistent 
mere oppositeness of two senses of time by failing utterly 
to specify NON-trivially or non-arbitrarily which one of 
them is the future sense and which one is past !" 
If time asymmetry prevails, then the future facing orientation 
of time can be determined unambiguously and in a non-arbitrary 
way, by relating that future orientation of time to the asymme-
try in the content of the world (e.g., mixing processes single 
4l 
out unambiguously the future orientation of time). 
ad ii) Usually, temporal orientability of spacetime is conside-
red to be a necessary condition for the possibility of the oc-
IkH 
currence of time asymmetry. At first, this appears to be a sound 
position in view of the reference to two opposite time orienta­
tions in the definition of time asymmetry. However, the problem 
is whether this reference to two opposite time orientations is 
intended globally or locally. In the former case time asymmetry 
presupposes temporal orientability of spacetime, whereas in the 
latter this is not necessarily the case. 
The issue can be put in another way: is time asymmetry a 
local or a global concept? At this point, it is necessary to 
recall that time asymmetry has a regional character (see p.122), 
i.e., regional in spacetirne, which moans that tirre asymmetry 
can be or is limited to finite regions of space and time. Of 
course, there is no reason to exclude the possibility of a global 
time asymmetry which prevails in the whole spacetime. 
Matthews has provided a strong argument for the regional 
character of time asymmetry, which concerns the assumption that 
the basis for time asymmetry in our actual universe is to be 
found in the prevailing boundary conditions: 
"..many of the attempts to define a direction of time [.time 
asymmetry) do so on tne basis of local boundary conditions 
together with the universal laws of physics..If these attempts 
are sound, then we should expect the physical phenomena which 
constitute the basis for a direction of time to be manifest 
in any region which possesses the appropriate boundary con­
ditions; the laws of physics will automatically be satisfied 
in the region." 
Thus, he concludes that in case time asymmetry is based on boun­
dary conditions, "then we should expect it to be local or regio­
nal in character." Indeed, the boundary conditions do not always 
and everywhere have to be the same an our universe. 
It is, however, important to see that the regional character 
of time asymmetry does not imply that, from a topological point 
of view, time asymmetry is a local phenomenon. If, e.g., thermo­
dynamic time asymmetry were really a local phenomenon in the 
topological sense, then any arbitrary small neighborhood of a 
point χ should exhibit thermodynamic time asymmetry; but this 
is clearly absurd, for there is a minimum size to the systems 
45 
which can exhibit thermodynamic time asymmetry. Thus, the problem 
of the relation between time asymmetry and temporal orientability 
requires a discussion of the size of the systems exhibiting time 
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asymmetry. Both 'small' and 'large' systems can behave asymmetri-
cally in time; even the universe as a whole cani and does exhi-
bit time asymmetric behaviour. If time asymmetry occurs with 
respect to systems which are small in comparison to the size of 
the universe and for which the process-time is short relatively 
to the time-scale of the evolution of the universe, then it 
not necessary to assume temporal orientability for the whole 
spacetime, since in that case it would be sufficient to require 
temporal orientability for those regions of spacetime, where 
time asymmetry obtains. 
But, the situation with respect to the time asymmetric beha-
viour of the universe as a whole is more complicated; in that 
case, time asymmetry is not regional and the global structure 
of the manifold, in particular its temporal orientability, ap-
pears to be much more relevant. Nevertheless, the question 
whether these 'global' time asymmetries are global in the topo-
46 logical sense is rather intricate; even in those cases, it is 
not clear whether temporal orientability of the spacetime mani-
fold is a necessary condition. Although time asymmetries that 
are global in the proper topological sense cannot ruled out, 
it appears that generally the temporal orientability of space-
time is not very relevant for the problem of time asymmetry. 
This brings to an end my attempt to clarify the concept of time 
asymmetry. Such clarification is an indispensible prerequisite 
for an adequate treatment of the problem that will be the subject 
of the next chapter: how to give a physical foundation to thermo-
dynamic time asymmetry? 
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IV. THERMODYNAMICAL TIME ASYMMETRY AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS. 
Summary. 
Two opposing views on the origin of the time asymmetric beha­
viour of thermodynamic systems are analysed and compared. The 
standard conception of thermodynamic time asymmetry, referred 
to as the 'mechanical program' and connected with names of, e.g., 
Boltzmann, Ehrenfest and Reichenbach, holds that it is the result 
of certain (accidental) boundary conditions prevailing in our 
universe. In other words, thermodynamic time asymmetry is suppo­
sed to be of a de facto nature. This position assumes that the 
time reversal non invariant second law of phenomenological ther­
modynamics which is incompatible with the laws of mechanics, 
cannot be valid in its original form, but must be replaced by 
the so-called statistical Η-theorem. The 'thermodynamical program', 
on the other hand, advocated by for instance Planck, Stueckelberg 
and Prigogine, holds that the second law is of the same funda­
mental nature as the laws of mechanics. According to this non 
standard point of view, thermodynamic time asymmetry finds its 
origin in one of the fundamental laws of nature and not in some 
boundary conditions. In view of the incompatibility between the 
second law and the laws of mechanics, this conception of thermo­
dynamic time asymmetry makes it necessary to reconsider the sta­
tus of mechanics; a way must be found to supplement or to combine 
in a consistent way the mechanical description of physical reali­
ty with the thermodynamical description. One of the most signi­
ficant differences between both programs concerns the distinction 
between reversible and irreversible processes; according to the 
mechanical program this is ultimately a matter of probabilities 
and therefore there is no clear cut distinction between both 
kinds of processes, whereas according to the thermodynamical 
program the second law allows for a clear distinction between 
reversible and irreversible processes. It will be argued that 
'with regard to the problem of thermodynamic time asymmetry i) 
the thermodynamical program deserves more attention than it has 
received sofar and that it cannot be put aside beforehand, ii) 
that Prigogine's criticism against the mechanical program, saying 
that the latter degrades irreversibility into an approximation 
and illusion, does not hold water, and iii) that the mechanical 
program in its most sophisticated form, viz., Reichenbach's 
branch systems approach, still shows serious shortcomings. 
IV.1 Introduction. 
Time asymmetry pervades our whole universe, from the time 
asymmetric decay of the neutral K-meson to the expansion of the 
cosmos. In classifying the various kinds of time asymmetry, 
Penrose lists as many as seven types,viz., time asymmetry in 
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К -meson decay, in quantum mechanical observations, in the gene­
ral entropy increase, in the retardation of radiation, in psy­
chological time, in the expansion of the universe and in 'black 
1 holes versus white holes'.I shall briefly turn to each of them, 
whereafter I shall restrict myself to thermodynamic time asym­
metry. 
-K -meson decay. It has already been pointed out that T-viola-
tion in weak interaction decay is of interest because it concerns 
microscopic processes which behave asymmetrically in time and 
because this time asymmetric behaviour seems to be due to the 
laws governing these processes and not to some boundary condi-
2 
tions. Yet, the effect of these time asymmetric decay processes 
is extremely small; the T-violating component of the К -meson 
-9 decay is only about 10 part of the T-conserving component, 
and thus we are dealing with a "very weak component of a weak 
interaction". Its relevance for the macroscopic types of time 
asymmetry is very controversial. 
-Quantum mechanical observation. In the standard interpretation, 
a quantum mechanical system does not show any time asymmetric 
behaviour as long as its behaviour is governed by the time re­
versal invariant Schrodinger equation. Only in the process of 
observation,i.e., of making a measurement, does it go through 
an irreversible change, for then the so-called 'collapse of the 
wave function' occurs. Suppose that before the measurement the 
system is in a 'pure' state,i.e., its wave function ψ may be 
written as the superposition of the eigenstates corresponding 
to the observable A to be measured: ψ= Σ.α„^ >
η
 . After the measure­
ment, the system will be in the eigenstate f corresponding to 
the eigenvalue Oj , measured for the observable. Then in the 
measurement, the original state function Έ.α
η
ψ
η
 is transformed 
into the state function ^ ; this is called the collapse of the 
wave function, which is an irreversible process. This irrever­
sible collapse of the wave function does not, however, occur 
when the measuring apparatus is treated as an ordinary quantum 
mechanical system; in that case, the interaction between the 
measuring apparatus and the object system is governed by the 
Schrodinger equation and is therefore reversible. This 'measure-
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ment problem' is still one of the controversial issues in the 
foundations of quantum mechanics; among other solutions, it has 
been suggested that in order to characterise a quantum mecha-
nical interaction between two systems as a measurement process 
on one of these, it is necessary to refer to a conscious obser-
ver who reads the result fron the measuring apparatus. 
-General entropy increase. Examples of this kind of time asym-
metry are very familiar in daily life; standard examples are 
the mixing of coffee and cream and the damped pendulum. This 
type of time asymmetric behaviour is described by the second 
law of phenomenological thermodynamics. The status of this law 
within physics is the main topic topic of this chapter. 
-Retardation of radiation. Consider an antenna that produces 
electromagnetic waves diverging into infinity; such waves are 
called'retarded'radiation. The Maxwell-equations, however, do 
not exclude the occurrence of the time reversed process: waves 
coming in from infinity, converging into the antenna and pro-
ducing electric currents.Such waves are called'advanced'radia-
tion. The last situation, however, is very unlikely to occur 
because very special boundary conditions must be satisfied in 
order to produce coherent incoming waves which converge into 
the antenna. Similarly, the time reversed process of the emis-
sion of light by stars does not occur; again, it requires very 
special boundary conditions to produce a 'star' which only ab-
sorbs radiation and thereby increases its energy. In some cos-
mologica! models this asymmetry in retarded radiation is due 
to the expansion of the universe, whereas in others it is con-
5 nected with a kind of thermodynamic time asymmetry. 
-Psychological time. In his survey of the different kinds of 
time asymmetry, Penrose circumscribes the asymmetry in psycho-
logical time as "the feeling of relentless forward temporal 
progression, according to which potentialities seem to be trans-
formed into actualities". But this is precisely what we have 
been referring to as the flow of time; therefore, his characte-
risation of the asymmetry of psychological time has to be re-
jected, since it obscures the difference between time asymmetry 
and the flow of time, which was introduced in the previous 
chapter. 
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The question is whether it is possible to extend the notion 
of time asyiranetry from the description of physical reality to 
the domain of subjective experience. Again, any reference to the 
flow of time would have to be avoided. It appears that it can be 
done; for example, the information stored in my memory increases 
relatively to one orientation of time, but decreases relatively 
to the other one. Thus, with respect to my personal experience, 
both orientations of time are not equivalent, and therefore psy-
chological time might be called asymmetric. 
-The expansion of the universe. The expansion of the universe 
is usually referred to as the 'cosmologica! arrow of time'. There 
is still no conclusive evidence that the current expansion will 
continue indefinitely; it may be followed by a period of contrac-
tion in which case the cosmologica! arrow would become reversed. 
In discussions of time asymmetry, the expansion of the universe 
often plays an important role because it is regarded to be the 
origin of other types of time asymmetry. In the previous chapter 
we have seen that it was connected with the asymmetry in the 
. . . 7 
creation and annihilation of electron-positron pairs. 
-Black holes versus white holes. The relevance of 'black holes' 
for the problem of time asymmetry is still very controversial. 
There are some indications that from a thermodynamical point of 
view black holes behave in accordance with the second lav; (as-
suming that the 'intrinsic entropy' of a black hole is propor-
tional to the surface A of the black hole's absolute event ho-
rizon, the increase of its intrinsic entropy follows immediate-
p 
ly from the fact that A cannot decrease ). According to Penrose 
the existence of the time reversed counterpart of black holes, 
i.e. white holes, cannot be ruled out since the laws of general 
relativity are time reversal invariant. From the same arguments, 
it then follows that these white holes show an anti-thermodyna-
mical behaviour; their intrinsic entropy will decrease. As in 
the case of advanced radiation, attempts have been made to rule 
out the actual occurrence of white holes in our universe on the 
grounds that the relevant boundary conditions for producing 
g 
white holes are extremely improbable. 
This survey of the different kinas of time asymmetry is very 
superficial, but within the present context it is not necessary 
15ύ 
to go into more details. Apart from the problems connected with 
each of these separately, the existence of different kinds of 
time asymmetry raises the question whether or not they are rela­
ted to each other; in other words, whether or not these diffe­
rent time asymmetries have a common origin. The unraveling of the 
connections between them is an extremely complicated matter; 
a better insight into these issues hinges in particular on further 
10 
developments in cosmology. 
It is rather astonishing that although "the phenomena of the 
11 
world are evidently irreversible", physics has managed so very 
well without taking into account this irreversibility in most 
of its basic theories; the laws of classical, relativistic and 
quantum mechanics, the laws governing the gravitational, the 
electromagnetic, the strong and the weak interaction (except for 
some special cases such as the decay of the neutral K-meson into 
two pions), all are or are supposed to be time reversal invariant. 
Whereas almost all processes observed in daily life happen 'in 
just one way' and therefore allow us to distinguish between past 
and future orientation of time, these laws themselves are the 
same for both orientations. 
This brings me to the central theme of this final chapter, 
namely the relation between time asymmetry and the laws of 
physics. Is it possible to account for the observed kinds of 
time asymmetry in our universe in terms of the time reversal 
invariant laws of physics mentioned above, or is the irreversi­
ble character of the phenomena so fundamental that the introduc­
tion of time reversal non invariant laws into the basic theories 
of physics cannot be avoided. In discussing this problem, I shall 
confine myself to thermodynamic time asymmetry because here the 
contrast between a reversible microscopic description and an 
12 irreversible macroscopic description shows itself most clearly. 
Consider once more Feynman's example of the mixing of blue 
ink with water. After having remarked that at the molecular le­
vel all the collisions between the molecules of water and ink 
are perfectly reversible, and that therefore, after mixing, the 
ink and water could be separated again, he writes: •' 
"Things are irreversible only in a sense that going one way is 
likely, but going the other way, although it is possible and 
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is according to the laws cf physics, would not happen in a 
million years. It is just ridiculous to expect that if you 
sit there long enough the jiggling of the atoms will separate 
a uniform mixture of ink and water into ink on one side and 
water on the other." 
14 And thus he concludes that: 
"...the apparent irreversibility of nature does not come from 
the irreversibility of the fundamental physical lawsj it co-
mes from the characteristic that if you start with an ordered 
system, and have the irregularities of nature, the bouncing 
of the molecules, then the thing goes one way." 
According to this widespread point of view, irreversibility in 
nature does not originate from the laws of physics, but is caused 
15 
by the "general accidents of life'r and therefore is a de facto 
irreversibility. 
Nevertheless, processes like the mixing of blue ink and water 
leave the impression that they behave irreversibly in a strictly 
lawlike way. The mixing of both components appears to be a neces-
sary consequence of taking away the separation between them; in 
other words, it looks as if a time reversal non invariant ]aw 0 
which distingaishes between past and future orientation of time 
governs these kinds of processes. The second law of phenomenolo-
gical thermodynamics is such a time reversal non invariant law, 
and it adequately describes the irreversible behaviour of macros-
copic systems. It states that relatively to the future orienta-
tion of time, the entropy of whatever closed system increases 
or stays equal, but never decreases. Because this law applies 
to any closed system, it is universally valid within a phenome-
. 17 
nological description and can therefore appropriately be qualified 
as a fundamental law of nature. Thus within a macroscopic or 
phenomenological description, it appears that irreversibility 
finds its origin, not in the "accidents of life", but in one 
of the basic laws of physics. 
But precisely, how 'basic' is this second law of phenomenolo-
gical thermodynamics, especially in comparison with the laws 
of classical mechanics? Is it as fundamental as these time rever-
sal invariant laws, or is it a 'second rate' law which, although 
adequately describing the behaviour of macroscopic systems, can-
not be valid because, as we will see, it is incompatible with 
classical mechanics? Here we come to the core of our problem. 
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These questions deserve close scrutiny since their answer deter-
mines to a large degree the physicist's conception of thermodyna-
mic time asymmetry. It leads either to the idea that irreversibi-
lity can be traced back directly to one of the fundamental laws 
of nature, or to the point of view that its origin lies else-
where, viz., in the boundary conditions prevailing in our universe, 
and therefore is but one of its accidental features. 
Ever since the problem of the 'arrow of time' has turned up, 
both points of view have been defended by physicists. This has 
led to two competing research programs or traditions with respect 
to the problem of the origin of thermodynamic time asymmetry: 
the mechanical and the thermodynamical program. Both have the 
same goal, namely to provide an explanation of thermodynamic time 
asymmetry as observed in daily life; but they approach the pro-
blem differently. Quite generally, the mechanical program pre-
fers the reversible mechanical description of physical reality 
to the irreversible thermodynamical one, whereas the thermody-
namical program roughly takes the opposite point of view in which 
the irreversible thermodynamical description is considered to be 
more basic then, or at least to be on a par with the reversible 
mechanical description. 
a) The mechanical program. The point of view underlying the me-
chanical program has become standard within physics. Important 
19 . 20 
contributions were made by people such as Boltzmann, Reichenbach 
21 . . . . . 
and Grunbaum. According to this position, thermodynamic time 
asymmetry is, relatively to the most fundamental, mechanical 
level of description, of a de facto nature since the laws of 
mechanics are time reversal invariant. Moreover, the validity 
of the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics in its 
original form is questioned because it is incompatible with the 
laws of mechanics. 
The origin of thermodynamic time asymmetry is sought in the 
boundary conditions prevailing in our universe. These must be 
such that, in combination with the laws of mechanics, they can 
explain the lawlike irreversible behaviour of macroscopic sys-
tems as observed in daily life. The most famous attempt in this 
direction is Reichenbach's 'branch systems hypothesis' which 
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will be examined later on. Schematically, this explanation of 
thermodynamic time asymmetry has the following structure: 
Reversible laws of microscopic physics 
+ Appropriate boundary conditions 
Lawlike irreversible behaviour of macroscopic 
systems. 
In other words, the fundamental laws of physics taken together 
with some specific boundary conditions can give rise to less 
fundamental laws, such as the second law, which adequately des-
cribe processes that behave irreversibly in a lawlike manner. 
Thus it is assumed that the paradox between macroscopic irrever-
sibility and microscopic reversibility can be resolved without 
tampering with the laws of classical mechanics. 
b) The thermodynamical program. Advocates of this point of view 
are relatively scarce among physicists, and in comparison with 
the mechanical program, there is far less continuity in the 
development of this position. It has been defended by,e.g., 
Planck who for some time thought that by giving up the hypothe-
sis of the atomicity of matter, it would be possible to reconcile 
the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics with the laws 
of classical mechanics. For him this second law had the same 
22 
'absolute' status as(classical)mechanics. More recently, Stueckel-
23 . 2k berg cind Prigogine have defended the thermodynamical program; 
their ideas will be discussed extensively later on. 
Phenomenological thermodynamics with its time reversal non 
25 invariant second law constitutes the 'hard core' of this program. 
In view of the incompatibility of classical mechanics with this 
second law, this implies that somehow the validity of classical 
mechanics has to be restricted, or at least that classical me-
chanics has to be embedded coherently into a broader framework 
in which there is room for time reversal non invariant laws. 
This, of course, is one of the main problems of the thermodyna-
mical program: how to reconstruct classical mechanics so that 
it becomes compatible with the second law, but without causing 
the collapse of the whole building of theoretical physics under 
this reconstruction. In view of this danger, it is not surpri-
sing that advocates of this program are rather scarce. 
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My intention in this chapter is, in the first place, to give 
a detailed exposition of both programs (sect. IV.2 and IV.3), 
especially of the thermodynamical one, since it is usually ne-
glected in the literature on thermodynamic time asymmetry, and 
secondly, to compare them (sect. IV.4). My interest in such com-
parison stems partly from its intrinsic relevance for the pro-
blem of thermodynamic time asymmetry, and was partly aroused 
by a recent book of Prigogine, Prom being to becoming, in which 
he severely attacks the mechanical program. I shall show that 
his criticism against the mechanical program is not justified. 
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IV.2 Thermodynamic time asymmetry: the mechanical program. 
From the point of view of the mechanical program, the histo­
ry of the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics is a 
history of attempts to reconcile this law with classical mecha­
nics; in other words, of attempts to explain its time reversal 
non invariance on the basis of the time reversal invariant laws 
of classical mechanics, or to reformulate it so that it becomes 
compatible with those laws. It is not possible here to describe 
the complete history of the second law, since such description 
would have to include an exposition of the evolution of phenome­
nological thermodynamics via the kinetic theory of gases into 
statistical mechanics. I shall confine myself to a summary of 
the most important developments that have taken place. I shall 
discuss successively Boltzmann's deterministic Η-theorem for 
individual systems which he thought to be equivalent to the 
second law, the so-called 'reversibility objections' against this 
theorem and finally the statistical H-theorem which is not sub­
ject to these reversibility objections. This statistical H-theo­
rem is generally regarded to be the reformulation of the second 
law of phenomenological thermodynamics in statistical mechanics. 
As a result of these developments, it became clear that the 
entropie behaviour of an isolated system, e.g., a gas, does not 
exhibit any asymmetry in time, since the statistical H-theorem 
is symmetric with respect to the two orientations of time. Thus, 
within the mechanical program, the time asymmetric behaviour 
of thermodynamical systems cannot be traced back to this H-
theorem; its origin has to be sought elsewhere. Different solu­
tions have been proposed, of which I shall discuss the most im­
portant ones, viz., the attempts to explain thermodynamic time 
asymmetry i) on the basis of certain limitations in human obser­
vation, and ii) on the basis of the behaviour of ensembles of 
open systems. I shall commence with a necessarily sketchy review 
of the history of the second law, starting from Boltzmann's at­
tempt to reconcile it with mechanics, and thus leaving aside the 
work of people such as Carnot, Clausius, Kelvin and Helmholtz 
26 
who introduced this law into physics. 
-Boltzmann's deterministic H-theorem for individual systems. 
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Boltzmann tried to recover the second law of phenomenological 
thermodynamics within the context of the kinetic theory of gases, 
based upon classical mechanics and the molecular or atomistic 
conception of matter. But observing that the laws of classical 
mechanics alone were not sufficient, he was forced to introduce 
an additional assumption about the behaviour of molecules in a 
gas, known as the assumption of molecular chaos ( the 'Stoss-
27 
zahlansatz'). Although mathematically this assumption can be 
formulated in a very precise way -it is expressed by the equali-
28 . . . 
ty of two distribution functions-, its physical interpretation 
29 
and implications are not well understood. Usually, the Stosszahl-
ansatz is interpreted as stating that there are no correlations 
between the velocities and positions of the particles of the 
30 
gas before they collide. This appears at first to be a rather 
plausible assumption if the molecules of the gas are considered 
to be moving around randomly. Examples of gases for which the 
assumption is not valid, can easily be found; Boltzmann gives 
31 
the following counterexamples: 
"Wir hätten (um aus der unendlichen Mannigfaltigkeit der 
möglichen Fälle nur zwei Beispiele herauszugreifen) eine 
molekular-geordnete Vertheilung, wenn jedes Molekül auf das 
von ihm am wenigsten entfernte central zuflöge, oder wenn 
jedes Molekül, dessen Geschwindigkeit unter einer gewissen 
Grenze liegt, noch 10 auffallend langsame Moleküle zu unmit-
telbaren Nachbarn hätte." 
Regardless of the physical interpretation of molecular chaos, if 
the assumption of such chaos is taken to be valid at each moment 
during the evolution of a gas, then it is possible to define 
for that gas a quantity H which is a function of the state of 
the gas, i.e., of the x.(t) and p.(t) of the molecules, so that: 
f| á 0 . H(t)= H(xi(t),pi(t)). 
Boltzmann thought that from this inequality the second law could 
be obtained immediately by equating H with minus S, and thus by 
making entropy a function of the phase-space variables x. and 
32 ! 
Pi· 
Boltzmann originally interpreted this H-theorem in a determi-
nistic way: for any gas in whatever state it would be possible 
to define a quantity H which in the course of the evolution of 
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the gas would decrease or stay equal in value, but would never 
increase. But he failed to see that his derivation of this H-
theorem did not allow for such deterministic interpretation since 
he had made use of probabilistic methods in deriving this re­
sult;. Moreover, another problem presented itself. The quantity H, 
as defined by Boltzmann, does not change sign under time reversal, 
i.e., under a replacement of p. by -p.; consequently, the H-
theorem is not time reversal invariant. But nevertheless its deri­
vation was based upon classical mechanics; starting from time 
reversal invariant laws, Boltzmann had arrived at a time reversal 
non invariant law. This fact gave rise to the so-called 'rever­
sibility objections'. 
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-The reversibility objections. 
i) Loschmidt and others argued that the deterministic H-theorem 
could not be correct on account of the fact that it was based 
upon the assumption that the mutions of and the collisions be­
tween the molecules of a gas were reversible. How, then, would 
it ever be possible to arrive at a strictly irreversible behaviour 
of a gas as predicted by the H-theorem? More particularly, given 
that H is a function of x. and the absolute value of p.,Ip.j , 
then it follows that if H decreases in the transition from 
1 1 2 2 
(χ.,ρ.) to (x ,p.), then Η must necessarily increase in the equa­
bly possible, temporally reversed process from (x.,-p.) to 
1 1 ^ "^  
(χ.,-p.). Therefore, any decrease of Η in a process A, necessari­
ly implies the increase of Η in the temporally reversed process 
Ar which is physically also allowed. Thus, the H-theorem could 
not be valid. 
ii) In his 'recurrence theorem', Poincaré had shown that an iso-
lated system passes through a sequence of states so that the 
system will return an infinite number of times to an arbitrary 
small neighborhood of any one of these states. Starting from this 
result, Zermelo claimed that the H-theorem could not be valid; 
if Poincaré's recurrence theorem holds, then this implies that if 
somewhere along the trajectory of an isolated system, H decrea-
ses, then elsewhere along the trajectory it has to increase. 
From these objections it became clear that something had to 
be Wrong with the assumption of molecular chaos. And indeed, it 
can be shown that a contradiction arises between classical me-
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chanics and the assumption that molecular chaos prevails at each 
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moment during the evolution of a gas, as was assumed by Boltzmann. 
This assumption, therefore, had to be abandoned. 
-The statistical H-theorem. 
Within statistical mechanics these reversibility objections are 
avoided by defining a statistical analogue of the entropy function 
and of the second law. This statistical approach differs strongly 
from the one of Boltzmann described above; there is no attempt to 
calculate in a deterministic way the behaviour of an individual 
system represented by a swarm of points in/t-space (y" -space is 
the six-dimensional space with coordinates x,y,z and ρ ,p ,p ; 
χ y ζ 
a point inM-spa.ce represents one molecule of a gas at a definite 
place with a definite momentum). Instead, the most probable beha­
viour of the system is computed by starting from an ensemble of 
similar systems, represented by a swarm of points in / -space 
(/"-space is a 6N-dimensional space, where N is the number of 
molecules in the gas; a point in/"-space represents the complete 
microscopic state of one of these systems, i.e., contains com­
plete information of places and momenta of all the molecules). 
Accordingly, this approach does not allow to make predictions 
about the actual behaviour of individual systems, but only about 
its most probable behaviour. 
The statistical analogue of Boltzmann's deterministic H-theorem, 
therefore, does not state that for a system not in equilibrium, 
H will necessarily decrease, but that the most probable behaviour 
of the system is so that H will decrease. Ίη other words, the 
most probable behaviour of a system not in equilibrium is toward 
equilibrium (where Η has a minimum value). In this version, the 
H-theorem is insensitive to the reversibility objections because 
it does not say anything about the precise behaviour of single 
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systems : 
"The statistical statement of the H-theorem....is quite con­
sistent with the reversibility and recurrence paradoxes. It 
is a statement about the most probable behaviour of a non-
equilibrium system, calculated using an ensemble which contains 
overwhelmingly points representing systems which d_o subse­
quently decrease the value of H. However, the ensemble inevi­
tably contains other rare examples of systems which increase 
their Η value As the microreversibility principle and 
recurrence theorem refer to exact results of an individual 
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system, they are not in contradiction with a statistical state-
ment about many similar systems. The fact that after a suffi-
cient period of time a given system will undergo entropy de-
creases, is quite consistent with the claim that if a system 
has a low value for the entropy, it is vastly more probable 
that this entropy will subsequently increase than decrease." 
According to the statistical mechanical interpretation of the 
entropy concept, the entropy of an isolated box of gas is not 
constant, as was the case for phenomenological thermodynamics, 
but fluctuations away from the maximum value of S occur due to 
small deviations from the equilibrium state in the gas. This is 
illustrated in fig. 20. This conception of entropy is usually 
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referred to as the 'Boltzmann entropy'-? Because the number of micro-
states corresponding to the macroscopic equilibrium state (the 
state of maximum entropy) is overwhelmingly larger than the num-
ber of microstates corresponding to non-equilibrium states with 
reDatively low entropy values, the gas will at most times be in 
a state of (almost) maximum entropy. Strong deviations from equi-
39 librium are very improbable. * 
The question to be considered now is whether or not this sta-
tistical H-theorem leads to an asymmetric behaviour of an isola-
ted box of gas. 
-The time symmetry of the statistical H-theorem. 
Within our context, the most fundamental result of the statisti-
cal mechanical reformulation of the second law of phenomenologi-
cal thermodynamics is that the entropie behaviour of an isolated 
HO box of gas does not show any sign of time asymmetry. A closer 
look at fig. 20, showing the entropie behaviour of such system, 
helps to understand why this is the case: there is no difference 
between the entropie behaviour of an isolated box of gas as 
seen relatively to the future (t ) or the past (t ) orientation 
ібо 
of time. In the t as well as in the t~ orientation of time, S 
increases as often as it decreases.Thus, if a gas is in a low 
state of entropy at moment t. and in a state of high entropy at 
moment t, we are not allowed to conclude that moment t- is 
1 earlier than t«. Since transitions from low entropy to high en­
tropy occur as frequently as the reverse transitions relatively 
to both orientations of time, we cannot single out one of them 
as the future orientation on the basis of the entropie behaviour 
of closed systems. 
Nevertheless, the statistical analogue of the deterministic 
H-theorem is valid: the most probable behaviour of a gas not in 
equilibrium is toward equilibrium. This can be seen as follows. 
When an isolated box of gas is observed to be in a relatively 
low state of entropy, then it is most probably at or near the 
bottom of a downgrade fluctuation (see fig.21a), since it is 
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rather unlikely that the gas is on the downgrade of a still 
4l 
stronger deviation from equilibrium (see fig. 21b). But from the 
bottom of a downgrade fluctuation, the entropy increases relative­
ly to both orientations of time, as predicted by the statistical 
Η-theorem. Thus, this statistical H-theorem does not introduce 
any time asymmetry within statistical mechanics, since the en­
tropy of a closed system decreases as often as it increases. 
That was to be expected a priori in view of the fact that it 
can be derived within the framework of classical mechanics. 
-Thermodynamic time asymmetry as observed in daily life. 
In spite of the symmetry of the statistical H-theorem, we obser­
ve in daily life only systems which develop from low entropy 
states to high entropy states and never the reverse. How can 
this be made plausible within the mechanical program? 
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Various kinds of solutions have been proposed; I shall restrict 
myself to the two most important ones: 1) solutions in which cer-
tain limitations inherent to human observation play a dominant 
role, and 2) solutions in which, one way or another, the assump-
tion that the system is (perfectly) closed is given up; the inter-
action of the system with its environment is considered to be 
the origin of its time asymmetric behaviour. The most famous 
example of the last group is Reichenbach1s branch systems ap-
proach; it deserves our special attention since it represents 
the mechanical program in its most elaborate state. 
1) Thermodynamic time asymmetry and human observation. 
Thermodynamic time asymmetry and human observation are frequently 
linked together. In particular, two specific limitations in hu-
man observation have been connected with thermodynamical irrever-
sibility, viz., a) the relatively short span of time involved 
in human observation, and b) the lack of microscopic information 
in human observation. 
la) The time interval A t , during which we as human beings can 
observe the behaviour of a closed system, is extremely small 
compared with the typical Poincaré recurrence time Τ of the sys­
tem (T is roughly the mean time, in which the closed system re-
42 turns -or almost returns- to its original state). This fact is 
sometimes regarded to be the cause of the observed asymmetric 
behaviour of a non-equilibrium closed system: this asymmetry 
would disappear if we would observe the closed system long enough, 
i.e., if A t becomes of the order of T. However, this relatively 
short observation time Δ t cannot explain that we only observe 
transitions from non-equilibrium to equilibrium and not the re­
verse. Consider again the entropy curve of a closed system as 
given in fig.20. If we were to observe the evolution of the gas 
through a 'slit' of Δ t sec, randomly distributed along the 
time axis, then transitions from high to low entropy would be 
observed as frequently as the reversed transitions, irrespective­
ly of whether this slit is small or large relatively to T: no 
asymmetric behaviour would result. Of course, if the slit is not 
distributed randomly along the time axis, then a time asymmetry 
might result. For example, if relatively to the t orientation 
the beginning of the slit is always situated at the bottom of a 
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downgrade fluctuation, then in most cases a transition from low 
to high entropy will be observed. But it will be clear that in 
the latter case the seemingly time asymmetric behaviour of the 
gas is caused by observing the gas only at the right moments, 
namely when it is at the bottom of a downgrade fluctuation. 
lb) According to this point of view, the basis for thermodynamic 
time asymmetry lies in our ignorance of the precise motions of 
all the molecules of a gas, in other words, in our lack of micros-
copie information. Because of our 'poor' means of observation, it 
is impossible to locate exactly in phase space the points repre-
senting the different molecules. This means that in statistical 
mechanics we are forced to use methods like 'coarse graining 
of phase space', i.e., phase space has to be divided into finite 
compartments or cells, and the only information available through 
human observation is how the various molecules are distributed 
45 . 
over these cells. But precisely with the help of techniques like 
coarse graining, it is possible to define a 'coarse grained en-
tropy' which increases in time; this stands in sharp contrast 
with the 'fine grained entropy' which is constant in time and 
which is based upon the exact knowledge of places and momenta 
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of all the molecules. Thus it is claimed that in case complete . 
microscopic information of the system would be available, it 
would show no sign of a time asymmetric behaviour. 
One of the charges brought against this position is that it 
reduces thermodynamic time asymmetry and irreversibility to 
anthropomorphic expressions since it attributes them, one way 
or another, to human ignorance. The same charge has been leveled 
against the use of the concept of entropy, because the definition 
of entropy also depends upon the process of coarse graining 
47 . . . . phase space. To avoid this criticism, Layzer, for instance, has 
tried to distinguish objectively between macroscopic and micros-
copic information, in order to give an objective meaning to ex-
48 
pressions such as "lack of microscopic information". 1 shall not 
consider the question whether or not this problem of anthropomor-
phism can be resolved, since in my opinion there is yet a stronger 
reason to doubt the validity of this kind of explanation of ther-
modynamic time asymmetry. The whole line of reasoning is based 
upon a false premisse, namely that the use of methods like coarse 
163 
graining in statistical mechanics, whether or not because of a 
lack of microscopic information, leads to a time asymmetric des­
cription of a closed gas. But his is not the case. According to 
the statistical Η-theorem, which is based upon corase graining, 
a closed gas benaves perfectly symmetrically in time! 
Undoubtedly, these attempts to connect thermodynamic time asym­
metry with limitations in human observation are responsible for, 
or at least have strengthened the idea that, within the mechanical 
program, the only possible solution of the conflict between the 
reversible laws of physics and the observed time asymmetric 
behaviour of thermodynamical systems lies in degrading the latter 
into an illusion. According to this idea, adherence to the mecha­
nical program implies that thermodynamic time asymmetry cannot be 
considered to be real, i.e., to be an aspect of physical reality, 
but necessarily leads to the point of view that thermodynamic 
time asymmetry is an illusion caused oy human observation. I shall 
return to this issue in the final section. 
2) Thermodynamic time asymmetry and the behaviour of open systems. 
Schematically, there are two types of interaction between a sys-
tern and its environment: a) The interaction is very weak so that 
it does not destroy the system nor alters any of the specific 
features of the system; in that case, the system is not perfectly 
closed but quasi-isolated. In practice this is always the case 
for any allegedly closed system; for instance, it is impossible 
to shield the gravitational interaction from any system, b) The 
interaction is such that at a certain moment a quasi-isolated 
system is formed which eventually merges back into its environ­
ment. Here, the interaction is responsible for the creation of 
the system and possibly also for its destruction; meanwhile, the 
system behaves as a quasi-isolated system. As an example, consider 
an ice cube in a glass of water; the system is created at the 
moment the ice cube is put into the water. During the melting of 
the ice cube, the system can be considered to be isolated "though 
51 the thermic isolation is not too good . Eventually the system 
will merge, from an entropie point of view, into its environment 
since it gets into thermal equilibrium with that environment. 
Both types of interaction have been used in order to explain 
thermodynamic time asymmetry; both cases will now be considered 
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in more detail. 
2a) Thermodynamic time asymmetry and random disturbances. 
In case the interaction of the system with its environment is 
very ъ-еак, it can be regarded as a Pertubation of the system. 
Let us assume that these pertubations take place at random; thus, 
the interaction of the system with its environment is treated 
like random outside disturbances. In the case of the evolution 
of a gas, these random disturbances will tend to destroy at each 
moment the correlations between the molecules of the gas and 
therefore tend to restore the situation of molecular chaos at 
each moment. Even if indeed they destroy all the correlations 
and thus maintain molecular chaos during the entire evo­
lution of the gas, Boltzmann's deterministic Η-theorem would not 
be valid because he overlooked the probabilistic element in what 
he took to be a deterministic H-theorem. 
The role of random disturbances in reaching equilibrium should 
not be overestimated, for "the internal relaxation time -the time 
required for the gas to reach internal equilibrium- is typically 
ii 
10 times shorter than the time required to reach equilibrium 
with the walls". T'hus, the internal collisions, not those with 
the walls, cause a gas to approach equilibrium. Consequently, the 
influence of random disturbances caused by collisions with the 
walls is very small, if not neglegible. Moreover, these random 
disturbances will a priori result as often in deviations from 
as in returns to equilibrium. Therefore, they cannot introduce 
any time asymmetry in the behaviour of a weakly isolated gas. 
Again, the entropy curve of such pertubated gas will be of exact­
ly the same form as in fig. 20; to any deviation from equilibrium 
there corresponds an approach to equilibrium. 
The gravitational interaction poses a special problem. Although 
it is the weakest of all known interactions, it does influence the 
microscopic evolution of a gas considerably, since, as Borei has 
calculated, "the change in gravitational potential caused by dis­
placing one gram of matter by one centimeter at the distance of 
the star Sirius would, in the course of one microsecond, substan­
tially alter the microscopic state of a macroscopic volume of 
gas'. The influence of the gravitational interaction upon the ap­
proach to equilibrium of a gas, is not known. But in whatever 
165 
way it affects the evolution of a gas, the gravitational inter-
action considered as random disturbances from the environment 
cannot,for the reasons given above,be the cause of the time asym-
metric behaviour of a gas. 
Although generally speaking random outside disturbances are 
thus not relevant for the problem of thermodynamic time asymmetry, 
it will be seen later on that, according to Prigogine, under 
special conditions random disturbances from outside or fluctua-
tions occurring inside a system do play a dominant role in the 
irreversible behaviour of certain thermodynamical systems. 
2b) Thermodynamic time asymmetry and branch systems. 
According to Reichenbach, the second kind of interaction is of 
fundamental importance for understanding the time asymmetric be-
haviour of thermodynamical systems observed in daily life. His 
point of view has been taken over with some modifications by 
Grünbaum. This approach to the problem of thermodynamic time 
asymmetry has become known as the 'branch systems approach'. In-
stead of concentrating upon the behaviour of one single permanent-
ly closed system - which, Reichenbach admits, behaves necessarily 
symmetrically in time- he analyses the statistical behaviour of 
a set of isolated systems which exist only for a short span of 
time. These systems are called 'branch systems'; they "branch 
off from a comprehensive system and remain isolated from then on 
56 for some length of time . Under certain conditions, an ensemble 
of branch systems does exhibit a statistical asymmetry in time. 
Given an ensemble of branch systems, each of which at the moment 
of formation t is in a relatively low state of entropy and as-
suming that most of them are at the bottom of a dip in the entro-
py curve, it follows that after some time the majority of these 
branch systems will be in a relatively higher state of entropy. 
This argument cannot be reversed; it does not follow that like-
wise some time before t. the majority of these branch systems 
was in a relatively high state of entropy, simply because they 
did not exist before tn ( the instant of their creation). Of 
all the branch systems, the future upgrades to equilibrium are 
left untouched, whereas the past upgrades to equilibrium, which 
are responsible for the symmetric behaviour of a permanently 
closed system, are cut off, because the branch systems were not 
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yet formed (see fig. 22). Therefore, the conclusion that some 
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time before t^ , the majority of branch systems was in a state of 
. . 57 
relatively high entropy is unwarranted-
However, not every ensemble of branch systems exhibits a time 
asymmetric behaviour. The requirement that these branch systems, 
at the moment of their creation, be in a relatively low state of 
entropy is essential to Reichenbach's argument. An ensemble of 
branch systems all of which are in equilibrium at the moment of 
their formation, does not exhibit any time asymmetric behaviour. 
To apply his analysis of the behaviour of branch systems to 
the real world, Reichenbach has to introduce an assumption cal-
58 led the 'branch systems hypothesis . This assumption must assure 
the existence in nature of the branch systems of the required 
type. It states 1) that during the current cosmic epoch the uni-
verse is in a relatively low state of entropy, and 2) that within 
our region of the universe a large number of closed or quasi-
closed systems in a relatively low state of entropy branch off 
constantly from the universe as a whole. Thus, Reichenbach as-
sumes that nature abounds in branch systems which start off in 
a relatively low state of entropy and he is convinced that this 
assumption can be regarded as empirically verified. Given this 
assumption, it is now possible to define objectively the future 
orienation of time in terms of the time asymmetric behaviour of 
these branch systems: "The direction in which most thermodynami-
cal processes in isolated systems occur is the direction of po-
59 
sitive time". The future orientation of time coincides with 
the orientation relatively to which the entropy of the universe 
as a whole increases; through the continual creation of branch 
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systems, this general entropy increase becomes apparent to us: 
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"The existence of a long upgrade of entropy [_of the universe], 
though a necessary condition for the phenomenon of time direc-
tion, is therefore not a sufficient condition. Time direction 
becomes apparent to us only because the upgrade contains a large 
number of situations in which subsystems branch off, disclosing 
in their further development the universal growth of entropy. 
This growth would not become evident unless the entropy of the 
subsystem initially had a low value as compared with the entro-
pies of other possible states of the subsystem while it re-
mains isolated. Our universe satisfies this condition. It owes 
its time directionj therefore, to the branch structure of the 
upgrade of its entropy curve on which we live." 
Thus, the general entropy increase in the universe as a whole is 
reflected in the thermodynamic behaviour of the majority of branch 
systems; only through them,does this general increase of entropy 
become observable to us. 
According to Reichenbach, the entropy of the universe itself 
is subject to fluctuations (see fig. 23). The application of his 
definition of the future orientation of time to an upgrade and 
fig. 23 
a downgrade of the entropy curve of the universe shows that the 
resulting future orientations of time are counter-directed. 
Therefore he remarks that "we cannot speak of a direction for 
time as a whole; only certain sections of time have directions, 
and these directions are not the same'. On this point he was cri-
ticised by Grünbaum who objected against the use of the notion 
of the entropy of the universe as a whole, because it is not 
well defined. The details of Grünbaum1s criticism, however, are 
not of interest within the present context, since they do not 
concern in any way the most essential aspect of Reichenbach's 
scheme of explanation, viz., that the origin of thermodynamic 
time asymmetry lies in the prevailing boundary conditions in our 
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universe. For both Reichenbach and Grunbaum, boundary conditions 
plus the time reversal invariant laws of physics, more particularly 
of classical statistical mechanics, can in principle explain the 
observed time asymmetric behaviour of thermodynamic systems. To 
this day, the branch systems approach is one of the most sophis-
ticated attempts to base thermodynamic time asymmetry on boundary 
conditions. 
Returning, finally, to the scheme of p.153, the goal of the 
mechanical program seems roughly to have been reached. Prom the 
boundary conditions specified in the branch structure hypothesis, 
together with the time symmetric statistical H-theorem, the time 
asymmetric behaviour of low entropy branch systems can indeed 
be deduced. It is possible to understand why 'counter-thermody-
namic' behaviour, from equilibrium to non-equilibrium, is so 
extremely improbable that it de facto never occurs, which explains 
the lawlike character of the irreversible approach to equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, I shall show in the final section that the branch 
systems approach in its present form is in some important ways 
incomplete. 
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IV.3 Thermodynamic time asymmetry: the thernodynamical program. 
In the mechanical program, the contradiction between the se-
cond law of phenomenological thermodynamics and mechanics is re-
moved by reformulating and reinterpreting the second law. I shall 
now consider some views which roughly follow the opposite strate-
gy: they start off from the validity of this second law and they 
assume that somehow classical mechanics has to be reinterpreted 
so that it becomes compatible with the second law. According to 
these views, the roots of thermodynamic time asymmetry lie in 
this basic law of nature and not in some boundary conditions. 
Advocates of this point of view are rather scarce among phy-
sicists because a commitment to this line of thought makes it 
necessary to reconsider and eventually to reconstruct one of the 
main pillars of theoretical physics. But even though the defen-
ders of the thermodynamical program are a minority, it is worth-
while to examine their ideas since they have far-reaching conse-
quences for the physicist1's conception of thermodynamic time 
asymmetry. The most important actual representatives of this non-
standard view are Stueckelberg and Prigogine, who developed the 
thermodynamical program to its most elaborate form. Both try, 
albeit in different ways, to forge phenomenological thermodyna-
mics and mechanics into an unique scheme which embraces both the 
thermodynamical and the mechanical mode of description in a har-
monious way. 
In Thermocinétique phénoménologique galiléenne, Stueckelberg 
and Scheurer expose the idea that the study of physical reality 
ought to start with and proceed from phenomenological thermody-
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namics. Instead of following the traditional path of commencing 
the study of the physical world by 'rational mechanics' ('la 
mécanique rationelle'), in which the notion of a material point 
particle is introduced by way of an axiom, Stueckelberg begins 
with the part of physics that is usually referred to as 'pheno-
70 
menological'. He opposes this phenomenological physics, within 
which the spacetime continuum such as it appears in observations 
of macroscopic material systems is an essential part, to micros-
copic or quantum physics in which discontinuity of the processes 
plays a fundamental role. Since within this phenomenological 
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description fluctuation phenomena can be disregarded, Stueckelberg 
does not refer to statistical mechanics. 
Time plays an important role within phenomenology. The succes-
sion of events leads to the conception of time as a one-dimensio-
nal and totally ordered continuum. But time has yet another ad-
ditional feature, viz., the direction of time ('la flèche du 
temps'), which accounts for the dissymmetry between past and fu-
ture and the irreversible evolution of the phenomena. This es-
sential aspect of time destroys Laplacian determinism, according 
to which the state of an isolated system at any time determines 
completely the state of the system at all other times, in the 
past as well as in the future. This Laplacian determinism is one 
of the most characteristic features of the mechanistic worldview; 
once the positions and the momenta of the point particles of a 
system are known, then in principle its whole history and also 
its whole future are determined. But within a phenomenological 
description this is precisely impossible. The symmetry between 
past and future is broken by the fact that the solutions of the 
differential equations describing the evolution of a system, 
converge in the distant future but diverge in the distant past 
because of the signs of the constants in the equations of motion 
71 (like friction coefficient or heat capacity). Usually the signs 
of these constants are fixed arbitrarily, but Stueckelberg shows 
that their signs are determined by the second law of phenomenolo-
gical thermodynamics. Thus, this second law destroys Laplacian 
determinism; it implies that in principle it is possible to 
predict the whole future of an isolated system, but not its whole 
past because we arrive at a singularity within a finite amount 
of time ( as in the case of the 'Big Bang' theories ). 
Because irreversibility is such an essential aspect of the 
phenomena and because this irreversibility is intimately connec-
ted with the non-decreasing of entropy, Stueckelberg is led to 
the conclusion that the study of the physical world is best star-
ted by that part of phenomenological physics which is ordinarily 
called 'phenomenological thermodynamics',but which he prefers 
to call 'thermocinétique phénoménologique' because forces are 
7-5 
not essential to the equations of motion: 
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"Puisque l'irréversibilité du temps se rapporte à la non dé-
croissance de l'entropie, c'est bien par la thermocinétique 
phénoménologique que nous sommes amenés a. commencer notre 
etude du monde physique". 
It is not his intention to oppose this phenomenological thermo-
kinetics to mechanics; on the contrary, the former constitutes 
the broader framework within which mechanics has its own place. 
The reversible processes studied within mechanics are considered 
to be a special case of the processes studied within phenomenolo-
gical thermokinetics. 
Roughly, Stueckelberg proceeds in the following way. By axiom, 
the state of a system is completely described by its 'geometri-
cal' , i.e., mechanical variables and (at least) one non-geometri-
cal variable. For the latter Stueckelberg chooses the entropy S 
7 и 
instead of for instance absolute temperature T, because S,con­
trary to Τ,ΙΞ an extensive variable and therefore of the same 
nature as the energy E (this allows to consider combinata ons of 
their densities). Because S is a non-geometrical variable, it 
cannot be written as a function of the phase space variables 
x. and p. which implies that, in general, the thermokinetic des­
cription cannot totally be reduced to the mechanical description. 
The entropy S characterises the 'internal' state of the sys-
75 tem. The evolution of the system is governed by the two famous 
principles of phenomenological thermodynamics from which the 
equations of motion for all the state variables, both geometrical 
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and non-geometrical, must be derived. To this end, the first 
principle concerning the conservation of energy, is generalised 
by Stueckelberg so as to encompass all conserved extensive quan­
tities, including not only the conservation of energy but also the 
conservation of linear and angular momentum.(and moreover, the 
77 
conservation of mass for the non-relativistic case). In other 
words, the new first principle of phenomenological thermodynamics 
embraces all the mechanical conservation laws; this is a first 
step toward a combined thermodynamical-mechanical description of 
physical reality. With respect to the second principle, the first 
one has a very special function, for it specifies the constraints 
under which the maximalisation of entropy occurs. Given any arbi­
trary system, this maximalisation has to take place so that quan­
tities like energy, mass and momentum are conserved. Within the 
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present context, Stueckelberg's reformulation of the second prin-
ciple of phenomenological therir.odynanics is especially relevant 
•:ince it ¿hows clearly that the origin cf thermoiynamic time 
asyinmiftry is to be found within this principle. 
According to Stueckelberg, the second principle in its usual 
form, 
dS/dt ^ 0, 
cannot account for the irreversible behaviour of thermodynamical 
systems, because the action of the time reversal operator Τ on the 
entropy S can be defined consistently so that this law becomes 
time reversal invariant (see p. 137). Therefore he proposes to 
reformulate it in two sub-principles: 1) the principle of evolu­
tion which is symmetric in time, and 2) the principle of equili­
brium which introduces a difference between the past and future 
7 fì 
orientation of time. According to this reformulated principle, 
there exists for any system an extensive state function S, called 
entropy, which satisfies two conditions: 
a)the principle of evolution: if the system is adiabatically clo-
sed, then S is a monotonie non-decreasing function of time, 
b)the principle of equilibrium: if the (finite) system is isola-
ted, then S tends toward a finite maximum in the distant future. 
Note that the principle of evolution applies to adiabatically 
closed systems (i.e., they may exchange energy with their envi-
ronment in the form of mechanical work, but not in the form of 
heat), whereas the principle of equilibrium is valid for isolated 
or totally closed systems. 
The principle of evolution (dS/dt ^· 0) does not, for the rea-
son indicated above, lead to any asymmetry in time. Instead, the 
principle of equilibrium breaks the symmetry between the past and 
future orientation of time. The reason lies in the fact that 
while entropy does have a maximum value, it does not have a mini-
mum value. In order to see why this is the case, the so-called 
third principle of phenomenological thermodynamics has to be ta-
ken into consideration. It states that the entropy has a lower 
bound at the zero point of absolute temperature T; but a lower 
bound is not a minimum. Under time reversal, therefore, the maxi-
mum of S(t) is not transferred into a maximum of S'(-t), but 
irto an upper bound. This destroys the symmetry between both 
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orientations of time because entropy has a maximum only relative-
7Q 
ly to one orientation of time (see fig. 24). ' 
From this reformulated second principle, Stueckelberg derives 
the dissymmetry in the solutions of the equations of motion of 
the state variables, viz., their convergence relatively to the 
future orientation of time, and their divergence in the opposite 
orientation. This works as follows. A direct consequence of this 
second principle is that it imposes certain restrictions upon 
the signs of quantities appearing in the equations of motion of 
a system. On the one hand, it requires that thermal coefficients, 
like heat capacity, must have a positive sign irrespectively of 
the sign of absolute temperature T, whereas on the other hand, 
it entails that mechanical quantities like mass and the constants 
of elasticity and friction have the same sign as absolute tem-
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perature. It is this determination of the signs of these quanti-
ties relatively to the sign of absolute temperature that induces 
8l 
the dissymmetry in the solutions of the equations of motion: 
"La détermination du signe de ces grandeurs relativement à. 
celui de la température entraîne que la solution des équations 
différentielles converge, seulement pour un sens du temps, ce 
qui donne lieu au phénomène de la flèche du temps". 
Thus, the determination of the signs of constants like heat capa-
city and friction is not a matter of arbitrary convention, but 
on the contrary follows from the second principle. The convergence 
of the solutions of the equations of motion toward the future and 
their divergence toward the past does not result from an appropriate 
selection of the signs of these quantities, but is a consequence 
of the second principle which thereby destroys Laplacian deter-
minism. 
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Stueckelberg's treatment of a simple example, the one-dimen-
sicnal harmonic oscillator with damping, illustrates the forego-
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mg. When such oscillator is considered to be a thermodynamical 
system, then its state is completely characterised by its entro­
py S which is its only non-geometrical variable, and its geome­
trical variables r and v, representing repectively position and 
velocity of the mass M. Its energy H is given by: 
H= H(S,r,v)= JMv2 + U(S,r), 
where U(S,r) represents the potential or 'internal' energy of the 
system. From the first principle, Stueckelberg infers that there 
must be a balance between the Newtonian inertial, the frictional 
and the elastic force: 
Mv - Pfr(S,r,v) -Fel(S,r,v) = 0, 
where F is by definition of friction equal to - λ ν, with A being 
the friction-coefficient. The principle of evolution, dS/dt ·^ 0, 
implies that: 
dS/dt = ^ (S,r,v) v 2> 0, 
from which follows that the friction-coefficient Д must have the 
same sign as absolute temperature T. Similarly, the principle of 
equilibrium fixes the sign of the mass M and the constant of 
elasticity a. Next, Stueckelberg considers the behaviour of the 
oscillator in the neighborhood of the equilibrium state which is 
given by (S=S , r=r
n
(S), v=0). In the linear approximation of 
this state, the energy can be written as: 
H(S,r,v) = ¿Mv2 + Ja0(r-r0)2 + U0, 
where 3·0,Γη and UQ are functions of S only. This leads to the 
following differential equation for r: 
(r-r0) + 2jr(r-r0) +u>2(r-r0) = 0 
з
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Whether the damping is strong (i.e., V-1^, >o) or weak {y-^O < 0) > 
the solutions of this equation, as is well known, do indeed con­
verge toward the distant future. This convergence is not the re-
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suit of arbitrarily selecting the appropriate signs for M, -Í and 
a; instead the determination of their signs is based upon the 
second principle. 
This dissymmetry in the solutions of the equations of motion 
isj however, not the only conclusion which Stueckelberg derives 
from the second law in its reformulated form. He also shows that 
the maximalisation of entropy under the constraints given by the 
first principle, implies a minimalisation of mechanical energy 
and that the metric of physical space has to be definite positive. 
This shows clearly that within Stueckelberg's approach, the ther-
modynamical and the mechanical description are closely intertwi-
ned. Mechanics becomes a special case of thermodynamics; a purely 
mechanical description is only possible for those isolated sys-
tems for which the entropy is constant, in which case the process 
under consideration is reversible. Thus, reversible mechanical 
processes become in a certain sense a degenerate instance of the 
more general class of irreversible thermodynamic processes. On 
this point, Prigogine, another defender of the thermodynamical 
program, strongly deviates from Stueckelberg's approach. 
The central problem of Prigogine's book From being to becoming 
is the question how dynamics, and more particularly classical and 
quantum mechanics,which he qualifies as the'physics of being', 
can be reconciled with phenomenological thermodynamics, the 
'physics of becoming'. He tries to bridge the gap between both 
by developing a 'microscopic theory of irreversible processes' 
from which dynamics and thermodynamics emerge as complementary 
modes of description. Within this theory, time no longer functions 
only as a simple parameter, as it was the case in dynamics, but 
it now becomes also an operator. In the following pages, I shall 
not go into the mathematical details of Prigogine's theory, but 
I shall concentrate mainly upon his reasons for developing such 
theory. Fortunately, Prigogine extensively argues why the construc-
tion of a theory which embraces both dynamics and thermodynamics 
is necessary. This is of primary interest for the topic of this 
chapter. 
Prigogine calls dynamics the physics of being because it eli-
minates 'becoming' from the description of physical reality; there 
is no difference between the past and the future in a dynamical 
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description. Any dynamical process that can take place in the 
'forward' direction of time can also take place in the opposite 
direction, and given the state of a dynamical system at any arbi­
trary moment, its whole future and past are in principle deter­
mined because of Laplacian determinism. The evolution of a dyna­
mical system is represented by a parametrised curve in phase 
space (see fig. 25); once one point of this trajectory is exactly 
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known, then in principle the whole trajectory is determined (this 
is related to the analyticity of the solutions of the usual dy­
namical differential equations which, as will be seen shortly, 
no longer obtains for dynamical systems showing the so-called 
Poincaré catastrophe). Thus, within dynamics, timi-; functions 
really only as a parameter which itself is "unaffected by the 
85 
transformation that it describes". In the dynamical picture of 
the physical world, there is no place for irreversibility as 
described by the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics 
and thus for becoming. Precisely because thermodyBamics puts 
the accent upon irreversibility, it is associated by Prigogine 
о с 
with the physics of becoming. 
Prigogine is not satisfied with the usual way in which the 
conflict between the physics of being and the physics of becoming 
is solved, namely by conceiving of thermodynamic irreversibility 
as corresponding to "some kind of approximation added to dynamics", 
or by considering it to be an "illusion caused by the observer's 
imperfect sense organs"?'In his opinion: 
"It is difficult to believe that the observed irreversible pro­
cesses, such as viscosity, decay of unstable particles, and 
so forth, are simply illusions caused by lack of knowledge or 
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by incomplete observation". 
Prigogine's own point of view with respect to irreversibility is 
summarised in the following statement which is the main thesis 
89 
of his book: 
"First, irreversible processes are as real as reversible ones; 
they do not correspond to supplementary approximations that 
we of necessity superpose upon time-reversible laws. 
Second, irreversible processes play a fundamental constructive 
role in the physical world; they are at the basis of important 
coherent processes that appear with particular clarity on the 
biological level. 
Third, irreversibility is deeply rooted in dynamics. One may 
say that irreversibility starts where the basic concepts of 
classical or quantum mechanics (such as trajectories or wave 
functions) cease to be observables. Irreversibility corresponds 
not to some supplementary approximation introduced into the 
laws of dynamics but to an embedding of dynamics within a 
vaster formalism". 
Let us first go deeper into the last point of this thesis. 
For Prigogine, the occurrence of irreversible processes is 
connected with the dynamical nature of the system involved. As 
is well known, different kinds of dynamical systems can be dis-
tinguished. For instance, they can be classified as integrable 
or non-integrable, depending on whether or not the Hamiltonian 
H can be written in a suitable form (viz., H= H(J... J ), where 
the J. are the action variables), and as ergodic and non-ergodic, 
depending upon whether or not the point representing the system 
in phase space covers the whole hyperplane corresponding to the 
90 
energy of the system. An illustration of the classification of 
dynamic systems, which is based upon the evolution of a volume 
element of phase space, is given in fig. 26. The flow of such 
N 
\ 
vOv) ^Jf? 
Various types of flow in phase space:(A) non-ergodic: 
(B) ergodic but non mixing; (C) mixing. 
fig. 26 
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volume element can assume different forms which are represented 
schematically; each flow pattern corresponds to a different cate-
gory of dynamic systems, viz., non-ergodic, ergodic but non-mixing, 
92 
and mixing systems. Other categories have been introduced recent-
ly as well, such as the so-called K- and C-systems of which the 
behaviour in phase space is even more complicated. Their behaviour 
in phase space becomes more and more unpredictable and more and 
more resembles the behaviour of stochastic processes. Features 
of a randomlike behaviour also appear in case of dynamic systems 
which exhibit the so-called Poincaré catastrophe; in case of the 
Poincaré catastrophe the invariants of motion, except for the 
Hamiltonian itself, cannot be written as analytic function of the 
93 
action variables. Thus, several types of dynamic systems, such 
as the mixing and K-systems and those exhibiting the Poincaré 
catastrophe, show a randomlike behaviour; then "the dynamical 
motion introduces random elements".94 
A closer look at the behaviour of the trajectories in phase 
space for such complex dynamical systems reveals that two trajec-
tories which are initially arbitrarily close together in phase 
space may separate strongly in the course of time. This means that 
two systems which are initially indistinguishable from a macros-
copic point of view, may evolve after some time into two diffe-
rent macroscopic states. This feature of the flow of trajectories 
95 
is called 'weak stability'. Weak stability has important conse-
quences for the prediction of the behaviour of dynamic systems. 
For weakly stable processes, it is possible to find in any neigh-
borhood of a state leading to one particular kind of macroscopic 
process, other states leading to a different kind of macroscopic 
process (see fig. 27). Since it is not possible to give the exact 
X o * o 
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A: weakly stable complex dynamical system; В: simple dyna­
mical system.О and χ represent states that lead to different 
types of motion. 
fig. 27 
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location of a system in phase space, a precise determination of 
its future behaviour is impossible: 
"There is then no point in increasing the precision of our ob­
servation. The microstructure of the phase space has become 
extremely complex. This is the reason why statistical arguments 
enter into every long-term prediction. In such situations, 
statistical ensembles must be considered." 
In those cases, it is no longer possible to compute the behaviour 
of the dynamical system in a deterministic way. According to Pri­
gogine, this fact "forces us to transgress the limits of a pure-
97 ly dynamical description". Weak stability allows, in his opinion, 
the first step toward the introduction of irreversibility in the 
formal structure of dynamics, because this weak stability is 
closely connected with 'randomness' at the microscopic level, 
which emerges as irreversibility on the macroscopic level. 
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Given that almost all dynamic systems are weakly stable and 
that the state of a system can only be determined with a finite 
accuracy, it follows that the notion of a trajectory, so funda­
mental for classical dynamics, looses its meaning. The use of 
ensemble theory becomes unavoidable and the state of a system can 
only be described in terms of distribution function in phase 
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space, ς , representing the probability density. The 'motion' of 
£ is given by the Liouville equation: 
%£ - . У (bJ^ έέ. - 12 £l \ - -¿ Lp (H: Hamiltonian of the 
Ъі ' ТГЛ^Л ¿% 3%, ¿Pc ' ^ system) 
where L is a linear operator, the so-called Liouville operator?·^^ 
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Because of weak stability, it is not possible to go from the des­
cription in terms of distribution functions to the description 
in terms of trajectories; both modes of description are no longer 
equivalent. 
The foregoing makes it necessary to reconsider the status of 
Poincaré's recurrence theorem which is of fundamental importan-
ce for the problem of the relation between the physics of beco-
ming (thermodynamics) and the physics of being (dynamics), since 
it implies that thermodynamics and dynamics are incompatible 
(an entropy function S of momenta and coordinates such that 
dS/dt$0, cannot be defined). But this recurrence theorem is va-
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lid for a description of dynamic systems in terms of trajectories. 
Now, if the notion of trajectory becomes meaningless for weakly 
stable systems, then at first sight the most obstinate stumbling 
block for combining thermodynamics with dynamics into an unique 
102 
scheme disappears. However, as Misra has shown, Poincaré's theo-
rem still holds for a description in terms of distribution func-
tions : the entropy cannot be defined as an average over sone 
distribution function. 
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Following Prigogine, this puts us before a dilemma: 
"The importance of the Poincaré-Misra theorem is that it leaves 
us only two alternatives. We can conclude with Poincaré that 
there is no dynamical interpretation of the second law. Then, 
irreversibility comes from supplementary phenomenological or 
subjectivistic assumptions, from "mistakes". But how then can 
we account for the wealth of important results and concepts 
that derive from the second law? In a sense living beings, we 
ourselves, are then "mistakes". 
Fortunately, there is a second alternative. Poincaré tried to 
associate entropy with a function of correlations and momenta, 
but this attempt also failed. Can we not retain the idea of 
introducing a microscopic entropy such that macroscopic entro-
py is an appropriate average of the microscopic entropy, thus 
realizing Poincaré's program in a different way?" 
In a nutshell, Prigogine proposes the following solution. Instead 
of defining microscopic entropy as a function of the phase space 
variables, he introduces the operator M for the microscopic entro-
py of a dynamic system. The choice of an operator for microsco-
pic entropy is connected with the fact that complex dynamic sys-
tems cannot be described in terms of trajectories^. This operator 
M does not commute with the Liouville operator L, 
-i[LM -ML) = D ^  0, 
where D is defined as 'the microscopic entropy production'. "Be-
cause M does not commute with L, a new kind of complementarity 
Ί Π fi 
arises between the thermodynamical and the dynamical description: 
"Either we consider eigenfunctions of the Liouville operator 
to determine the dynamical evolution of the system or we con­
sider eigenfunctions of M, but there are no common eigenfunc­
tions of the two noncommuting operators L and M." 
Either the entropy operator К can be defined, in which case the 
system under consideration is not purely mechanical and does not 
admit of a description in terms of trajectories, but a recourse 
to distribution functions is necessary; or no such operator M 
exists, in which case the system can be described in a purely 
I8l 
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mechanical way by the use of trajectories. Prigogine claims that 
such operator M can indeed be constructed for weakly stable dynamic 
systems. They are 'sufficiently complex' to show a thermodynamical 
type of behaviour. 
The further details of Prigogine's construction of a micros­
copic theory of irreversibility do not concern us here. However, 
one specific aspect of this theory is worth mentioning, viz., 
the introduction of time as an operator. Prigogine introduces, 
besides the operator M, also the operator Τ which is defined in 
the following way (roughly, Τ is the square root of M): 
M = T + Τ (T+: hermitian conjugate of T). 
This operator Τ has an interesting property: its commutator with 
L is constant: 
[L,TJ = il (I: the unity operator). 
Since the Liouville operator L corresponds to the time derivative 
(see p. 179), the operator Τ is most naturally interpreted as 
corresponding "to a 'time' in the sense that the representation 
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L —>i^ , Τ —* t, satisfies the commutation relation." This new 
time corresponding to the operator Τ is interpreted by Prigogine 
as a 'fluctuating' time; it represents the 'internal' time or 
Ihe 'age' of a system, and is therefore not just a parameter like 
time in classical dynamics. Since 
J-^<T > = constant, (< T>:expectation value 
" of T) 
macroscopic, parameter time t is "simply the average over the 
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new operator time" T. According to this new concept of operator 
time, the age of a system depends upon the distribution function 
by which that system is described and is therefore not just an 
112 
index or an external parameter. 
I shall now briefly turn to the second part of Prigogine's 
thesis (see p. 177) in which he stares that irreversible proces­
ses play an important constructive role in our universe. This is 
a rather remarkable claim since the second law of phenomenologi-
cal thermodynamics has generally been interpreted as leading to 
a maximalisation of disorder in our universe and as expressing 
a tendency toward uniformity in nature; it is supposed to lead 
182 
to a destruction of highly ordered, complex systems or structu­
res . 
Prigogine points out that this standard interpretation of the 
second law is only valid within a particular domain of phenomeno-
logical thermodynamics, viz., the study of closed systems in the 
neighborhood of equilibrium. For these systems indeed, the state 
of maximum entropy is the state of highest uniformity and disorder. 
To show that the second law can contribute to a better understan­
ding of the genesis of structures in our universe, Prigogine turns 
to the study of open thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium. 
His thesis is that the creation of order occurs in open systems 
far from equilibrium in which case fluctuations play an impor­
tant role ('order through fluctuations'), whereas the destruction 
of order occurs in closed systems in the neighborhood of equili­
brium ('Boltzmann order principle'). 
The following example illustrates that non-equilibrium may 
113 be a source of order: 
"When we apply a thermal gradient to a mixture of two different 
gases, we observe an increment of one of the components at the 
hot wall, whereas the other concentrates at the cold wall. This 
phenomenon, already observed in the nineteenth century, is 
called thermal diffusion. In the staedy state, the entropy is 
generally lower than it would be in a uniform state. This 
shows that nonequilibrium may be a source of order." 
This observation has been the starting point for Prigogine's 
ideas. For more complex systems, the non-equilibrium may generate 
114 
a new kind of structures, the so-called dissipative structures. 
Dissipative structures may arise in comiblex open systems far 
from equilibrium; they stabilize their situation by a constant 
115, exchange of matter and energy with their environment. In this 
way, they are able to maintain the non-equilibrium with this 
environment. Their total entropy change can be split into two 
parts, viz., the internal entropy production, dS./dt, which ac­
cording to the second law is always positive or zero, and the 
entropy flow from outside, dS /dt, which can be negative or po-
Д
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^ Ti sitive (see fig. 2 8)VÎhus for a system that is not in equili-
brium, it is possible to keep the total entropy change equal to 
zero and therefore to maintain the non-equilibrium by compensa-
ting the internal entropy production by an outward flow of entro-
183 
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ру. This, however, implies that the system must be able to exchange 
matter and energy with its environment. 
For Prigogine, these dissipative structures "are essential in 
the understanding of coherence and organisation in the nonequili-
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brium world in which we live." The study of the behaviour of dis­
sipative structures and more generally of open thermodynamic sys­
tems far from equilibrium shows that their behaviour is very spe­
cific; it depends upon the particular constitution of the system 
involved. But this is precisely what is needed for an understan­
ding of the abundance of different kinds of organisation in our 
118 
world: 
"The laws of equilibrium are universal.However, far from equi­
librium the behaviour may become very specific. This is a wel­
come circumstance, because it permits us to introduce a dis­
tinction in the behaviour of physical systems that would be 
incomprehensible in an equilibrium world." 
On the basis of complex chemical reaction scheme's, Prigogine 
analysés the conditions under which dissipative structures may 
emerge; in his opinion the occurrence of 'autocatalytic' reactions 
. . 119. 
is a necessary condition. Since this type of reaction is frequent-
ly encountered in biological systems, where they play an important 
role, Prigogine claims that the study of dissipative structures 
may contribute to a better insight into the structure of biologi-
cal organism. 
Generally, the occurrence of instabilities in the behaviour of 
thermodynamic systems is of primary importance for the emergence 
of dissipative structures. Only when a system is sufficiently com-
plex can such instabilities occur far from equilibrium. Starting 
from these considerations, Prigogine develops a theory of self-
120 
organisation mainly based upon stability theory. One of the most 
striking aspects of this theory is the role which Prigogine attri-
184 
butes to fluctuations. Whereas generally fluctuations play but 
a minor role in macroscopic physics, they become crucially impor-
tant in the theory of self-organisation. For large systems near 
equilibrium, the 'law of large numbers' implies that fluctuations 
are neglegible. But in the neighborhood of instabilities, the 
law of large numbers breaks down, whereas fluctuations near equi-
librium are damped, non-equilibrium fluctuations in the neighbor-
hood of instabilities may become amplified and may determine 
what transition to a stable state will occur. Near equilibrium, 
fluctuations do not affect the average values of the relevant 
quantities, but in the neighborhood of instabilities a "fluctu-
ation drives the average." This leads to a new order principle: 
"In all these situations a new order principle appears that 
corresponds essentially to an amplification of fluctuations 
and to their ultimate stabilization by the flow of matter 
and energy from the surroundings. We may call this principle 
"order through fluctuations"." 
Thus, in the neighborhood of instabilities, fluctuations deter-
mine the future evolution of the system. Once fluctuations have 
triggered off a transition to a stable state, the same fluctua-
tions cannot bring about the reversed process since fluctuations 
are no longer important as soon as the system has reached its 
final stable state.12^ 
In conclusion, thermodynamics does not, according to Prigogine, 
contradict the emergence of highly complex systems in our univer-
se. For explaining the appearance of such systems not in equili-
brium with their environment, it is not necessary to introduce 
"some new principle of nature, such as the 'instability of the 
homogeneous' or 'a differentiating force, creator of organiza-
tion'', or to introduce an 'army of Maxwell demons^" which would 
have to account for the allegedly anti-thermodynamical behaviour. 
On the contrary, their emergence is in accordance with the laws 
of physics, in particular of phenomenological thermodynamics, 
when they are applied far away from equilibrium conditions. 
This conclusion brings to an end thé exposition of the basic 
ideas underlying the thermodynamical program developed by Stuec-
kelberg and Prigogine. In the discussion of these ideas I shall 
treat extensively of the first part of Prigogine's main thesis, 
where he states that "irreversible processes are as real as 
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r e v e r s i b l e o n e s . " 
166 
IV.3 Discussion 
It must be clear by novi that the mechanical and the themo-
dynamical program stand in sharp contrast to each other. The 
mechanical conception of irreversibility as an accidental feature 
of our universe is diametrically opposed to the thernodyr.amical 
conception according to which irreversibility is deeply anchored 
in the fundamental laws of physics. The controversy concerning 
the two programs crystallises around the status of the second 
law of phenomenological thermodynanics: is it, or is it not one 
of the fundamental laws of physics, which is to be put on a par 
with the laws of mechanics? 
Compared with the mechanical program, the thermodynamical one 
has received little attention from both physicists and philo-
sophers of science. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons thereof 
lies in the nature of the thermodynamical program itself: it 
presents a strong conceptual break with traditional physics and 
requires a 'rethinking' of its foundations. 
An evaluation of both programs is not an easy matter. In the 
first place, the thernodyramical program has not yet had a real 
chance to prove itself because of lack of interest. Since there 
is no reason to reject it beforehand, it is to be hoped that it 
will receive more attention in the future, especially from the 
physicists. Up to this day the need for working on and elabora-
ting the thermodynamical program has not been felt by the 
majority of physicists. Looking at the history of physics, this 
is not so surprising. The work spent on the mechanical program 
has had a very fruitful impact upon the development of physics 
127 itself ; the challenge of thermodynamcal irreversibility led 
to statistical mechanics, particularly to ensemble theory and 
ergodic theory. This creative role is by itself already a strong 
justification for a comnitment to tne mechanical program. It has 
proven to be highly 'progressive' in the past; this however in 
no way guarantees that the situation will stay the same in the 
future. 
In the second place, the controversy between both research 
programs is mainly of a conceptual nature. It is not based upon 
a dispute about empirical data nor is it to be expected that a 
'crucial' experiment will decide the issue. In fact there is 
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disagreement neither about the irreversibility of the relevant 
processes nor about the adequacy of the second law of phenoneno-
logical thermodynamics for describing this irreversible behaviour. 
There is however disagreement about the interpretation and 
integration of this second law within the whole building of 
physical theories. 
Therefore, the issue concerns primarily the coherence of the 
physicist's conception of thermodynarnical time asymmetry. So one 
might be tempted to evaluate both approaches with respect to 
their 'inner conceptual coherence'. In my opinion, this does not 
lead anywhere; apart from the fact that a fair comparison would 
require a further articulation of the thermodynarnical program, 
there are no objective criteria for comparing the inner coherence 
of conceptual frameworks (except trivial ones, like logical 
consistency). A conceptual scheme in which thermodynarries and 
mechanics are related to each other by way of a reduction -
whether in the form of a reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics 
(as in the mechanical program), or in the form of an incorporation 
of mechanics into thermodynamics from which pure mechanics 
emerges as a special case (as in Stueckelberg's schomej - could 
be as coherent as a conceptual scheme in which thermodynamics 
and mechanics correspond to complementary modes of description 
(as in Prigogine's case). Physicists have learnt 'to live', 
albeit reluctantly, with complementarity; they have become used 
to it and generally they no longer consider complementarity as 
a deficiency of a theory. 
Finally, a proper evaluation of both programs is not possible 
without taking into consideration the other types of time 
asymmetry. The problem whether or not irreversibility should be 
built into the fundamental laws of physics is not specific for 
thermodynarnical time asymmetry. It also presents itself for these 
other types. Therefore, both points of view would have to be 
evaluated within a broader perspective. 
At the present time however, a confrontation is more needed 
than an appraisal. Indeed, the latter would be premature because 
a real debate between both camps has not yet taken place; 
Prigogine has recently challenged the defenders of the classical 
program not only by offering a new theory of microscopic 
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irreversibility, but also by arguing that the mechanical 
conception of thermodynamical irreversibility is not acceptable 
since it reduces irreversibility to an illustion or an approxi-
mation. Later on, I shall comment on his criticism against the 
mechanical program; first I would like to make some general 
observations on both programs, which I hope will help to clear 
the path for a discussion. These observations concern i) the 
distinction between time asymmetry and the flow of time, ii) the 
distinction between reversible and irreversible processes, iii) 
the role of Poincaré's recurrence theorem, and iv) the role of 
boundary conditions. 
i) In the first place, it should be constantly kept in mind that 
the real issue at stake is the problem of time asymmetry and not 
of the flow of time. In the case of Stueckelberg's theory, it 
is immediately clear that the principle of equilibrium (principle 
2b) only breaks the symmetry between the past and future 
orientation of time (the maximum of entropy is reached in 'the 
distant future'). From this principle it follows as we have seen 
that the solutions of the equations of motion of a system 
converge relatively to one orientation of time, but diverge 
relatively to the opposite orientation. Thus, the solutions of 
the differential equations are time asymmetric. But Stueckelberg 
still goes one step further; he assumes that the future orien-
tation of time coincides with the orientation relatively to 
which the solutions converge. In other words, equilibrium is 
reached in the future. In this way, Stueckelberg also determines 
the flow of time. From a purely physical point of view, however, 
this determination of the flow of time is arbitrary; there is 
physically no reason why the future orientation of time could 
not be defined as the orientation relatively to which the 
solutions diverge. For Stueckelberg, the contention that 
equilibrium is reached in the future is founded in phenomenology 
which implies an appeal to the experience of the flow of time 
by a conscious observer; but in my opinion a purely, physical 
objective determination of the flow of time should avoid any 
reference to a conscious observer. 
A similar remark applies to Prigogine's analysis: his failure 
to distinguish between time asymmetry and the flow of time has 
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seduced him into entitling his book From being to beconing and 
into referring to thermodynamics as the physics of becoming; 
whereas in fact he discusses time asymmetry rather than the 
problem of the flow of time or of temporal becoming. It is there-
fore no surprise to see that Prigogine gets into trouble as soon 
as he starts discussing the relation between the flow of time 
and the entropy increase in our world : 
"We may construct a Lyapounov function [an entropy function] 
that increases monotonously with the "flow" of time or an-
other one that decreases (. ) in one description equili-
brium is reached in the "future", and in the other in the 
"past". In other words, the time symmetry of dynamics can be 
broken in two ways; however, how to distinguish between them 
is a difficult question." 
Indeed, thermodynamical time asymmetry does not determine whether 
the forward flow of time coincides with the direction in which 
entropy increases or whether it coincides with the direction in 
which entropy decreases. Thermodynamical time asymmetry structur-
ally distinguishes between both orientations of time; it does not 
however allow us to tell the past from the future. 
ii) One of the most conspicuous differences between both programs 
concerns the distinction between reversible and irreversible 
processes. According to the mechanical point of view, irreversibi-
lity is ultimately a matter of probabilities: all processes are 
in principle (i.e. relatively to the fundamental laws of physics) 
reversible, but the occurrence of the reverse of certain processes 
is so unlikely that de facto they never take place. Because 
irreversibility is a matter of probabilities, there is no clear 
cut distinction between reversible and irreversible processes, 
but there is a gradual transition from one type of process to 
the other (cfr. the discussion about the (un)ordered deck of 
cards at p.128- 9). 
This is not the case for the thermodynamical conception 
of irreversibility: isolated systems behave irreversibly because 
their behaviour is governed by a time reversal non invariant 
law. Either the entropy is constant during a proces (* = 0), 
which implies that it is reversible, or the entropy increases 
(S > 0), which means that the process is irreversible. It might 
be proposed that this sharp distinction between reversible and 
irreversible processes could be more refined by conceiving of 
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the amount of entropy increase as a quantitative measure of 
irreversibility; this would allow for the introduction of 
'degrees of irreversibility'. Whenever S is very small, process-
es could even be called 'quasi-irreversible'. However, this 
procedure is rather problematic. Since there is no absolute 
standard of entropy increase, it is not clear what it means for 
S to be small. Moreover, S is an extensive quantity and there-
fore the entropy production in any type of process could be 
increased by scaling it up; in that case the process would 
become 'more irreversible' because of an higher entropy 
increase, whereas qualitatively the process does not change. It 
is equally unclear how the introduction of degrees of irrever-
sibility could be reconciled with the idea that irreversibility 
has a lawlike character. It seems that the conception of 
irreversibility of the thermodynamical program implies that in 
principle there is a strict boundary between reversible and 
irreversible processes. 
In this context, it is worthwhile to point out an ambiguity 
in Prigogine's theory. On the one hand, there is clear evidence 
that he is in favour of a clearcut distinction between rever-
sible and irreversible processes. For instance, he writes that 
if we give up the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics 
and replace it by the statistical mechanical H-theorem, then 
we are lost, for in that case it would no longer be possible 
129 to distinguish between reversible and irreversible processes . 
Similarly, the complementarity between the mechanical and 
thermodynamical description leads to a clearcut distinction 
between reversible and irreversible processes: either a micro-
scopic entropy operator exists, in which case the system shows 
a thermodynamical, possibly irreversible behaviour, or it does 
not exist, in which case it does show a reversible mechanical 
behaviour^ . 
On the other hand, Prigogine's analysis of the limits of a 
mechanical description suggests that there is a smooth gradual 
transition from a mechanical to a thermodynamical type of 
behaviour. In order to show a thermodynamical behaviour, a 
dynamical system must be 'sufficiently' complex: the more 
complex it is, the more it shows a randomlike behaviour which 
191 
ultimately leads to irreversibility. This gives the impression 
that there is no definite turning point at which there is a 
qualitative break between a mechanical and thermcdynamical 
description. Instead it points to a smooth g^ a-dual transition 
from one mode of description to the other. In that case there 
can be no clear distinction between reversible and irreversible 
processes. 
Central to the controversy concerning the two programs is 
the difference in opinion regarding the principle of the 
classification into reversible and irreversible processes. This 
difference and the consequences thereof deserve more attention 
than they have recieved sofar. Within the mechanical program 
this classification is a matter of probabilities (as is the 
definition of Boltzmann entropy: S f» log W, where W is a 
probability), whereas in the thermodynamical program it is 
based upon one of the fundamental laws of physics. 
iii) The role of the reversibility objections, in particular 
of Poincaré's recurrence theorem, should not be overestimated 
or misunderstood in a comparison of both programs. These 
reversibility objections have indeed played a major part in 
the development of the mechanical program. But as soon as a 
strictly mechanical point of view is abandoned, as in the 
thermodynamical program, they loose all their strength. The 
reversibility objections cannot be leveled against Stueckelberg's 
description of a thermodynamical system because he assumes from 
the outset that the state of such system is characterised by, 
besides its standard mechanical variables, at least one non-
mechanical variable, viz. entropy. By axiom, the entropy S 
cannot be written as a function of the mechanical state 
variables and therefore it is not subject to the reversibility 
objections. Thus, Stueckelberg avoids a contradiction between 
the time asymmetry in the second law and the time reversal in-
variant laws of mechanics. Prigogine proceeds differently; rea-
lising that Poincaré's recurrence theorem only applies to func-
tions of the phase space variables, he proposes to define micros-
copic entropy by way of an operator. Whenever such operator can 
be defined, the mechanical description and therefore the rever-
sibility objections lose their meaning. 
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iv) Within the mechanical program, the boundary conditions 
stated in the branch systems hypothesis perform a double function. 
In the first place these boundary conditions are necessary in 
order to account for the irreversible behaviour toward equili-
brium of low entropy systems. This is achieved by assuming that 
the formation of low entropy branch systems satisfies certain 
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conditions of randomness ; from these it follows that an 
arbitrarily selected low entropy branch system is most probably 
at the bottom of a dip in its entropy curve and that it therefore 
will approach equilibrium. In the second place, these boundary 
conditions posit the actual creation of low entropy branch 
systems in our universe; thus the time asymmetric behaviour of 
thermodynamical systems as observered in daily life can be made 
plausible; the boundary conditions assure the constant production 
of low entropy systems without which the actual occurrence of 
thermodynamical time asymmetry in our region of the universe 
cannot be understood. 
Within the thermodynamical program, boundary conditions 
play a less prominent role. It is not necessary to introduce 
special assumptions about boundary conditions in order to 
explain the irreversible behaviour of thermodynamical systems. 
Given a system in a relatively low state of entropy, its 
irreversible behaviour is the result of the second law of 
phenomenological thermodynamics and does not require special 
restrictions upon the initial low entropy state. There is no 
intrinsic connection between the initial state of the system 
and its subsequent irreversible behaviour as in the mechanical 
program. Boundary conditions however are important with regard 
to the problem of explaining the actual occurrence of 
thermodynamical time asymmetry in our region of the universe. 
With respect to this problem, boundary conditions play the 
same role in both programs. Thus, the thermodynamical program 
also requires a kind of branch systems hypothesis whose function, 
however, will not be the same as in the mechanical program. 
It is necessary only for an account of the actual occurrence of 
the thermodynamical time asymmetry in our region of the universe, 
not for an explanation of the irreversible behaviour of low 
entropy systems. 
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The last three points illustrate once more that the 
mechanical and the thermodynamical program follow completely 
different routes in solving the problem of thermodynamical time 
asymmetry. With respect to traditional physics, the most inter-
esting and challenging feature of the thermodynamical program 
is that not only it expresses the need for reconsidering the 
foundations of physics in connection with the problem of irre-
versibility, but that it also actually shows how the structure 
of mechanics can be extended or embedded in a broader frame-
work so that irreversibility is built into the foundations of 
physics. Whether or not the building of theoretical physics can 
be reconstructed upon these new foundations so that it can 
compete with traditional reversible physics, is for the moment 
an open question. Both Stueckelberg and Prigogine however are 
convinced that it is worthwhile to proceed in this way in order 
to 'save' irreversibility. Apparently, most physicists do not 
share this conviction and question the need for such extension 
of mechanics. They are convinced that irreversibility is 
ultimately a matter of probabilities and that therefore thermo-
dynamical irreversibility can be accounted for in a purely 
mechanical way. But precisely on this point they are criticised 
by the advocates of the thermodynamical program, who charge 
that irreversibility is thus degraded into an illusion. 
Especially Prigogine has attacked the mechanical conception 
of thermodynamical time asymmetry for essentially this reason. 
His arguments against the mechanical program will now be 
examined in more detail; I shall argue that they are not 
convincing and that they do not justify the abandonment of the 
mechanical program. 
In the first part of his main thesis (see p.177), Prigogine 
states that "irreversible processes are as real as reversible 
ones" and that irreversibility does not correspond to some 
kind of "supplementary approximations that we of necessity 
superpose upon time-reversible laws". He assumes that the 
second law of phenomenological thermodynamics is strictly valid 
which implies that it must be possible to define, in one way 
or another, some kind of deterministic H-theorem à la Boltzmann 
which is exactly valid and is not the result of approximations 
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added to the laws of mechanics. The statistical Η-theorem is not 
acceptable for two reasons. In the first place, it gives up the 
monotonie increase of entropy. "But then", Prigogine says, "we 
are lost, for the distinction between reversible and irreversible 
processes would have to be replaced by some new one, which at 
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present we cannot even formulate in a consistent way" . In the 
second place, the statistical Η-theorem is based upon techniques 
like coarse graining. But apart from the fact that this approxi­
mation technique has proven to be unsuccessful1-^, it makes 
irreversibility into an anthropomcrphic or subjectivistic 
phenomenon which would be due to 'poor' human observation 
For Prigogine the Poincaré-Misra recurrence theorem implies 
that within a mechanical description a foundation of the second 
law of phenomenological thermodynamics cannot be given; this 
would mean that within such description thermodynamical irrever-
sibility necessarily becomes an illusion or an approximation. 
Prigogine cannot accept this conception of irreversibility and 
therefore the mechanical description of physical reality is 
considered to be inadequate: it does not justice to one of the 
principal features of the physical world, viz., irreversibility. 
This is the main motive behind his attempt to develop a theory 
which transcends the limits of a purely mechanical description. 
In my opinion, this criticism against the mechanical program 
is not justified. Apparently for Prigogine a description of 
physical reality in which irreversibility is not anchored in one 
of the fundamental laws, degrades irreversibility into an 
approximation or an illusion. Irreversibility is 'real' only if 
it is of a lawlike nature. However, a comparison of the statisti-
cal Η-theorem with the second law of phenomenological thermo­
dynamics shows that this interpretation of what is 'real', is 
unnecessarily restrictive. 
Indeed, the statistical H-theorem is not completely 
equivalent to the second law, but is a kind of approxination of 
this law in the sense that it does not predict with absolute 
certainty that the entropy will increase or stay equal but only 
asserts that this will most probably be the case. But for non-
equilibrium macroscopic systems this probability becomes 
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practically equal to 1 because once they have reached equilibrium 
fluctuations away from equilibrium are extremely improbable. 
Therefore the process will apppar to be de facto irreversible as 
is illustrated by the following quotation of Boltzmann's Gas-
theorie ^ : 
"Man darf sich aber die Sache nicht so vorstellen, als ob zwei 
Gase, die in einem mit absolut glatten indifferenten Wänden 
versehenen,1/10 Liter enthaltenden Gefässe anfangs unver-
mischt waren, sich mischen, nach einigen Tagen wieder ent-
mischen, dann wieder mischen u.s.w. Man findet vielmehr .... 
dass erst nach einer Zeit, die noch enorm gross gegen-
über iQlOiQ jarren ist, sich nach der ersten Mischung wieder 
eine irgendwie bemerkbare Entmischung einstellen würde. Dass 
dies praktisch gleichbedeutend ist mit niemals, erkennt man, 
wenn man bedenkt, dass in diesem Zeiträume gemäss den Wahr-
scheinlichkeitsgesetzen viele Jahren enthalten sein müssten, 
in welchen durch blossen Zufall an demselben Tage alle Ein-
wohner einer grossen Stadt einen Selbstmord begingen, oder 
in alle Gebäuden derselben ein Brand entstünde, während doch 
die Versicherungsgesellschaften sich in guter Uebereinstim-
mung mit den Thatsachen befinden, wenn sie solche Fälle nicht 
in Betracht ziehen. Wenn nicht eine selbst viel geringere 
Unwahrscheinlichkeit praktisch gleichbedeutend mit der Unmög-
lichkeit ist, so könnte sich Niemand darauf verlassen, dass 
auf den heutigen Tag eine Nacht und auf diese wieder ein Tag 
folgen wird." 
Thus, for macroscopic systems not in equilibrium the predictions 
of the statistical Η-theorem are perfectly in accord with our 
observations: the statistical Η-theorem "is all that is needed 
1"5б 
to successfully account for the observations of the real world. 
For macroscopic systems, there is in practice no difference be­
tween the predictions of the statistical Η-theorem and those of 
the second law of phenomenological thermodynamics; whereas the 
latter in principle rules out the reversal of certain processes, 
the former predicts that de facto the reversal will never occur 
because it is extremely improbable. In either case, the predicted 
behaviour will be the same, viz., an irreversible approach to 
equilibrium. But then there is no reason at all to qualify the 
resulting irreversible behaviour as 'real' in one case, and as 
an 'illusion' in the other. 
Of course, the statistical Η-theorem is derived on the basis 
of time reversal invariant laws, and therefore all processes are 
in principle (i.e. relatively to those laws) reversible. For 
Prigogine, this means that "we are lost" because one could not 
distinguish meaningfully between reversible and irreversible 
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processes. But if we accept that irreversibility is of a de facto 
nature and give up the idea of a clear cut distinction between 
reversible and irreversible processes (cfr. ρ.189-91)>then the 
situation does not look that hopeless since after all it is pos­
sible to indicate under what conditions systems will eventually 
show a de facto irreversible behaviour. As is well known, this 
strongly depends upon the size of the system as is clearly il-
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lustrated by the following example given by Smoluchowski. In 
air at 300oK with a density of Ji.lO y molecules/cm·5, the average 
recurrence time for deviations of 1% from the average number of 
molecules in a sphere with radius ¿.Ю-·3 cm, is of the order of 
3.10 years. However, when the radius of the sphere is reduced 
-Б . . . 
to _1.10 cm, then the average recurrence time for deviations 
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of 1% becomes about 10 sec. Thus for 'large', macroscopic 
systems the probability for the spontaneous occurrence of sig­
nificant deviations from the equilibrium state becomes so extre­
mely small that they will never de facto take place. Consequent­
ly, once such macroscopic system has reached equilibrium, it 
will not return spontaneously to its initial state, and so the 
reversal of the process by which it reached equilibrium will in 
fact not occur; it is improbable to the degree that it is 
"praktisch gleichbedeutend mit der Unmöglichkeit." 
Similarly, Prigogine's objections against the use of techni-
ques such as coarse graining are not convincing. For Prigogine, 
the use of these techniques implies that irreversibility becomes 
an approximation and an illusion. But on closer inspection, this 
conclusion seems unfounded. It is based upon the assumption that 
in the statistical mechanical description, irreversibility is 
related to the introduction of coarse graining. However, this 
is not the case, for although the statistical Η-theorem is deri­
ved by t.'ie coarse graining of phase space, it nevertheless is 
completely symmetric in time (see also ρ. l62-3).Therefore, a sta­
tistical mechanical description of a low entropy system predicts 
with or without coarse graining, a de facto irreversible beha-
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viour: 
"It must not be imagined that to remove coarse graining removes 
the macroscopic asymmetry. A complete description of the pen­
dulum motion would still predict, with overwhelming probabili-
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ty, that the pendulum would be damped to rest..." 
Within statistical mechanics, coarse graining has a special func­
tion; it is introduced in order to define a 'quantitative measure 
of irreversibility', i.e., to define an entropy function. It is 
however not the origin of the de facto irreversible behaviour 
of systems. 
In this respect, it is important to recognise that a distinc­
tion must be made between the problem of explaining why certain 
systems behave in an irreversible way and the problem of defining 
a quantitave measure of irreversibility, like an entropy func­
tion S. Prigogine is very much concerned with the second problem; 
he is looking for an universally valid expression for the entro­
py of a system so that the second law of phenomenological thermo­
dynamics is strictly valid. Since within a mechanical description 
such entropy function of the phase space variables p. and q. 
does not exist, he concludes that mechanics cannot account objec­
tively for irreversibility. I have tried to show that this con­
clusion does not follow. Even without introducing a quantitative 
measure of irreversibility, mechanics predicts that a closed 
non-equilibrium macroscopic system will show a de facto irrever­
sible behaviour toward equilibrium. The problem of defining a 
quantitative measure of irreversibility constitutes the next 
step. Assuming that an objective foundation can be given to 
coarse graining, then the coarse grained entropy function of 
statistical mechanics appears το be a good candidate for such 
a quantitative measure of irreversibility. Vor Prigogine, however, 
the use of coarse graining for defining an entropy function is 
not successful and, moreover, it cannot be given an objective 
foundation. Assuming for the sake of argument that he is right, 
this means that the mechanical program should try to produce 
a different way for defining a quantitative measure of irrever­
sibility; it does not, however, mean that it cannot account for 
the de facto irreversible behaviour of macroscopic systems. 
These considerations show clearly that the mechanical program 
can produce a strong defence against Prigogine's criticism. From 
the mechanical point of view, there is no need to insist with 
Prigogine upon the strict validity of the second law of phenome-
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nological thermodynamics. Such insistence endangers mechanics 
without yielding any profit since the statistical Η-theorem leads 
to the same predictions with respect to the behaviour of non-
equilibrium systems. Moreover, it is not necessary to follow Pri­
gogine in his claim that weak stability forces us to "transgress 
the limits of a purely dynamical description" because in his 
opinion this would make the notion of a trajectory meaningless. 
A description in terns of distribution functions, be they needed 
for practical reasons or in principle, can perfectly well be 
combined with the principles of mechanics, as is standard prac­
tice in statistical mechanics and is demonstrated by Prigogine 
himself. The use of distribution functions does not by itself 
undermine the mechanical mode of description, even if in principle 
a transition to a description in terms of trajectories is out 
of the question. 
In the foregoing pages I have tried to show that the mechani­
cal program can be defended successfully against the charges 
brought up against it from the side of the thermodynamical pro­
gram. This conclusion should, however, not be misunderstood; 
in my opinion, it does not render the theories developed within 
the thermodynamical program obsolete. Further work on this pro­
gram should not be justified in the first place by the arguments 
that can be levelled against the mechanical program; it should 
derive its rationale from its inner coherence, especially with 
respect to the problem of thermodynamic time asymmetry, and by 
showing that it can serve as a fruitful point of departure for 
doing physics. Moreover, a proliferation of theories regarding 
the origin of thermodynamic time asymmetry should also be wel­
come to the defenders of the mechanical program, for precisely 
in competition with other theories can it prove its vigour. 
The elaboration of the mechanical program, however, must also 
continue for, as I intend to show in the remaining pages, this 
program in its most sophisticated form, viz., Reichenbach's 
branch systems theory, is still incomplete in view of its goal 
which is the explanation of the occurrence of thermodynamic time 
asymmetry in our region of the universe. So far,it was shown 
that given a system not in equilibrium, the mechanical program 
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can account fer its subsequent irreversible behaviour toward 
equilibrium. The next question is of course how, when we observe 
a low entropy system in daily life, it reached the state of low 
entropy in the first place? In other words, how can we explain 
the constant creation of non-equilibrium systems in our environ-
ment? They cannot be the result of spontaneous fluctuations 
such as occur inclosed systems. Such explanation is out of the 
question because it would ruin the argument by which the irre-
versible behaviour toward equilibrium itself was deduced. From 
the point of view of the behaviour of closed systems, transi-
tions from non-equilibrium to equilibrium are as rare as trans-
itions in the reversed order, from equilibrium to non-equilibrium, 
and therefore the really interesting question about processes 
showing thermodynamic time asymmetry is not why the reversal 
does not take place, but why they themselves do take place at 
all. 
Reichenbach's branch systems theory is supposed to solve this 
problem of the constant creation of non-equilibrium or low entro-
py systems. But for several reasons, it appears premature to 
consider this branch systems approach as the final solution to 
the problem of thermodynamic time asymmetry. 
To begin with, the first part of the branch systems hypothe-
sis, in which the universe in our region is said to be in a rela-
tively low state of entropy, is still not well understood. There 
is still much disagreement about the cosmologica! origin of this 
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relatively low state of entropy. The status of this boundary 
condition becomes especially problematic when the gravitational 
interaction is taken into consideration, for in that case any 
region in our universe containing a sufficient amount of matter 
would be in a relatively low state of entropy since in view of 
the phenomenon of gravitational collapse a self-gravitating sys-
tem has no natural equilibrium state. Consequently, it seems 
that this condition can always be satisfied in a trivial way 
by considering a sufficiently large portion of the universe. 
A further clarification of these points regarding the first part 
of the branch systems hypothesis is needed. 
Secondly, Reichenbach assumes that the creation of low entro-
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py systems in our environment is a well-established empirical 
fact : 
"Our environment is rich in processes which, either as a natu-
ral product or through the intervention of man, create as 
parts of their results ordered subsystems, which from then on 
remain isolated and run through an evolution toward disorder..." 
Indeed, one cannot but agree with this. But strangely enough, 
Reichenbach does not take the next step: he makes no effort at 
all to make this constant creation of low entropy branch systems 
plausible (except for the phrase "either as a natural product or 
through the intervention of man"). He seems to be satisfied with 
having shown that the basic assumptions from which he derives the 
time asymmetric behaviour of the majority of branch systems, are 
'factual statements' about our universe. But precisely these 
factual statements themselves require further explanation. The 
boundary conditions specified in the branch systems hypothesis 
are very special; they do not as usual merely describe some brute 
contingent fact about nature, which defies any explanation, but 
they state instead that nature displays a certain pattern by 
constantly creating branch systems. This pattern itself needs 
further clarification and explanation. 
The constant creation of branch systems is rather astonishing: 
parts of the universe branch off from their surroundings and 
behave during a finite time interval as if the rest of the uni-
verse does not exist at all. This poses at least the following 
questions: under what conditions can the creation of low entropy 
systems take place, and how can it be explained that, once formed, 
tney stay xsolated for a while? At first it seems rather easy 
to create a low entropy branch system; in view of the relatively 
low state of entropy of the universe in our region, it would be 
sufficient to simply isolate an appropriate subsystem from its 
environment. But in order to make plausible the spontaneous 
creation of low entropy branch systems, one must explain how 
nature manages to keep a subsystem isolated from the rest of the 
universe. As long as the branch systems approach simply posits 
the constant creation of low entropy branch systems as an empi-
rical fact, but does not take the next step of making their oc-
currence plausible, it can hardly be maintained that it provides 
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a satisfactory account of thermodynamic time asymmetry as obser-
ved in daily life. 
Finally, we must ask how it is possible to reconcile the irre-
versible behaviour of thermodynamic systems toward disorder with 
the evolution from the presumed homogeneous and undifferentiated 
conditions in the early stages of the universe to the present, 
highly structured and differentiated state. This evolution to-
ward a higher state of organisation has taken place on different 
levels; there has been an evolution of the physical universe at 
the microscopic level, e.g. the creation of the chemical elements, 
but also at the macroscopic level, e.g. the organisation of the 
'primordial soup' into solar systems, star clusters, galaxies 
and clusters of galaxies. At another level of organisation there 
was biological evolution. From the point of view of the time 
asymmetric behaviour of closed thermodynamic systems toward dis-
order, this constant evolution toward ever more complex and high-
ly structured systems is paradoxical. 
Up to this date, the mechanical program has not come up with 
an explanation of this extraordinary kind of time asymmetry. In 
this respect, the thermodynamical program has a lead over the 
mechanical one. According to Prigogine's theory of self-organisa-
tion, the creation of coherent structures does not contradict 
the laws of phenomenological thermodynamics; whereas the second 
law of phenomenological thermodynamics leads to a destruction 
of order in the neighborhood of equilibrium, it may lead to a 
creation of order in open systems far from equilibrium. Thus, 
the emergence of order in our universe does not contradict the 
second law, but on the contrary becomes a consequence thereof. 
For the advocates of the mechanical program it is important 
that Prigogine's theory of self-organisation does not depend 
upon his theory of microscopic irreversibility. It is based 
on a phenomenological description of physical reality, more in 
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particular on phenomenological thermodynamics. But the mechani-
cal program does not deny that phenomenological thermodynamics 
is an adequate theory for describing macroscopic systems. The 
applicability of the second law is not questioned, because, as 
we have seen, the statistical H-theorem leads to the same pre-
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dictions with respect to the behaviour of non-equilibrium macros-
copic systems; only, the mechanical program gives a different 
foundation to this second law, one which is compatible with me-
chanics. Thus the basis upon which Prigogine constructs his 
theory of self-organisation, viz., phenomenological thermodyna-
mics, is also present within the mechanical program. This opens 
the way for incorporating this theory into the mechanical pro-
gram. That would be of great value for then at last, a coherent 
interpretation of the tendency both toward order and toward 
disorder in our universe would come within reach of this pro-
gram. 
Clearly, the problem of thermodynamic time asymmetry cannot yet 
be relegated to the archives of the history of physics; it still 
challenges the physicist as well as the philosopher of science 
and this will continue for the near future. The dilemma between 
a reversible (mechanical) and an irreversible (thermodynamical) 
description of physical reality remains. In this chapter I have 
exposed both points of view and have pointed out the most signi-
ficant differences between them. At this moment, an evaluation 
of both programs appears premature; a discussion among the phy-
sicists on this point has not yet taken place, mainly because 
of a lack of interest in the thermodynamical program. Maybe, 
this chapter can serve as an impulse toward such a discussion. 
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30. Sklar (1977), p. 333 ff. 
31. op. cit. p. 342. 
32. See, for instance, McCarty (1967). 
33. More precisely, a subset A of M is called 'open' if for every point χ in 
A there is an ε ball В = {у distance between χ and у is smaller than e}, 
ε > 0, which contains χ and is at the same time wholly contained in A: 
В с A. 
34. Cfr. Kronheimer (1971) and Winnie in Earman (1977a). 
35. Cfr. Winnie in Earman (1977a), p. 157. Strong causality roughly means 
that every event has arbitrary small neighborhoods to which no timelike 
curve returns once having left that neighborhood. 
36. This is not always done; cfr., for instance, Reichenbach (1957), p. 136, 
where he writes that "the first topological determination of time deals 
with time order at the same point"; see also p. 244. Also Lucas'(1973) 
chapter on "The topology of time" mainly deals with temporal order. 
37. Cfr. Thirnng (1977), p. 12. 
38. Earman (1977b). 
39. Loc. cit. p. 213. 
40. For the notion "covering spacetime" see Sklar (1977), p. 312 ff. For the 
notion of observationally indistinguishable spacetimes see C. Glymour, 
"Indistinguishable space-times and the fundamental group" in Earman 
(1977a). 
41. Roughly, spacetime A with closed time is the result of 1) 'rolling up' 
the covering Minkowski spacetime В with linear time and 2) identifying 
the points 0, 0', 0'', a, a', a1', b, b', b'' etc. In the transition 
from a spacetime M to its covering spacetime Μ', one spacetime point of 
M, e.g. a, is replaced by an infinitude of spacetime points in M' (a', 
a'
1
 etc.); here the difficult problem of the identification of spacetime 
points arises. 
42. Earman (1977b), p.225. 
43. For more details, we have to refer to the relevant literature, especially 
Earman (1977b), Glymour and Malamant in Earman (1977a), Sklar (1977). 
44. Earman (1977b), p. 225. 
45. Cfr. Weyl (1963), p. 39-40. 
46. A metric space M is called 'Cauchy complete' iff every Cauchy sequence in 
M converges to a limt point in M. A sequence s , S-, s_, etc. of points 
in M is called a 'Cauchy sequence' iff for each positive ε there exists 
an integer N such that the distance between s and s. is smaller than ε 
whenever both ι and j are greater than N. Cfr, TlcCarty (1967), p. 163. 
47. Cfr. Hurewicz (1941), p. 4. Following this definition, the number of 
dimensions is always an integer. Other definitions can be introduced, 
which allow for fractional, i.e., non-integer values of the number of 
dimensions (the so-called 'fractal' dimensions); cfr. Mandelbrot (1977), 
who also briefly discusses the possible use of 'fractal times' in physics 
(Mandelbrot (1977) p. 296-7). I will not consider these 'fractal times' 
here. 
48. op. cit. p. 10-1. 
49. Cfr. Kline (1972), p. 997. 
50. See, for instance, Melyukhin, "A philosophical evaluation of modern ideas 
concerning the properties of space and time in the microworld", in 
Kuznetsov (1965); also Lucas (1973), p. 32 and the references given there. 
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51. Grünbaum (1973), p. 460. 
52. Whithrow (1972), p. 141. 
53. If the total energy in the universe is finite, then the application of 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle Δ Ε Δ t Ì h/2, leads to a minimum 
accuracy in time-measurements. 
54. See, for instance, Flint (1948), and Abramenko (1958). 
55. For discrete time in the sense of time with a discrete topology, there is 
no reason to assume that the length of an arbitrary time interval is 
equal to a multiple of a fundamental time unit. For instance, dense time 
is discrete in the topological sense, but the notion of next instant, and 
a fortiori of the smallest time unit between instants lying next to each 
other, does not make any sense. 
56. Cfr. Graves (1971), ch. 15. 
57. See Weyl (1963), p. 136-7, Weyl (1952), p. 283-5, Dorling (1970), Penney 
(1965), Lanczos (1962), Scheurer (1979), p. 240. 
58. Newton-Smith (1980), p. 121 ff. 
59. Cfr. Winnie in Earman (1977a), p. 140, and Cfr. Woodhouse (1973), p. 496. 
60. Cfr. Laudan (1977), eh. 2. 
61. I disagree with Sklar who maintains that temporal orientability is a 
notion which only makes sense in the spacetime approach; cfr. Sklar 
(1977), p. 301. 
62. Choquet-Bruhat (1977), p. 201. 
63. Cfr. R. Geroch and G.T. Horowitz, "Global structure of spacetimes", in 
Hawking (1979), p. 227. 
64. loc. cit. 
65. Cfr. Sklar (1977), p. 315. 
66. Hawking (1979), p. 231. 
67. Loc. cit. 
68. For the notion "time reversal invariance of physical laws" see Ch. Ill, 
sect. 3. 
69. Cfr. Christenson (1964). 
70. С stand for charge conjugation, i.e., particle-antiparticle conjugation, 
and Ρ stands for the parity operator, i.e., space-inversion. The CPT 
theorem states that any process must be invariant under a combined charge 
conjugation (C), space-inversion (P) and time-reversal (T) ; cfr. Sakurai 
(1973), p. 173-4. See also Ch. Ill, ρ 135-6. 
71. Geroch and Horowitz in Hawking (1979), p. 229. 
72. For the definition of a distance metric, a measure metric and a Riemannian 
metric, see, for instance, Grünbaum (1973), p. 468 ff. 
73. Newton (1974), p.6. 
74. In Reichenbach's terminology, they have to be free of "differential 
forces"; cfr. Reichenbach (1957), p. 13. 
75. In curved spacetimes, the integral may take on a maximum value for more 
than just one trajectory. 
76. Moreover, it is a myth that S.T.R. cannot deal at all with accelerations; 
cfr. Bondi (1967), p. 53. 
77. Cfr. Schlegel (1977). 
78. Böhm maintains the contrary: "We see then that there is actually nothing 
paradoxical in the relativistic conclusion that an accelerared clock 
will register less time in passing between two points than would an 
unaccelerated clock passing between the same points". Cfr. Böhm (1965), 
p. 172. 
79. Cfr. Weingard (1979). 
80. Cfr. Schlegel (1977). 
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81. Böhm (1965), Ch XXX. 
82. Reichenbach (1957), p. 116. 
83. op. cit. p. 117. 
84. Sklar (1977), p. 123. 
85. Mittelstaedt (1976), Ch. I and 11. 
86. Cfr. Reichenbach (1957), p. 117. 
87. Mittelstaedt (1976), p. 36. 
88. op. cit. p. 38-9. 
89. op. cit. p. 39. 
90. op. cit. p. 39-40. 
91. Milne (1948). 
92. op. cit. p. 36. 
93. op. cit. p. 230. 
94. op. cit. p. 224. 
95. Schlipp (1969), p. 52. 
96. Kant (1956), p. 74 ff; Kant (1969), p. 32 ff. For Kant, the a prion 
character of the structure of time, implied that it was universally 
and necessarily valid; cfr. Kant (1956), p.40 *. 
97. Poincaré (1952), p. 50. 
98. Cfr. Stegmüller (1975), p. 221 ff. 
99. Karman (1970), p. 274-6. 
Ch. II 
1. For an underpinning of the differentiable structure of spacetime, see: 
J. Ehlers et al., "The geometry of free fall and light propagation", in 
O'Raifeartaigh (1972), and: Woodhouse (1973). 
2. H. Dingle, "Scientific and philosophical implications of the special 
theory of realtivity", in Schlipp (1969), p. 540. 
3. ibidem. 
4. Cfr. L. Rosenfeld, "Observation and the direction of time", in Gold 
(1967), p. 187. 
5. H. Weyl (1963), p. 116. 
6. Cfr. Thirring (1977), p. 12. 
7. Cfr. Hurewicz (1941), p. 4-5. 
8. 'Dual' here means interchanging domain and codomain of a function. It 
should not be confused with the 'duality' of sets and topological spaces; 
cfr. Choquet-Bruhat (1977), p. 10, 21. 
9. Einstein (1952), p. 117. 
10. Cfr. for instance, Artistotle, who defined time as the 'number of motion 
in respect of "before" and "after"; Aristotle, Physica, 219 . 
11. Galileo, Descartes and Newton introduced the notion of state of motion; 
cfr. Koyré (1965), p. 188 ff. 
12. See sect. 1.4. 
13. Cfr. Sklar (1977), p. 163, 203. 
14. Cfr. Reichenbach (1971), p. 38; genidentity is the same as the physical 
identity of a thing. 
15. Newton (1974), p. 6-7. 
16. op. cit. p. 8. 
17. Cfr. Earman (1970a), p.290. 
18. Einstein (1952), p. 111. 
19. Frank (1909), Cartan (1923), Cartan (1924), Friedrichs (1927), Havas 
(1964), Trautman, "Comparison of Newtonian and relativistic theories of 
spacetime" in Hoffman (1966). Cfr. also Stein (1967). 
20. Weyl (1963), ρ 95. 
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21. op cit ρ 96. 
22. Misner (1973), ρ 291; for the notion of stratification see also J 
Ehlers, "The nature and structure of spacetime", in Mehra (1973) 
23. The expression 'stratified manifold' is used by mathematicians for a 
different type of construction from the one intended by Weyl and Misner. 
24. For the interested reader, these are given in appendix I (p. 109), 
together with a discussion of a foliation in case the manifold in ques­
tion is a spacetime manifold. 
25. Cfr. Misner (1973), p. 253: knowledge of the geodesies implies knowledge 
of the covariant derivative which in turns implies knowledge of the con­
nection coefficients 
26. Cfr. Misner (1973), ch. 12. 
27. See appendix II, p. 110 
28. Grossly, a fiber bundle structure is a generalisation of the more simple 
direct product structure of two spaces For an elementary description of 
a fibre bundle and its relation to space and time and spacetime, see 
Trautman, "Theory of gravitation", in Mehra (1973). 
29. Havas (1964), p. 943, Havas gives a third reason which concerns the fact 
that in a generally covariant formulation of Newtonian mechanics, para­
meter time and coordinate time are in general no longer equal in value. 
This can be seen as follows: to achieve the most general covariant for­
mulation of Newtonian mechanics, Havas has to admit the largest class of 
allowable coordinate transformations which leaves absolute simultaneity 
intact. This class consists of reparametnsations of coordinate time 
(cfr. p. 953). But a reparametnsation of coordinate time does not, of 
course, change the parametrisation of a wordline by its proper time; 
this parametrisation is given once and for all. Therefore, parameter time 
and coordinate time are no longer equal in value in the most general 
covariant formulation of Newtonian mechanics (cfr. p.954, equation 118N). 
30. Cfr. Trautman in Hoffman (1966), p.416. 
31. A. Einstein, "Autobiographical notes", in Schlipp (1969), p. 53. 
32. Minkowski, "Space and time", in Einstein (1952), ρ 75. 
33. Graves (1971), p. 137. 
34. ibidem. 
35. Einstein (1954), p. 56. 
36. op. cit. p. 57. 
37. The problem of determinism itself is extremely complicated; here I am 
only interested in the way determinism is connected with the special 
theory of relativity. 
38. Cfr. Rietdijk (1966), and Putnam (1967). 
39. Cfr. McCall (1967), p. 341. 
40. The problem discussed here, should not be confused with the longstanding 
problem whether or not time exists without change; for an analysis of 
that problem see, for instance, Schoemaker (1969) 
41. Cfr., for instance, F. Christensen, "The theory of space-like time", 
in Fraser (1978), and Christensen (1981). For the opposite question 
(can space be timelike9), cfr. Webb (1977). Bergson has strongly objected 
against the tendency to treat time like space, cfr. Bergson (1944). 
42. Heisenberg (1927), p. 172. 
43. Cfr. von Neumann (1955), p. 354. 
44. Cfr. Dirac (1926). 
45. Cfr., for instance, Rankin (1965) and Prigogine (1980). At first sight, 
Heisenberg's uncertainty relations suggest that space and time are 
treated in the same way in non-relativistic quantum mechanics: 
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A closer analysis reveals that this is not the case. The uncertainty 
relation between χ and ρ (у and ρ etc.) is based upon the fact that the 
operators χ and ρ (у and ρ etc") do not commute (cfr. Jammer (1974), 
p.71 ff). Since, however, in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, 
time is not an operator, but is treated as a parameter, there can be no 
commutator between time and the energy operator H. Hence, the difference 
in derivation and interpretation of the uncertainty relations between 
position and impulse and between time and energy (Cfr. Landau (1974), 
p. 158). 
See, for instance, Sakurai (1973), ch. 3. 
Cfr. Jammer (1974). 
Lautman (1977), p. 257. 
op. cit. p. 272. 
op. cit. p. 266. 
op. cit. p. 266 ff. 
op. cit. p. 260. 
op. cit. p. 259-61. 
Scheurer (1977), p. 166. 
Op. cit., p. 160. 
Scheurer (1973), p. 35. 
Scheurer (1977), p. 163. 
Op. cit., p. 164. 
Op. cit., p. 165. 
Reichenbach (1957), p. 110-2. 
op. cit. p. 110. 
op. cit. p. 112. 
op. cit. p. 110. 
Cfr, for instance, Hanson (1958) and Popper (1972). 
Earman (1970). 
loc. cit. p. 261. 
loc. cit. p. 274. 
Definition following lyanaga (1977), p. 359. 
Earman (1970), p. 276-277. 
Ch. Ill 
1. Feynman (1973), p.108. 
2. Op. cit. , p.lll. 
3. The expression 'the direction of time' has become famous through Reichen-
bach (1971). 
4. Kuhn (1970), p.10 ff. 
5. Stueckelberg (1974), p.18. 
6. Grunbaum (1971); p. 197 ff. 
7. Davies (1977). 
8. Op. cit., p.3-4, p.22. 
9. I am aware that the expression 'flow of time' is not without problems; 
however, I do not know what is to be gained by replacing it by Grunbaum's 
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'temporal becoming' which is also problematic (is there a non-temporal 
becoming?). Therefore, I will keep on using the expression 'flow of time', 
which is, moreover, part of physical discourse since Newton who speaks of 
'the flow of absolute time' (Newton (1974), p.6). 
10. Davies (1977), p.3-4. 
11. Op. cit., p.22. 
12. Op. cit., p.3. 
13. Op. cit., p.34. 
14. Op. cit., p.34. 
15. Op. cit. , p.3. 
16. Grunbaum (1971), p. 200-1. 
17. Grunbaum (1973), p. 210-1. 
18. It is not always possible to draw a clear boundary line between de facto 
and nomologically irreversible processes (for instance, in cosmology); 
cfr. Grunbaum (1973), p. 211. 
19. Reichenbach (1971), p. 134 and passim. 
20. Cfr. Schlipp (1974), p. 67, and Bunge (1967), p.423 ff. 
21. Several proposals for the specific nature of these boundary conditions 
have been put forward in the course of time, such as i) the fact that the 
initial state of the universe had a relatively low entropy, n ) the dis­
symmetry between matter and antimatter, i n ) the expansion of the uni­
verse, and iv) Reichenbach's branch systems hypothesis. The last one will 
be discussed extensively in Ch. IV. 
22. Cfr. Weinberg (1978). 
23. Op. cit., p. 107. 
24. Davies (1977), p.4 
25. Sklar (1977), p. 367. 
26. Sakurai (1973), p. 173. 
27. Davies (1977), p.26. 
28. If m, in analogy to e, is considered to be a 'charge', then the cases 
T(e) = e and T(m) = m could be subsumed under the general rule that Τ 
does not affect the sign of charges. 
29. Cfr. Reichenbach (1971), p. 264 ff, and the references given there. 
30. Cfr. Scheurer (1970). 
31. Stueckelberg (1974). in order to recover the time reversal non invariance 
of the second law, he adds to the second law a principle of evolution 
(see also ch. IV). 
32. Cfr. Davies (1977), ρ 155-6. 
33 Reichenbach (1971), p. 108 ff. 
34 See Davies (1977), p. 176 and Bunge (1968), p. 380-1. 
35. Cfr. Sklar (1977), p. 370. 
36. Cfr . , C h n s t e n s o n (1964). 
37. Overseth (1969) p . 93 and p . 101. 
38. See p . 37-38. 
39. Earman (1974) and Earman (1972a); Earmans's position has been severely 
criticised by Grunbaum (1973), p. 788 ff. 
40. Grunbaum (1973), p. 790. 
41. See p. 128, the example of the two pictures of the system 'blue ink with 
water'. 
42. Matthews (1979), p. 91-2. See also p.122. 
43. Matthews (1979), p. 92. 
44. Even if the cosmologica! principle is valid, then it is still possible 
that, due to local density fluctuations, irregularities arise, Cfr. 
Layzer (1971). 
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45. Matthews (1979), p. 88. 
46. For the definition of global time asymmetries (global in the topological 
sense) see Matthews (1979). 
Ch. IV 
1. Cfr. Penrose, "Singularities and time-asymmetry", in Hawking (1979). 
2. See p. 140-2. 
3. Cfr. Penrose, ref. 1, p. 583. 
4. For more details, cfr. for instance Davies (1977), ch. 6, and Jammer 
(1974), ch. 11. 
5. Cfr. Davies (1977), ch. 5. 
6. Penrose, ref. 1, p. 591. 
7. See. p. 123-5. 
8. Cfr. Davies (1977), p. 97-102. 
9. Cfr. Penrose, ref. 1, p. 600-11. 
10. The implications of various cosmologica! models for the problem of time 
asymmetry are extensively discussed in Davies (1977). 
11. See p. Ill (the quotation of Feynman). 
12 See p. 138-40. 
13. Feynman (1973), p. 112. 
14. op. cit. p. 113. 
15. op. cit. p. 112. 
16. At least in its standard conception; cfr. p. 137. 
17. Within a phenomenological or macroscopic description it is assumed that a 
system can be characterised by 'macroscopic observables' like temperature 
and pressure, which physical quantities can be specified by definite ex-
perimental procedures, this is only possible if the systems under con-
sideration are sufficiently large, so that fluctuations are not signifi-
cant and can be neglected. 
18. In the following I shall consider the relation between the second law 
and classical mechanics; the problem does not substantially change when 
classical mechanics is substituted by relativistic or quantum mechanics. 
The significant feature these different mechanics have in common, is that 
their laws or principles are all time reversal invariant. 
19. Boltzmann (1896) and Boltzmann (1898). 
20. Reichenbach (1971). 
21. Grunbaum (1973). 
22. Cfr. Kuhn (1978), p.23-5. 
23. Stueckelberg (1974). 
24. Prigogine (1980). 
25. Notions like 'research program' and 'hard core' are taken from Lakatos 
(1978); roughly, a research program consists of (i) a hard core of theo-
ries which are assumed to be irrefutable, and (n) a positive heuristic 
which defines the relevant problems and shows the way for constructing 
auxiliary hypotheses to protect the hard core. A research program is said 
to be progressive as long as it succesfully predicts new facts and solves 
theoretical problems, but degenerative as soon as it produces only 'post 
hoc' and 'ad hoc' explanations. In the following I shall use these 
notions in a rather loose sense; it was not my intention to produce here 
a 'rational reconstruction' of the historical development of the problem 
of thermodynamical time asymmetry. 
26. In the following, I heavily draw upon Davies (1977). 
27. Boltzmann (1896), p. 20-1. 
28. Davies (1977), p.38. 
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29. op cit. p.57 
30 op. cit p.38 
31. Boltrmarm (1896), ρ 21. 
32. Cfr. Davies (1977), ρ 42. 
33. Cfr. Kuhn (1978), p.44. 
34. Cfr. Davies (1977), ρ 56 and the references given there. 
35. See Davies (1977), p.58. 
36. For a derivation of the statistical H-theorem and the role of the 
ergodic hypothesis, see Davies (1977), p. 63 ff. 
37. Davies (1977), p. 65. 
38. In most discussions of thermodynamic time asymmetry, the Boltzmann 
entropy plays a dominant role It should however be noted that besides 
this Boltzmann entropy, other entropy concepts have been introduced; for 
instance, the coarse grained Gibbsian entropy. The latter type of entropy 
differs strongly from the Boltzmann entropy because its value does not 
depend upon the actual behaviour of the gas as for the Boltzmann entropy, 
but instead only depends upon the constraints imposed upon the gas (Cfr. 
Sklar (1977), p. 393). In the following, I shall refer to the Boltzmann 
entropy of a gas simply as the entropy of a gas. 
39. See also later on p. 194-6. 
40. Cfr Davies (1977), ρ 67. 
41. For the reason that small fluctuations from equilibrium occur much more 
frequently than large ones; cfr. Davies (1977), p.70, Grunbaum (1973), p. 
257-8, and Sklar (1977), p.387. If these fluctuations are characterised 
by their maximum depth, then they have a Gaussian distribution; cfr. 
Scott (1967), p. 28 and the references given there 23 
42. For macroscopic systems Τ is of the order of 10 1 0 sec; cfr. Davies 
(1977), p. 56. 
43. Cfr. for instance, Earman (1974), p. 38. 
44. Cfr. for instance, Layzer (1972) and Layzer (1975). 
45. For the notion of coarse graining, see any textbook on statistical 
mechanics. 
46. Cfr. Davies (1977), p. 49 ff. 
47. Grunbaum has extensively discussed this problem; cfr. Grunbaum (1973) 
Ch. 19, "Is the coars-grained entropy of classical statistical mechanics 
an anthropomorphism9". 
48. Cfr. Layzer (1972), p. 281. 
49. Later on, a third kind of interaction, encountered in "dissipative struc­
tures" will be discussed. 
50. Cfr. Reichenbach (1971), p.118. 
51. Ibidem. 
52. Davies (1977), p. 75. 
53. Cfr. Layzer (1975),p.66. 
54. Reichenbach (1971), passim. 
55. Grunbaum (1973), ρ 209 ff. 
56. Reichenbach (1971), p.118. 
57. Note that with respect to the statistical time asymmetric behaviour of 
ensembles of branch systems, it is of importance that the branch systems 
exist only for a short span of time (short relatively to the Poincaré 
recurrence time). If the lifetime of these systems would be of the order 
of the Poincaré recurrence time, then the effect of their initial low 
entropy states would disappear due to subsequent large deviations from 
equilibrium; in that case, their behaviour would again be symmetrie in 
time. Cfr. Reichenbach (1971),p. 121 (inequality (6) holds only for small 
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59. 
60. 
61. 
62 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
for small time intervals ) and p. 126-7; cfr. also 
p. 135 ff. 
of these boundary conditions, see 
i, in other words, 
Davies (1977), ρ 78. 
Reichenbach (1971), 
op. cit. p. 127. 
op. cit. p. 131. 
op. cit. p. 127. 
op. cit. p. 127. 
Crunbaum (1973), p. 261-2. 
op.cit. p. 261. 
For a more detailed formulation 
Reichenbach (1971), p. 136. 
See p. 194-6. 
Stueckelberg (1974). 
Prigogine (1980). 
The basic ideas underlying Stueckelberg's approach are not always expli­
citly stated in this book; the following exposition is based upon many 
discussions with P.B. Scheurer who is co-author of the book. 
Stueckelberg (1974), p. 9. 
op. cit. p. 10 
Cfr. also Weyl (1963), 
Stueckelberg (1974), p. 
p. 205-206. 
10. 
28. Op. cit. p. 11, 19-20, 
Op. cit. p. 28. 
Op. cit. p. 29. 
Op. cit. p. 25 ff. 
Op. cit. p. 23. 
Op. cit. p. 24. 
Op. cit. p. 43 and p. 32-33. 
Op. cit. p. 33. 
Cfr. op. cit. p. 33-6. 
The condition of maximum entropy implies that for a system in equilibrium 
the first variation of entropy must be zero and that the second variation 
must be negative. From these conditions, it can be derived that mass and 
the constant of elasticity must have the same sign as absolute tempera­
ture. See op. cit. p. 32-3 and ρ 35. 
Op. cit. p. 33 and p. 106. 
Prigogine (1980), p. 3. 
Op. 
Op. 
Op. 
Op. 
Cfr 
cit. 
cit. 
cit. 
cit. 
op. 
13. 
12. 
12-3. 
XIII. 
cit. p. 29 and 33. 
Figure taken from Prigogine (1980), p. 36. 
The Liouville operators corresponding to these various categories have 
different spectral properties: "mixing implies that L has no discrete 
eigenvalues other than zero, and K-flow implies that all eigenvalues of 
L have the same multiplicity." op. cit. p. 188, cfr. also p. 37. 
41. 9 3 . 
9 4 . 
9 5 . 
9 6 . 
9 7 . 
9 8 . 
9 9 . 
Cfr. op. 
Op. c i t . 
Op. c i t . 
Op. c i t . 
ibidem. 
Cfr. op. 
Cfr. op 
c i t . p . ' 
p. 43. 
p . 43 ff 
p . 44. 
c i t . p . 
. c i t . ρ 208. 
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100. Cfr. op. cit p. 44 and 207-8. 
101. Cfr. op. cit. p. 25. 
102. Cfr. op. cit. p. 171 ff. 
103. op. cit. p. 157-8. 
104. Cfr. op. cit. p. 158 and 207; for a different interpretation of the use 
of operators see Scheurer (1981). 
105. Cfr. op cit. p. 174. 
106. op. cit. p. 174-5. 
107. op. cit. p. 196-7. 
108. Cfr. op. cit. p. 176. 
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Samenvatting. 
Een onderzoek naar de structuur van de fysische tijd. 
In de fysica wordt de tijd gewoonlijk voorgesteld door een 
variablele t met als domein een verzameling U, waarvan de elemen-
ten corresponderen met de momenten van de fysische tijd. Dit 
domein U bezit bovendien een bepaalde structuur: de momenten 
van de tijd zijn geordendj hebben bepaalde topologische eigen-
schappen, en door een metriek is het mogelijk de lengte van tijds-
intervallen met elkaar te vergelijken. De standaard opvatting 
van de structuur van de fysische tijd is die van een Euclidische 
lijn. Deze structuur wordt, zo dit al expliciet gebeurt, meestal 
beargumenteerd op intuïtieve gronden: de tijd is continu omdat 
tijdsintervallen oneindig deelbaar· zijn en één-dimensionaal omdat 
de momenten van de tijd lineair geordend zijn, etc. 
In dit proefschrift wordt op de volgende aspecten van de fysi-
sche tijd nader ingegaan: i) de structuur van de tijd en de daar-
mee verbonden epistemologische problemen, ii) de geometrische rol 
van de tijd in de tijd en ruimte en de tijdruimte beschrijving 
van de fysische werkelijkheid, en iii) het probleem van tijd-
asymmetrie, beter bekend als het probleem van de richting van de 
tijd. 
In Hfdst. I wordt allereerst ingegaan op de vraag of het nog 
wel zinvol is te spreken van 'tijd' binnen een tijdruimtelijke 
beschrijving van de fysische werkelijkheid, en zo ja, hoe dan de 
eigenschappen van de tijd kunnen worden afgeleid uit de structuur 
van de tijdruimte. In het algemeen kan een tijdruimte niet op 
universele, d.w.z. voor alle waarnemers dezelfde wijze in tijd 
en ruimte worden opgesplitst; toch laat de locale structuur van de 
tijdruimte toe dat het begrip 'tijd' op zinvolle wijze kan worden 
gebruikt. Problemen doen zich vooral voor bij de globale structuur 
van de tijd aangezien er geen eenduidige methode ter bepaling van 
de globale eigenschappen van de tijd voorhanden is. 
Achtereenvolgens worden de ordenings-, de topologische en de 
metrische structuur nader bestudeerd, waarbij de essentiële ver-
schillen tussen Newton's absolute tijd en Einstein's relatieve 
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tijd worden uiteengezet. Ieder van deze structuren roept specifieke 
epistemologische problemen op; enkele daarvan worden nader uitge-
werkt, zoals de relatie tussen temporele en causale ordening, de 
vraag of de fysische tijd discreet dan wel continu is, en het 
probleem van de 'eenheid van de tijd', waarbij de vraag of er 
één unieke metriek voor de tijd bestaat, centraal staat. 
In Hfdst. II wordt het onderscheid tussen parameter en coördi-
naat tijd geïntroduceerd. Een analyse van het standaard schema 
voor de beschrijving van de beweging van een puntmassa toont dat 
de tijd geometrisch op twee manieren kan functioneren, nl. als 
parameter en als coördinaat. Het verschil tussen beide functies 
van de tijd wordt bestudeerd aan de hand van een vergelijking 
van de 'tijd en ruimte' en de 'tijdruimte' beschrijving van de 
werkelijkheid. In de tijd en ruimte beschrijving functioneert 
tijd als een parameter , terwijl in de tijdruimte beschrijving 
tijd een dubbelrol vervult, nl. als parameter en als coördinaat. 
Zowel de speciale relativiteitstheorie als de klassieke mechanica 
kunnen in beide 'talen' worden geformuleerd. In het algemeen kan 
men stellen dat een overgang van de tijd en ruimte naar de tijd-
ruimte beschrijving altijd mogelijk is maar dat het omgekeerde 
slechts mogelijk is wanneer de betreffende tijdruimte een fysisch 
relevante foliatie toelaat. 
Voor Reichenbach was de introductie van tijd als een coördi-
naat in de relativiteitstheorie slechts een mathematisch hulp-
middel, alleen relevant voor de mathematische fysica maar niet 
voor de studie van de tijd. Hier wordt stelling genomen tegen 
deze opvatting. Aan de hand van een aantal concrete voorbeelden, 
zoals het probleem van het aantal dimensies van de tijd, van de 
'verruimtelijking' van de tijd, en het onde^scheid tussen de 
stroom van de tijd en tijd-asymmetrie, wordt duidelijk gemaakt 
dat het onderscheid tussen parameter en coördinaat tijd kan bijdra-
gen tot een beter inzicht in de fysische tijd. 
In de laatste twee hoofdstukken komt het probleem van de rich-
ting van de tijd aan bod. In Hfdst. III wordt dit probleem opge-
splitst in twee deelproblemen, nl. dat van tijd-asymmetrie en 
dat van de stroom van de tijd, Tijd-asymmetrie verwijst niet naar 
een eigenschap van de tijd zelf, maar naar een eigenschap van de 
processen: er is ruwweg sprake van tijd-asymmetrie wanneer 
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er processen bestaan die niet t.o.ν. beide oriëntaties van de 
tijd voorkomen. Terwijl tijd-asymmetrie niet is gebaseerd op, 
noch verwijst naar de begrippen 'heden', 'verleden' en 'toekomst' 
(maar slechts naar de tegengestelde oriëntaties van de tijd), is 
de stroom van de tijd juist onlosmakelijk met deze begrippen 
verbonden. De stroom van de tijd staat voor de 'beweging' van 
het heden naar de toekomst, waardoor toekomstige gebeurtenissen 
werkelijkheid worden. Dit proefschrift beperkt zich tot tijd-
asymmetrie. 
In Hfdst. III wordt vervolgens een definitie van tijd-asymme-
trie voorgesteld die, in afwijking van wat gebruikelijk is, tijd-
asymmetrie niet noodzakelijk aan de onomkeerbaarheid van proces-
sen koppelt. Voor- en na'delen van de aan deze definitie ten 
grondslag liggende opvatting van tijd-asymmetrie worden besproken. 
Als aanvulling op deze definitie volgt een bestudering van de 
relatie tussen een proces A, en het daarvan in de tijd omgekeer-
г г 
de proces А ; fysisch gezien is de bepaling van А , gegeven A, 
niet altijd een eenvoudige zaak. De tijdsomkeer operator Τ speelt 
hierin een belangrijke rol; de bepaling van A impliceert dat 
de actie van Τ op alle betrokken fysische grootheden bekend moet 
zijn. In het algemeen kan de actie van Τ op fysische grootheden 
op meerdere coherente wijzen worden gedefinieerd. Dit heeft weer 
belangrijke gevolgen voor het al dan niet invariant zijn van 
wetten onder de tijdsomkeer. operator T. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk betreft het tijd-asymmetrisch gedrag 
van thermodynamische systemen: een gesloten systeem niet in equi­
librium, evolueert naar equilibrium, maar het omgekeerde komt 
niet voor. Dit onomkeerbare gedrag van thermodynamische systemen 
is vervat in de tweede hoofdwet van de fenomenologische thermo­
dynamica: de entropy van een gesloten systeem neemt toe of blijft 
gelijk, maar neemt nooit af. Twee tegengestelde visies op de oor­
sprong van deze thermodynamische tijd-asymmetrie worden hier 
uiteengezet en met elkaar vergeleken; de controverse tussen beide 
draait om de relatie tussen de tweede hoofdwet, die niet invariant 
is onder tijdsomkeer, en de wetten van de (klassieke) mechanica, 
die wel invariant zijn onder tijdsomkeer. In de standaard opvat­
ting (het 'mechanische programma') wordt thermodynamische tijd-
asymmetrie gezien als het gevolg van bepaalde feitelijke omstan-
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digheden, i.e., van de facto geldende randvoorwaarden in het 
universum. De oorsprong ervan is dus niet te vinden in de funda-
mentele wetten van de fysica. Volgens deze opvatting moet de 
tweede hoofdwet, die niet verenigbaar is met de wetten van de 
mechanica, vervangen worden door het zgn. 'statistisch mechani-
sche H-theorema'. De aaaraan tegengestelde visie (net 'thermody-
namische programma') stelt dat de tweede hoofdwet even fundamen-
teel is als de wetten van de (klassieke) mechanica. Aangezien 
echter beide niet met elkaar te verenigen zijn, moet de toepas-
baarheid van de mechanische beschrijvingswij ze op de een of andere 
manier worden ingeperkt of worden ingebed in een omvangrijker 
formalisme zonder dat onder deze reconstructie van de mechanica 
het gehele bouwwerk van de theoretische fysica ineenstort. 
Hier is niet gestreefd naar een évaluer:!ng van beide program-
mas, maar naar een verkenning van de conceptuele kloof tussen hen. 
Een van de meest significante verschilden betreft het onder-
scheid tussen omkeerbare en onomkeerbare processen. Volgens de 
mechanische opvatting is dit onderscheid een kwestie van waar-
schijnlijkheden en is er derhalve geen scherpe grenslijn tussen 
omkeerbare en onomkeerbare processen, terwijl volgens de thermo-
dynamische opvatting de tweede hoofdwet een strikt onderscheid 
tussen beide soorten van processen toelaat. Aangetoond wordt 
dat i) de kritiek op het mechanische programma van de zijde 
van Prigogine die onder meer stelt dat in de mechanische visie 
de thermodynamische tijd-asymmetrie gereduceerd wordt tot een 
benadering of een illusie, niet gerechtvaardigd is, en dat ii) 
de meest uitgewerkte versie van het mechanische programma, nl. 
Reichenbach's theorie van de vertakkingssystemen, geen afdoende 
oplossing voor het probleem van de thermodynamische tijd-
asymmetrie biedt. 
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STELLINGEN 
I 
Het beëindigen van de verdediging van een proefschrift met de uitroep 'hora est', is symptomatisch 
voor 'chronarchie'. 
Cfr. L. Wright, Clockwork Man, 
Elek, London, 1968, p. 7. 
Il 
Het gebruik van chronarchische apparaten, zoals prikklokken, is gebaseerd op het principe 'tijd is 
geld'. 
I l l 
Gezien de vaak gehoorde constatering dat op hogere leeftijd de jaren 'sneller' verstrijken, kan men 
stellen dat niet alleen geld maar ook ti jd aan inflatie onderhevig is. 
IV 
Indien veiligheid wordt geïnterpreteerd in termen van aanvaardbaar risico, dan volgt daaruit dat het 
vaststellen van het al dan niet veilig zijn van kerncentrales niet enkel een zaak is voor deskundigen. 
V 
Stellingen bij proefschriften zijn niet het meest geschikte forum voor een politieke stellingname. 
VI 
Forman's stelling dat de anti-causale houding in Weimar - Duitsland een belangrijke rol heeft ge-
speeld bij de totstandkoming van de acausale quantum mechanica is niet houdbaar. 
Cfr. P. Forman, "Weimar culture, 
causality, and quantum theory, 
1918-1927,...", Historical studies 
in the physical sciences, vol. 3 
(1971), 1-115. 



